Mohammad Muzamil Yousufi v. Cammilla Wamsley, et al.
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Opinion
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3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 MOHAMMAD MUZAMIL YOUSUFI, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02098-JNW-MLP 8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY 9 RESTRAINING ORDER v. 10 CAMMILLA WAMSLEY, et al., 11 Respondent. 12 13 1. INTRODUCTION 14 This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Mohammad Muzamil 15 Yousufi’s motion for a temporary restraining order. Dkt. No. 2. The Court ordered 16 Respondents to file an opposition to the motion by November 18, 2025, Dkt. No. 5, 17 but they filed a Return on the merits of the habeas petition instead, Dkt. No. 7, and 18 did not oppose the TRO motion. For the reasons discussed below, the Court 19 GRANTS the motion. 20 2. BACKGROUND 21 On October 24, 2025, Respondents notified Yousufi that they intended to 22 remove him to Mexico. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. That same day, Yousufi petitioned for a writ 23 1 of habeas corpus, alleging that his planned removal to Mexico—a country different 2 from the one designated in his final removal order—is unlawful because
3 Respondents failed to provide him meaningful notice or opportunity to invoke his 4 statutory protections against removal to a country where he may face persecution or 5 torture. See Dkt. No. 1. 6 About a week later, Yousufi filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, 7 alleging that he “now faces imminent removal from the U.S. to a dangerous third 8 country – purportedly Mexico, possibly Uganda, Libya, Senegal, or El Salvador….”
9 Dkt. No. 2 at 2–3 (emphasis added). This Court issued a provisional TRO “to 10 preserve the Court’s jurisdiction and to maintain the status quo” while it awaited 11 Respondents’ response, if any, to Yousufi’s TRO motion. Dkt. No. 3 at 2–3. The 12 Court later ordered Respondents to file their opposition “if any, to [Yousufi’s] motion 13 by November 18, 2025.” Dkt. No. 5 at 2. Rather than file an opposition against 14 Yousufi’s TRO motion, Respondents filed a return memorandum, noted for 15 December 16, 2025, contesting Yousufi’s habeas petition. Dkt. No. 7.
16 Respondents’ return argues against permanent injunctive relief but does not 17 address Yousufi’s TRO motion or the applicable Winter factors. 18 3. DISCUSSION 19 3.1 The Legal Standard. “[I]f a party fails to file papers in opposition to a motion, such failure may be 20 considered by the court as an admission that the motion has merit.” LCR 7(b)(2). 21 The standard for issuing a TRO is the same as the standard for issuing a 22 preliminary injunction. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 23 1 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977). A TRO is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be 2 awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v.
3 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “The proper legal standard for 4 preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate (1) ‘that he is likely to 5 succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 6 of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) that an 7 injunction is in the public interest.’” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 8 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). These four factors—the Winter
9 factors—apply whenever a preliminary injunction is sought. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; 10 see All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (“a 11 showing on all four prongs” is required). 12 The Ninth Circuit takes a “sliding scale” approach to preliminary relief, 13 under which “serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that 14 tips sharply towards the plaintiffs can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, 15 so long as the plaintiffs also show that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and
16 that the injunction is in the public interest.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs 17 Enf’t, 16 F.4th 613, 635 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). This approach allows a 18 stronger showing of one Winter factor to offset a weaker showing of another. 19 Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Hawaii, Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky v. Labrador, 20 122 F.4th 825, 843–44 (9th Cir. 2024). 21
22 23 1 3.2 The Winter factors support a TRO. Yousufi raises serious questions going to the merits of his habeas petition. He 2 alleges that Respondents notified him of their intent to deport him to Mexico. He 3 also alleges that a DHS officer handed him a written Notice of Removal to Mexico 4 that provided no specific information about when he would be removed and no 5 means to assert his rights under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Dkt. No. 1 6 at 2–4. Respondents did not oppose the TRO motion or dispute these allegations. 7 The Court thus credits Yousufi’s allegations and finds they raise serious questions 8 about whether Respondents have violated his due process and statutory rights by 9 attempting third-country removal without providing him adequate notice and an 10 opportunity to seek CAT protections. 11 The second Winter factor—irreparable harm—tips sharply in favor of a TRO. 12 While the burden of removal alone does not “constitute the requisite irreparable 13 injury,” Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation modified), 14 Yousufi argues that removal to Mexico would cause him irreparable harm given his 15 severe PTSD, his lack of resources in the country, his lack of ability to speak the 16 local language, and the criminal danger targeting people removed from the United 17 States to Mexico. Dkt. No. 1 at 3. And removal in the face of physical danger 18 without a meaningful opportunity to seek CAT protections would itself constitute 19 irreparable harm. Id. 20 The final two Winter factors merge when the Government is a party. Padilla 21 v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 953 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020). These factors also 22 tip sharply in Yousufi’s favor. The TRO imposes little to no burden on Respondents. 23 1 Respondents remain free to carry out their non-discretionary statutory duties in 2 third-country removal proceedings. On the other hand, absent a TRO, Yousufi will
3 potentially face life-changing and irreparable harm. 4 4. CONCLUSION 5 In sum, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining 6 order. Dkt. No. 2. Respondents and all their officers, agents, servants, employees, 7 attorneys, and persons acting on their behalf, in concert or in participation with 8 them are immediately ENJOINED from removing or deporting Petitioner to any
9 third country in the world without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard 10 in reopened removal proceedings with a hearing before an immigration judge. 11 Respondents have filed a Return on the merits of the habeas petition, Dkt. 12 No. 7, and the petition will be ripe for decision on December 16, 2025. Because the 13 Court will soon decide the merits of this case, the TRO will remain in effect pending 14 resolution of the habeas petition. 15 Dated this 21st day of November, 2025.
16 a Jamal N. Whitehead 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23
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