UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 MOHAMED ABDALLA MAHMOUD, Case No. 3:25-cv-00040-ART-CLB 3 Plaintiff, ORDER REOPENING CASE 4 v.
5 HOLZ JEFFERY, et al.,
6 Defendants.
7 8 Plaintiff Mohamed Abdalla Mahmoud, who is in the custody of the Nevada 9 Department of Corrections, brought this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 10 1983. The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, found 11 some colorable claims, and granted Plaintiff leave to file an optional amended 12 complaint curing the deficiencies of other claims. (ECF No. 6.) About two weeks 13 later, Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss this case without prejudice (ECF No. 7), 14 which took effect upon filing under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) 15 because no answer or motion for summary judgment had been filed. The Court 16 entered an order acknowledging the voluntary dismissal and closing the case. 17 (ECF No. 8.) About two months later, Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen this case 18 under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 “and any other applicable rules the Court deem[s] 19 properly appropriate.” (ECF No. 10 at 4.) 20 The Court now construes this motion to seek relief under Federal Rule of 21 Civil Procedure 60(b), grants the motion, and reopens the case. This ruling 22 returns the case to the posture it was in at the time of voluntary dismissal, 23 meaning that Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this order to file an optional 24 amended complaint. Otherwise, this case will proceed immediately on the 25 colorable claims found in the Court’s screening order. (See ECF No. 6.) 26 27 1 DISCUSSION 2 Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512 is a federal criminal statute that does not provide a 3 basis to reopen a civil case. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 4 permits a court to relieve a party “from a final judgment, order, or proceedings” 5 in certain circumstances. And the Supreme Court recently held that a voluntary 6 dismissal under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” and thus allows for the 7 possibility of relief under Rule 60(b). Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 8 604 U.S. 305, 307, 311–12 (2025). Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court 9 liberally construes his motion to reopen as seeking relief under Rule 60(b). 10 Plaintiff requests to reopen this case because, at the time of his voluntary 11 dismissal, he was in the infirmary or on suicide watch being subjected to 12 misconduct by staff. (See ECF No. 10 at 1–4.) Plaintiff supports this assertion 13 with his own sworn declaration. (Id. at 6–7.) And Plaintiff argues that, if he is 14 forced to refile this case anew rather than reopen it, then his claims may be 15 barred by the two-year statute of limitations. (Id. at 3–4.) The Court finds these 16 arguments to be properly addressed under Rule 60(b)(6). 17 Courts “use Rule 60(b)(6) ‘sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 18 manifest injustice.’” Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 19 United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 20 1993)). Relief is available under Rule 60(b)(6) only where the grounds 21 enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1) through (5) do not apply. See BLOM Bank SAL v. 22 Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 211 (2025); id. at 210 (summarizing these grounds as 23 “mistake or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or the void or 24 prospectively inequitable status of a judgment”). The Court makes no findings 25 regarding the alleged actions of prison staff around the time of Plaintiff’s 26 voluntary dismissal, but for four primary reasons, the Court exercises its 27 discretion to grant Plaintiff relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 1 First, from the substance of Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal motion and 2 subsequent motion to reopen, it appears that Plaintiff was isolated in an 3 infirmary setting suffering from serious physical and/or mental illness at the 4 time of voluntary dismissal. (See ECF No. 7 at 1 (motion to voluntarily dismiss 5 stating that Plaintiff is “suffering serious physical and mental disabilities”); ECF 6 No. 10 at 6 (declaration stating that Plaintiff attempted suicide while he was in 7 the infirmary).) Suffering from serious illness in this manner is one factor that 8 may support relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See BLOM, 605 U.S. at 211–12 9 (discussing Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949), which found a 10 movant entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) where he was unable to defend 11 himself due to being incarcerated, ill, without counsel, and “disturbed and fully 12 occupied in efforts to protect himself against” criminal charges in separate 13 proceedings). 14 Second, Plaintiff was reasonably diligent in moving to reopen this case 15 after his release from an isolated infirmary setting. (See ECF No. at 6 (declaration 16 establishing that Plaintiff filed the motion about a month after leaving “isolation 17 lockdown”)); Fed R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (providing that motions “under Rule 60(b) 18 must be made within a reasonable time”). 19 Third, it appears that Plaintiff’s concern about the statute of limitations 20 may be well-founded, as the colorable claims found in the Court’s screening 21 order are based on alleged events that occurred in 2022 or 2023. (See ECF No. 22 6 at 4–7, 12–13 (due process claim based on alleged 9-month placement in 23 administrative segregation beginning in 2022); id. at 16–23 (conditions of 24 confinement, equal protection, and ADA claims arising from alleged bathroom 25 access issues in 2022); id. at 23–25 (retaliation claim based on alleged events in 26 2022); id. at 32–37 (retaliation, excessive force, and equal protection claims 27 arising from grievances and alleged use of force in March 2023); id. at 38–40 1 (free-exercise and RLUIPA claims based on alleged events in 2022 and 2023)); 2 Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) 3 (explaining that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Nevada is two 4 years). 5 Fourth, the Ninth Circuit has held that a Rule 60(b)(6) movant must 6 “establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances which prevented or 7 rendered him unable to prosecute an appeal.” Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 8 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martella v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 9 Seafarers Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL–CIO, 448 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir. 1971)). And 10 the Ninth Circuit has also held that “a ‘voluntary dismissal without prejudice”— 11 as took effect here—“is ordinarily not a final judgment from which the plaintiff 12 may appeal.’” Galaza v. Wolf, 954 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 13 Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 MOHAMED ABDALLA MAHMOUD, Case No. 3:25-cv-00040-ART-CLB 3 Plaintiff, ORDER REOPENING CASE 4 v.
