IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MOHAMAD EZZEDDINE, No. 88598-7-I
Appellant,
DIVISION ONE
v.
ORDER DENYING MOTION
CITY OF BURIEN, FOR RECONSIDERATION AND WITHDRAWING AND
Respondent. SUBSTITUTING OPINION
Appellant Mohamad Ezzeddine filed a motion to reconsider the opinion filed on April 20, 2026, in the above case. As ordered by the court, the respondent City of Burien filed on May 27, 2025, an answer to Ezzeddine’s motion to reconsider. The panel has determined that the motion for reconsideration should be denied. The panel has also determined that the opinion in the above-entitled case filed on April 20, 2026, should be withdrawn and a substitute opinion be filed. Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the opinion filed on April 20, 2026, is withdrawn and a substitute opinion shall be filed.
FOR THE COURT:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
MOHAMAD EZZEDDINE, No. 88598-7-I
Appellant,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CITY OF BURIEN,
Respondent.
BUI, J. — The City of Burien (City) issued a number of Notice of Civil Violation (NOCV) code violation citations to Mohamed Ezzeddine, alleging that he built structures on his property without construction and building permits and operated an Airbnb 1 business without a business license. Ezzeddine requested a hearing to challenge the violations, and the Hearing Examiner upheld four out of five violations. Ezzeddine then filed a Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) petition, under ch. 36.70C RCW, to the superior court, and the court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment, denied Ezzeddine’s motion for reconsideration, and dismissed his LUPA petition.
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2021, Mohamad Ezzeddine purchased property located in the City. In
1 Airbnb is an online marketplace where property owners advertise properties available
for short-term rental to potential guests. Anna Hirner, How does Airbnb work for owners? A complete 2026 guide, Guest Ready (May 29, 2026), https://www.guestready.com/blog/how-doesairbnb -work/. Unlike traditional hotels, Airbnb does not own any real estate; it functions as a digital broker, handling search tools, and booking infrastructure. supra.
2024, after receiving a report that Ezzeddine was operating an Airbnb business on the property without a permit, the City visited the property in January and February. As a result of the site visits and further investigation, which included a review of aerial photographs, a preliminary Geotech Evaluation, and a draft critical area report, the City determined that the structures the City observed on Ezzeddine’s property were constructed without a permit and that Ezzeddine was operating a business without a license by advertising on Airbnb that the structures were available for rent. The permitting system used by King County and the City had no record showing Ezzeddine had a business license to operate an Airbnb or a permit for construction. Ezzeddine stated the listings were a “future aspiration.” The City advised Ezzeddine to remove all Airbnb listings associated with the property until he acquired appropriate permits and posted placards on the four structures marking them as “unfit for human occupancy.”
On May 29, a code enforcement officer visited Ezzeddine’s property again, and observed the “unfit for human occupancy” placards affixed on the structures had been removed and the previously observed violations had not been corrected. Additionally, the code enforcement officer checked the Airbnb website, and all four of the unpermitted structures were listed as “active” for rent.
On June 13, the City issued a notice listing three alleged violations, which included operating a business without a license by renting four structures located on the property (a residential home, a shipping container/tiny home, an A-frame house, and a white shed-like structure), performing construction work on all four structures without a permit, and removing the placards without the City’s
3
permission.
On August 6, the City issued a second notice, which included the previous June violations, but added two new violations. The new violation No. 4 alleged that the A-frame house structure, being located in a location identified as “critical area”, was constructed without undergoing a “critical area review.” The new violation No. 5 alleged that Ezzeddine did not have a construction permit to build a deck and fence that surrounded the shipping container/tiny house on wheels, and the structure lacked the required insignia of the Department of Labor & Industries for “factory-built housing.” Finally, the August notice amended violation No. 2 to include only three structures because the primary residence was removed as one of the structures involved.
Ezzeddine requested an administrative hearing to contest the violations.
At the first hearing on December 5, Ezzeddine did not dispute he did not have a business license, the construction permits, or that he removed the “unfit for human occupancy” placards. Instead, he challenged the accuracy and reliability of the evidence presented by the City, including the aerial photographs, geographic information system (GIS) maps, screenshots of Airbnb listings, and the accuracy of the City’s and King County’s permitting systems. Ezzeddine also claimed the second violation notice was improperly served, and the City posted an “unfit for human occupancy” sign on the residential structure, but it was not cited as a structure in violation of Burien Municipal Code.
