Mohamed v. Anatolia Units 1 CA3

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 25, 2014
DocketC073868
StatusUnpublished

This text of Mohamed v. Anatolia Units 1 CA3 (Mohamed v. Anatolia Units 1 CA3) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mohamed v. Anatolia Units 1 CA3, (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

Filed 6/25/14 Mohamed v. Anatolia Units 1 et al. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ----

JOSEPH MOHAMED, SR., C073868

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 34201200117582CUBCGDS) v.

ANATOLIA UNITS 1, 2 AND 4 MASTER ASSOCIATION,

Defendant and Respondent.

This action for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment involves the right to use certain recreational facilities, known as The Clubhouse (or club) at Anatolia (the club), at a common interest development in Rancho Cordova known as Anatolia Units 1, 2 and 4 (Anatolia). Plaintiff Joseph Mohamed, who owns 102 vacant lots in Anatolia, contends that the homeowners’ association for the development -- defendant Anatolia Units 1, 2 and 4 Master Association (the association) -- has wrongfully refused to issue him club membership cards for each of his 102 vacant lots.

1 On demurrer, the trial court concluded that Mohamed is not entitled to membership cards for his vacant lots. On Mohamed’s appeal from the judgment of dismissal, we agree. As we will explain, Mohamed is entitled to use the club, but he is not entitled to (nor does he need) a membership card to do so. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We take the following facts from the allegations in Mohamed’s first amended complaint and the attached exhibits: In or about August 2009, Mohamed purchased 106 lots (homesites) in Anatolia. He subsequently developed four of those lots, which he uses as rental properties. The remaining 102 lots are undeveloped. Under the master declaration of establishment of conditions, covenants and restrictions for Anatolia units 1, 2 and 4 (the CC&R’s), all owners of homesites and condominiums in Anatolia are members of the club. Under the CC&Rs, the owner of a homesite is the record holder of fee simple title to the homesite. This includes merchant builders, which is anyone who has acquired property within the community to develop and sell to members of the general public. As owner of the 102 vacant lots, Mohamed has been assessed $86 in club charges each month for each lot since he purchased them for mandatory membership in the club and for the right to use the facilities and amenities of the club. Mohamed has requested that the association issue him club membership cards for each of the 102 vacant lots he owns, but the association has refused. As a result of this refusal, in January 2012 Mohamed commenced this action against the association. The association demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. Thereafter, Mohamed filed his amended complaint, setting forth causes of action for declaratory relief, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. Mohamed sought a judicial declaration that he is entitled to a membership card for each of his 102 vacant lots and as to the reasonableness of the association’s

2 interpretation of the CC&R’s under former Civil Code section 1354 (now Civil Code section 5975). Mohamed further claimed that the association’s refusal to issue him 102 club membership cards amounted to a breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The association demurred again, asserting that the CC&R’s do not give Mohamed the right to a club membership card for each of his 102 vacant lots, and that Mohamed failed to show that the CC&R’s were unreasonable. The trial court agreed, concluding that “[t]he CC&Rs do not provide for membership cards for lots owned by plaintiff unless someone is residing on the lot” and that the CC&R’s were not unreasonable. Denying Mohamed further leave to amend, the court entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the association, and Mohamed timely appealed. DISCUSSION This is a strange case. The gist of Mohamed’s complaint is that the association is wrongfully denying him access to the club because the association has refused to issue him a club membership card for each of his vacant lots. The association, however, concedes Mohamed’s right to use the club; the association simply contends that he is not entitled to a membership card for each of his vacant lots. In other words, it is the association’s position that Mohamed has the right to use the club and he does not have to present a membership card to do so. Notwithstanding the association’s concession that he is entitled to use the club without a membership card, Mohamed nonetheless insists that a membership card is an absolute requirement for club use under the rules and regulations for the club (the rules) and thus the association’s refusal to issue him a membership card for each of his vacant lots is tantamount to refusing him access to the club. In light of the parties’ positions, the question on appeal is whether the CC&R’s and/or the rules can be reasonably construed as requiring a merchant builder to have a membership card to exercise his or her right to use the club. If such a construction is reasonable, then it was error for the trial court to rule against Mohamed on demurrer.

3 (See Aragon-Haas v. Family Security Ins. Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 232, 239 [in passing on the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must accept the plaintiff’s construction of a written agreement as long the pleading does not place a clearly erroneous construction on the agreement].) We conclude, however, that Mohamed’s construction of the CC&R’s and the rules is not reasonable. The CC&R’s say nothing about membership cards at all, and while the rules do contain provisions stating that a membership card is necessary to use the club, we agree with the association that those provisions were not intended to apply to merchant builders like Mohamed, who are thus entitled to use the club even without a membership card. We begin our analysis by setting forth the governing legal principles. “The CC&R’s are interpreted according to the standard canons for interpreting written instruments.” (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1410.) Some of those canons are as follows: “In construing a contract the court should strive to ascertain its object as reflected in the provisions thereof; should be guided by the intention of the parties as disclosed by those provisions [citations]; should endeavor to effect the intention and object thus ascertained [citation]; should adopt that construction which will make the contract reasonable, fair and just [citations]; [and] should avoid an interpretation which will make the contract unusual, extraordinary, harsh, unjust or inequitable . . . .” (Harris v. Klure (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 574, 577-578.) “The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.” (Civ. Code, § 1641.) While “the language of the agreement, if clear and explicit and not conducive to an absurd result, must govern its interpretation,” “this does not mean that a portion only of a written instrument, although it is clear and explicit, may be selected as furnishing conclusive evidence of the intentions of the parties.” (Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. etc. Mfg. Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 751, 760.) “The character of a contract is not to be determined by isolating any single clause . . . .” (Transportation Guar. Co. v. Jellins (1946) 29

4 Cal.2d 242, 247.) If it is impossible to give effect to all the provisions in an agreement, “ ‘an interpretation which gives effect to the main apparent purpose of the contract will be favored.’ ” (McNeil v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Manufacturing Co.
128 P.2d 665 (California Supreme Court, 1942)
McNeil v. Graner
206 P.2d 38 (California Court of Appeal, 1949)
March v. Pantaleo
48 P.2d 29 (California Supreme Court, 1935)
Aragon-Haas v. Family Security Insurance Services
231 Cal. App. 3d 232 (California Court of Appeal, 1991)
General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly
258 Cal. App. 2d 465 (California Court of Appeal, 1968)
Harris v. Klure
205 Cal. App. 2d 574 (California Court of Appeal, 1962)
14859 Moorpark Homeowner's Assn. v. Vrt Corp.
63 Cal. App. 4th 1396 (California Court of Appeal, 1998)
Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin
53 Cal. App. 4th 445 (California Court of Appeal, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Mohamed v. Anatolia Units 1 CA3, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mohamed-v-anatolia-units-1-ca3-calctapp-2014.