5 HOLZ JEFFERY, et al.,
6 Defendants.
7 8 Plaintiff Mohamed Abdalla Mahmoud, who is in the custody of the Nevada 9 Department of Corrections, brought this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 10 1983. The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, found 11 some colorable claims, and granted Plaintiff leave to file an optional amended 12 complaint curing the deficiencies of other claims. (ECF No. 6.) About two weeks 13 later, Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss this case without prejudice (ECF No. 7), 14 which took effect upon filing under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) 15 because no answer or motion for summary judgment had been filed. The Court 16 entered an order acknowledging the voluntary dismissal and closing the case. 17 (ECF No. 8.) About two months later, Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen this case 18 under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 “and any other applicable rules the Court deem[s] 19 properly appropriate.” (ECF No. 10 at 4.) 20 The Court now construes this motion to seek relief under Federal Rule of 21 Civil Procedure 60(b), grants the motion, and reopens the case. This ruling 22 returns the case to the posture it was in at the time of voluntary dismissal, 23 meaning that Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this order to file an optional 24 amended complaint. Otherwise, this case will proceed immediately on the 25 colorable claims found in the Court’s screening order. (See ECF No. 6.) 26 27 1 DISCUSSION 2 Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512 is a federal criminal statute that does not provide a 3 basis to reopen a civil case. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 4 permits a court to relieve a party “from a final judgment, order, or proceedings” 5 in certain circumstances. And the Supreme Court recently held that a voluntary 6 dismissal under Rule 41(a) counts as a “final proceeding” and thus allows for the 7 possibility of relief under Rule 60(b). Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 8 604 U.S. 305, 307, 311–12 (2025). Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court 9 liberally construes his motion to reopen as seeking relief under Rule 60(b). 10 Plaintiff requests to reopen this case because, at the time of his voluntary 11 dismissal, he was in the infirmary or on suicide watch being subjected to 12 misconduct by staff. (See ECF No. 10 at 1–4.) Plaintiff supports this assertion 13 with his own sworn declaration. (Id. at 6–7.) And Plaintiff argues that, if he is 14 forced to refile this case anew rather than reopen it, then his claims may be 15 barred by the two-year statute of limitations. (Id. at 3–4.) The Court finds these 16 arguments to be properly addressed under Rule 60(b)(6). 17 Courts “use Rule 60(b)(6) ‘sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 18 manifest injustice.’” Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 19 United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 20 1993)). Relief is available under Rule 60(b)(6) only where the grounds 21 enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1) through (5) do not apply. See BLOM Bank SAL v. 22 Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 211 (2025); id. at 210 (summarizing these grounds as 23 “mistake or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or the void or 24 prospectively inequitable status of a judgment”). The Court makes no findings 25 regarding the alleged actions of prison staff around the time of Plaintiff’s 26 voluntary dismissal, but for four primary reasons, the Court exercises its 27 discretion to grant Plaintiff relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 1 First, from the substance of Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal motion and 2 subsequent motion to reopen, it appears that Plaintiff was isolated in an 3 infirmary setting suffering from serious physical and/or mental illness at the 4 time of voluntary dismissal. (See ECF No. 7 at 1 (motion to voluntarily dismiss 5 stating that Plaintiff is “suffering serious physical and mental disabilities”); ECF 6 No. 10 at 6 (declaration stating that Plaintiff attempted suicide while he was in 7 the infirmary).) Suffering from serious illness in this manner is one factor that 8 may support relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See BLOM, 605 U.S. at 211–12 9 (discussing Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949), which found a 10 movant entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) where he was unable to defend 11 himself due to being incarcerated, ill, without counsel, and “disturbed and fully 12 occupied in efforts to protect himself against” criminal charges in separate 13 proceedings). 