The hearing examiner left the record open until the next day, December 6, to allow the City to submit evidence in response to Ezzeddine’s submission of
4
numerous exhibits on the day of the hearing. A second hearing was held on February 25, 2025, to address the materials that were additionally submitted. At the hearing, Ezzeddine again did not dispute his violations but challenged the accuracy and reliability of the City’s evidence and a witness’s recollection.
On March 12, 2025, the hearing examiner entered its written decision, finding that substantial evidence supported four out of the five cited violations, and dismissing one violation. The hearing examiner found the City’s evidence credible, which included the aerial photographs, witnesses’ testimony, and the permitting system. On the topic of the permitting system, the hearing examiner found Ezzeddine made “some headway” contesting the accuracy of the permitting system. But, it concluded that Ezzeddine lacked the evidence necessary to support his contentions in order to overcome the City’s evidence that showed no permits existed during the period of time when Ezzeddine built or modified the structures on his property.
The hearing examiner sent the decision to Ezzeddine by e-mail and regular mail on the same day. The “Right of Appeal” section of the decision contained an advisement that “[a]ppeals must be served and filed within 21 days of issuance of this decision as specified in LUPA.”
On April 2, 2025, Ezzeddine sent an e-mail to City of Burien Administrative Assistant Michele Barrera, the City’s legal counsel, and an individual whose e- mail address appeared to be a law firm. Barrera stated that none of the three recipients of the e-mail and the attached LUPA petition were designated agents to receive the LUPA. On April 7, 2025, Ezzeddine filed and served an amended
5
LUPA petition.
King County Superior Court received the e-filing of the LUPA petition on April 2, 2025. On the same day of receipt, the court issued a case schedule order setting the matter for hearing on September 8, 2025. The City filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Ezzeddine’s LUPA petition. The superior court granted the motion finding that Ezzeddine’s untimely appeal of the hearing examiner’s land use decision deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction under RCW 36.70C.040(2)-(3); Ezzeddine failed to demonstrate statutory grounds for relief under RCW 36.70C.130(1); and there were no genuine issues of material fact. The trial court denied Ezzeddine’s motion for reconsideration. Ezzeddine timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Assuming without deciding whether Ezzeddine timely served his LUPA petition, we accept the City’s invitation to reach the merits of the contentions Ezzeddine raised on appeal that he had statutory grounds for relief under LUPA; and the superior court denied him a meaningful hearing because it did not consider his filed documents and arguments.
“Judicial review of land use decisions is governed by LUPA.” Whatcom County Fire Dist. No. 21 v. Whatcom County, 171 Wn.2d 421, 426, 256 P.3d 295 (2011) (citing Griffin v. Thurston County Bd. of Health, 165 Wn.2d 50, 54, 196 P.3d 141 (2008)). Under LUPA, a “land use decision” means, inter alia, “[t]he enforcement by a local jurisdiction of ordinances regulating the . . . modification, maintenance, or use of real property.” RCW 36.70C.020(2)(c). We apply the
6
standards under RCW 36.70C.130 based on the record created before the Hearing Examiner. Westside Bus. Park, LLC v. Pierce County, 100 Wn. App. 599, 602-03, 5 P.3d 713 (2000); 36.70C.130(1) RCW; 36.70C.120(1) RCW.
As the challenging party, Ezzeddine bears the burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the Hearing Examiner’s land use decision. See RCW 36.70C.130(1)(a)-(f). We may grant relief to Ezzeddine if he meets any of the standards set forth in (a) through (f) of RCW 36.70C.130(1). Quality Rock Prods., Inc. v. Thurston County, 139 Wn. App. 125, 132, 159 P.3d 1 (2007). Ezzeddine’s arguments focus on two grounds under RCW 36.70C.130(1), subsection (a) and (c), which provide:
(a) The body or officer that made the land use decision engaged in unlawful procedure or failed to follow a prescribed process, unless the error was harmless;
...
(c) The land use decision is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
....
The standard in subsection (a) is a question of law this court reviews de novo. Cingular Wireless, LLC v. Thurston County, 131 Wn. App. 756, 768, 129 P.3d 300 (2006).
