Mohammed Islam v. Loretta Lynch

Ninth Circuit

Mohammed Islam v. Loretta Lynch

667 F. App'x 918

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 1, 2016

Docket15-73798

StatusUnpublished

This text of 667 F. App'x 918 (Mohammed Islam v. Loretta Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Mohammed Islam v. Loretta Lynch, 667 F. App'x 918 (9th Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Mohammed S Islam, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

We do not consider the material attached to the opening brief that is not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. I.N.S., 79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that, even if Islam testified credibly, the harm he experienced did not rise to the level of persecution. See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1059-60 (petitioner failed to establish past persecution where he was *919 beaten and robbed on two occasions and accosted by a mob). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Islam did not establish it would be unreasonable for him to relocate. See Gomes v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 2005) (lack of persecution after relocation supported finding that petitioners could relocate again safely). Thus, we deny the petition for review with respect to Islam’s claim for asylum.

Because Islam failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he necessarily cannot meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because Islam failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government of Bangladesh if returned. See Go v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011) (credible testimony and country reports describing generalized evidence of mistreatment did not compel reversal of agency’s denial of CAT).

Finally, Islam’s challenges to his continued detention and the agency’s denial of bond are not properly before us. See Leonardo v. Cranford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing procedure for challenging agency’s bond determinations).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Mohammed S Islam, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

We do not consider the material attached to the opening brief that is not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. I.N.S., 79 F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that, even if Islam testified credibly, the harm he experienced did not rise to the level of persecution. See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1059-60 (petitioner failed to establish past persecution where he was *919 beaten and robbed on two occasions and accosted by a mob). Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Islam did not establish it would be unreasonable for him to relocate. See Gomes v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 2005) (lack of persecution after relocation supported finding that petitioners could relocate again safely). Thus, we deny the petition for review with respect to Islam’s claim for asylum.

Because Islam failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he necessarily cannot meet the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because Islam failed to show it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government of Bangladesh if returned. See Go v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2011) (credible testimony and country reports describing generalized evidence of mistreatment did not compel reversal of agency’s denial of CAT).

Finally, Islam’s challenges to his continued detention and the agency’s denial of bond are not properly before us. See Leonardo v. Cranford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing procedure for challenging agency’s bond determinations).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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667 F. App'x 918, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mohammed-islam-v-loretta-lynch-ca9-2016.

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