14 Second, Plaintiff was reasonably diligent in moving to reopen this case 15 after his release from an isolated infirmary setting. (See ECF No. at 6 (declaration 16 establishing that Plaintiff filed the motion about a month after leaving “isolation 17 lockdown”)); Fed R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (providing that motions “under Rule 60(b) 18 must be made within a reasonable time”). 19 Third, it appears that Plaintiff’s concern about the statute of limitations 20 may be well-founded, as the colorable claims found in the Court’s screening 21 order are based on alleged events that occurred in 2022 or 2023. (See ECF No. 22 6 at 4–7, 12–13 (due process claim based on alleged 9-month placement in 23 administrative segregation beginning in 2022); id. at 16–23 (conditions of 24 confinement, equal protection, and ADA claims arising from alleged bathroom 25 access issues in 2022); id. at 23–25 (retaliation claim based on alleged events in 26 2022); id. at 32–37 (retaliation, excessive force, and equal protection claims 27 arising from grievances and alleged use of force in March 2023); id. at 38–40 1 (free-exercise and RLUIPA claims based on alleged events in 2022 and 2023)); 2 Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) 3 (explaining that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Nevada is two 4 years). 5 Fourth, the Ninth Circuit has held that a Rule 60(b)(6) movant must 6 “establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances which prevented or 7 rendered him unable to prosecute an appeal.” Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 8 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martella v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 9 Seafarers Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL–CIO, 448 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir. 1971)). And 10 the Ninth Circuit has also held that “a ‘voluntary dismissal without prejudice”— 11 as took effect here—“is ordinarily not a final judgment from which the plaintiff 12 may appeal.’” Galaza v. Wolf, 954 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 13 Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995)). 14 In sum, there is some evidence that (1) Plaintiff suffered from serious 15 physical and/or mental illness in isolation at the time of voluntary dismissal, (2) 16 Plaintiff moved to reopen this case within a reasonable time after being released 17 from isolation, (3) the statute of limitations may bar Plaintiff from refiling the 18 colorable claims already found to exist in this case, and (4) leaving the voluntary 19 dismissal in effect may prevent Plaintiff from prosecuting an appeal. The Court 20 therefore finds that the interests of justice support reopening this case under 21 Rule 60(b)(6). See Klapprott, 335 U.S at 614–15 (stating that Rule 60(b)(6) 22 empowers courts to act when “such action is appropriate to accomplish justice”). 23 Upon its reopening, this case will return to the posture it was in at the 24 time of voluntary dismissal. Therefore, as stated in the Court’s screening order, 25 Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of this order to file an optional amended 26 complaint. (See ECF No. 6 at 42, 47.) If Plaintiff chooses not to file an amended 27 complaint by that date, this action will proceed immediately on the colorable 1 || claims outlined in the Court’s screening order. (Id.) Il. CONCLUSION 3 It is therefore ordered that Plaintiff's motion to reopen (ECF No. 10), 4 || construed as a motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), is 5 || granted. 6 The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to reopen this case. 7 The Clerk of Court is further directed to update Plaintiffs address to High 8 || Desert State Prison, as provided in his most recent filing. (See ECF No. 10 at 1.) 9 It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint 10 || curing the deficiencies outlined in the Court’s screening order (ECF No. 6), he 11 || will file the amended complaint within 30 days of the date of this order. 12 The Clerk of Court is further directed to send Plaintiff the approved form 13 || for filing a § 1983 complaint and instructions for the same. If Plaintiff chooses to 14 || file an amended complaint, he will use the approved form and write the words 15 || “First Amended” above the words “Civil Rights Complaint” in the caption. 16 It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, 17 || the Court will screen it in a separate screening order, and the screening process 18 || may take many months. 19 It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff chooses not to file an amended 20 || complaint within 30 days of the date of this order, this action will proceed 21 || immediately on the colorable claims outlined in the screening order (ECF No. 6). 22 DATED: February 19, 2026. 23 24 Ares jlosect qe 25 ANNER.TRAUM 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28