Subsection (c) requires a factual determination that this court reviews for substantial evidence. Cingular, 131 Wn. App. at 768. Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of an asserted fact. Cingular, 131 Wn. App. at 768. “Our deferential review requires us to consider all of the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most
7
favorable to the party who prevailed in the highest forum that exercised fact- finding authority.” Cingular, 131 Wn. App. at 768. Subsection (a): unlawful procedure or not following prescribed process Ezzeddine contends “[the] parties reached an agreement for out-of-court resolution,” but the City engaged in “bad faith breach of [the] settlement agreement” by posting the “placards on the main house,” without any prior discussion, all of which constitute unlawful procedure. Without deciding the existence of a settlement agreement, which the City said there was not, Ezzeddine fails to explain how City not agreeing to settle constitutes an unlawful procedure. Argument unsupported by citation to authority will not be considered. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). Therefore, Ezzeddine waived this argument. RAP 10.3(a)(6).
Additionally, Ezzeddine claims the handling of hearing exhibits “violated fundamental due process requiring notice and opportunity to respond.” We disagree. The hearing examiner allowed the City to submit additional exhibits one day after the hearing because Ezzeddine brought materials and documents to the hearing without giving the City notice and copies, thus, the City’s additional submission was in rebuttal. At the same time, the hearing examiner told Ezzeddine he may object by December 23, and Ezzeddine did not do so. The record does not support that Ezzeddine was deprived of notice and an opportunity to be heard on the City’s additional exhibits. Even assuming there was error in allowing the additional exhibits, which there was not, Ezzeddine fails to explain how the additional submission of exhibits was prejudicial. “Passing
8
treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.” Palmer v. Jensen, 81 Wn. App. 148, 153, 913 P.2d 413 (1996); RAP 10.3(a)(6).
Finally, Ezzeddine complains he did not “receive notice, explanation, opportunity to present additional evidence” prior to the Hearing Examiner “revers[ing] himself” after the Hearing Examiner stated that Ezzeddine “successfully cast some doubt on the completeness of the county permitting records.” Again, Ezzeddine fails to provide any citations to the record or authority supporting his contention, and we will not consider the argument. Palmer, 81 Wn. App. at 153; RAP 10.3(a)(6).
In conclusion, Ezzeddine waived all arguments related to his claim that the Hearing Examiner engaged in unlawful procedure in violation of RCW 36.70C. 130(1)(a). Subsection (c) - lack of substantial evidence Next, Ezzeddine asserts the Hearing Examiner’s land use decision was not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record because the permit tracking system and GIS Maps the City relied on to prove Ezzeddine did not have requisite building and construction permits were unreliable, and a 2017 utility survey shows the man-made pond existed before Ezzeddine’s ownership of the property. These contentions were unsupported by citations to the record or relevant authority, and even if they were, we do not weigh evidence or substitute our judgment for the Hearing Examiner’s judgment.
9
Phoenix Dev., Inc. v. City of Woodinville, 171 Wn.2d 820, 832, 256 P.3d 1150 (2011).
Ezzeddine further asserts the Hearing Examiner discounted evidence about the unreliability of the permit tracking system. We disagree.
The Hearing Examiner did consider the reliability of the permit tracking system. The Hearing Examiner found,
[T]here is little evidence in the record to show how accurate the King County system is in tracking older permits. Also, [they] may often use the County’s system as part of their job functions, but there is little basis in the record to conclude that they have extensive familiarity with the limitations and accuracy of the County’s website. In this regard it was also helpful that the City was able to establish that the white shed and A-frame improvements triggering building and construction permit requirements occurred when the violation site was in the City when the City’s permitting system would be tracking the approval any such permits.
Although Ezzeddine may disagree with how the Hearing Examiner weighed evidence regarding the reliability of the permit tracking system, this court does not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the Hearing Examiner’s judgment. Phoenix Dev., 171 Wn.2d at 832. Additionally, the record shows that the City’s evidence on the improvements made to the A-frame and white shed- like structures relied on the City’s permitting system, and the Hearing Examiner’s weighing of this type of evidence is within its judgment. Therefore, this argument fails.
Finally, Ezzeddine argues the witnesses’ reliance on the photographs of the shed and A-Frame did not support the findings that the structures did not have the required permits because the City should have conducted a formal inspection of the structure. We disagree. At the hearing, a building inspector
10
used the photographs posted on Airbnb depicting the interior of the structures, which included the various rooms, and testified to the need for plumbing and electrical permits for structures that would be occupied since they were advertised as rentals. Ezzeddine did not explain how a formal inspection would be more reliable and accurate than the photographs, along with other evidence the City presented. Again, Ezzeddine takes issue with how the Hearing Examiner weighed evidence, but he fails to explain how the record lacked a sufficient quantum of evidence to persuade a reasonable person he did not have the requisite building, or construction permits for the white shed. Therefore, Ezzeddine’s argument fails. Phoenix Dev., 171 Wn.2d at 832.
All of Ezzeddine’s assertions that the land use decision was not supported by substantial evidence, pursuant to 36.70C.130(1)(c),fail. Summary Judgment Generally, orders on summary judgment are reviewed de novo. Borton & Sons, Inc. v. Burbank Props., LLC, 196 Wn.2d 199, 205, 471 P.3d 871 (2020). “We may affirm an order granting summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Berst v. Snohomish County, 114 Wn. App. 245, 251, 57 P.3d 273 (2002). “A genuine issue of material fact exists where reasonable minds could differ on the facts controlling the outcome of the litigation.” Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). “When determining whether an issue of material fact exists, [we] must construe all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Ranger, 164 Wn.2d at 552.
11
Ezzeddine relies on Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct.
893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and article I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution, to argue his due process rights were violated when the superior court did not consider his “opposition brief” in determining the motion for summary judgment. Ezzeddine referenced the “no working papers” verbiage in the court’s order to argue the superior court did not consider his responsive briefing. He is mistaken.
Working papers are unofficial copies of the parties’ motions filed to the hearing judge, 2 which are required when filing responsive papers opposing a motion. 3 Although the superior court noted Ezzeddine failed to submit working copies along with his original documents, this does not mean the court did not consider his responsive briefing. In fact, the summary judgment order explicitly states “the Court has reviewed the following: . . . The opposition filed by Plaintiff (no working papers received) at sub. #34 and 35 . . . .” Further, in the order denying reconsideration, the superior court indicated,
Petitioner’s motion largely rests upon the incorrect belief that because the order says working papers were not received the opposition documents were not considered. There is nothing in the order that supports this contention. The order only correctly identifies that working papers were not received and reflects the docket numbers where the pleadings were located for review.
Because there is no evidence that the superior court failed to consider
2 See generally, King County Local Civil Rule (KCLCR) 7.
3 “Any party opposing a motion shall file and serve the original responsive papers in
opposition to a motion, serve copies on parties, and deliver working copies to the hearing judge no later than 4:30 p.m. four judicial days before the date the motion is to be considered. Working copies shall be submitted pursuant to the requirements in this rule.” KCLCR 7(b)(4)(D).
12
Ezzeddine’s responsive briefing, his due process claim fails. 4 Finally, Ezzeddine argues there are “genuine issues of material fact [that]
preclude summary judgment,” and he lists the evidence he disagreed with. We reject his contention, because, as discussed previously, the hearing examiner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Attorney fees Ezzeddine requested an award of attorney fees, but he does not provide argument to support the awarding of fees, and he is not the prevailing party. 5 Thus, his request is denied.
CONCLUSION
Ezzeddine failed to demonstrate statutory grounds for relief under RCW 36.70C.130(1), or to show the superior court did not consider his court filings and arguments. The superior court did not err dismissing Ezzeddine’s LUPA petition.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
4 Ezzeddine also argues “one business day after the City’s reply [is] insufficient time for
proper deliberation on complex constitutional and statutory issues.” He does not cite any supporting authority. Therefore, Ezzeddine waived his contention. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Bosley, 118 Wn.2d at 809.
5 A party must “devote a section of its opening brief to the request for the fees or expenses.” RAP 18.1(b). “Argument and citation to authority are required under the rule to advise us of the appropriate grounds for an award of attorney fees as costs.” Wilson Ct. Ltd. P’ship v. Tony Maroni’s, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 692, 710 n.4, 952 P.2d 590 (1998)). Requests that fail to comply with these requirements are properly denied. Thompson v. Lennox, 151 Wn. App. 479, 485, 212 P.3d 597 (2009). Even if Ezzeddine complied with RAP 18.1(b), he is not the prevailing party, thus fees would still be denied. RAP 18.1(a).