1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN MOFFITT, Case No. 24-cv-1445-MMA-DDL
12 Plaintiff, ORDER: 13 v. (1) GRANTING IN PART AND 14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., DENYING IN PART CITY OF SAN 15 Defendants. DIEGO’S MOTION TO DISMISS; AND 16
17 (2) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTY OF 18 SAN DIEGO’S MOTION TO 19 DISMISS
20 [Doc. Nos. 12, 13] 21 22 On December 18, 2024, Defendants City of San Diego (including “San Diego 23 Police Department”) (“City Defendants”) Defendant County of San Diego, e/s/a San 24 Diego County Sheriff’s Department and San Diego County Jail (“County Defendants”) 25 (collectively, “Defendants”) filed respective motions to dismiss Plaintiff John Moffitt’s 26 (“Plaintiff”) second amended complaint. Doc. Nos. 12–13. Plaintiff filed responses in 27 opposition to each, to which Defendants replied in turn. Doc. Nos. 14–17. The Court 28 found these matters suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument 1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1 and took 2 them under submission on January 17, 2025. Doc. No. 18. For the reasons below, the 3 Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART County Defendants’ motion and 4 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the City Defendants’ motion. 5 I. BACKGROUND1 6 On January 1, 2023, Plaintiff was sleeping in his residence when San Diego Police 7 Department officers entered his apartment. Doc. No. 11 (“SAC”) ¶¶ 16, 21. To gain 8 entry, police had “contacted a manager of the facility,” who provided them an electronic 9 key fob. Id. ¶ 45. The officers, however, did not “assess whether Plaintiff was present, 10 asleep, or awake.” Id. Without searching his apartment, police released a canine unit 11 inside. Id. ¶ 21. The canine bit Plaintiff, causing him serious bite wounds. Id. ¶ 22–23. 12 During the officers’ attempt to arrest him, Plaintiff “did not threaten the officers, did not 13 lunge at the officers, did not yell or do anything while in the apartment” to indicate that 14 he may be a threat. Id. ¶ 45. 15 After arresting Plaintiff, the officers transported him to San Diego County Jail. Id. 16 ¶ 24. Upon his arrival, Plaintiff exhibited open bite wounds to his arm. Id. ¶ 16. This 17 condition exposed him to infection. Id. While detained at the county jail, Plaintiff 18 “repeatedly asked for the custodial staff to advise the medical staff that he needed 19 emergency medical care. The custodial staff2 repeatedly denied said requests stating he 20 did not need that care.” Id. Eventually, however, Plaintiff was provided medical care, 21 though “the medical staff did not deem it necessary . . . to send him to the hospital for the 22 care he needed.” Id. Eventually his arm became infected, which led to sepsis. Id. ¶ 26. 23 Upon becoming septic, “he was finally transferred to an outside medical facility where he 24
25 26 1 Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true the allegations set forth in the Complaint and draw all 27 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009). 28 1 was hospitalized for weeks.” Id. Plaintiff’s “arm was nearly amputated, requires further 2 medical attention, and he has suffered severe physical and emotional damage.” Id. ¶ 27. 3 Plaintiff initiated this action in state court on December 19, 2023, and Defendants 4 removed this action on August 14, 2024. Doc. No. 1. Defendants subsequently filed 5 motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, which the Court granted on 6 November 13, 2024. Doc. Nos. 3–10. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on 7 December 4, 2024, alleging three causes of action: (1) Violation of Civil Rights (42 8 U.S.C. § 1983); (2) Negligence – Professional; and (3) Excessive Force. SAC ¶¶ 35–73. 9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 10 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests a complaint’s sufficiency. Navarro v. 11 Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s 13 obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and 14 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. 15 Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 16 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations, brackets, and 17 citations omitted). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual 18 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 19 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 20 544, 570 (2007)). 21 Reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the 22 truth of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 23 nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 24 Legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of 25 factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987); 26 W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, “conclusory 27 allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to 28 dismiss.” Pareto v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). In 1 determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, generally, a court may not look 2 beyond the complaint for additional facts. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 3 (9th Cir. 2003); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705–06 (9th Cir. 1998). 4 When a motion to dismiss is granted, the court must decide whether to grant leave 5 to amend. The Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments, and thus leave to 6 amend should be freely granted. See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 7 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). However, a court need not grant leave to amend when 8 permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an exercise in futility. See, e.g., Rutman Wine 9 Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Denial of leave to 10 amend is not an abuse of discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that 11 further amendment would be futile.”). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 Defendants move to dismiss each cause of action in Plaintiff’s second amended 14 complaint. Doc. Nos. 12–13. Plaintiff opposes dismissal. Doc. Nos. 14–15. In its prior 15 order granting Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss the first amended complaint, 16 Doc. Nos. 3–4, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, some with prejudice, and some 17 without. See generally Doc. No. 10. Throughout, the Court noted deficiencies in 18 Plaintiff’s pleadings including, in several sections, Plaintiff’s failure to specify the nature 19 of the claims he brings against Defendants and failure to sufficiently plead his claims 20 against the Doe Defendants. See id. at 5–6, 8–11. 3 21 Importantly, and as discussed in each respective section, so far as Plaintiff fails to 22 identify the rights he seeks to vindicate or identify the nature of his first and third causes 23 of action, the Court reminds Plaintiff that it is emphatically his duty to provide at least 24 “fair notice of what . . . the claim is and the grounds upon [which] it rests.” Twombly, 25 550 U.S. at 554–55 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Reviewing 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has largely failed to 2 remedy these issues. 3 A. Doe Defendants 4 First, Defendants argue, as they did in their first round of motions to dismiss, that 5 Plaintiff “makes improper use of ‘Doe’ pleadings” by failing to specify how any alleged 6 Doe Defendant acted in a manner that violated his rights. Doc. No. 13-1 at 14; Doc. 7 No. 12 at 9–10. Plaintiff responds that he “identifies the Doe Defendants as employees 8 or agents of the San Diego Police Department and San Diego County Sheriff’s 9 Department who participated in or failed to prevent the unconstitutional conduct” and 10 that further investigation will uncover their identities. Doc. No. 14 at 4. 11 To state a Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege how “each Government- 12 official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions” violated his 13 constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77. Allegations “must be individualized 14 and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or 15 omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 16 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71 (1976)). The 17 pleadings must show each defendant “[performed] an affirmative act, participate[d] in 18 another’s affirmative acts, or omit[ted] to perform an act which he is legally required to 19 do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 20 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). While a plaintiff may refer to unnamed defendants as 21 “Does” at the pleading stage, this does not relieve them of the requirement that they 22 allege a Doe personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights in 23 order to state a complaint against that individual. See Brink v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 24 23-cv-1756-DMS (SBC), 2024 WL 3315992 *3 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2024). “A district 25 court should dismiss claims against Doe defendants in a Section 1983 suit when the 26 complaint does not ‘even minimally explain how any of the unidentified parties . . . 27 personally caused a violation of [the claimant’s] constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting 28 Estate of Serna v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 20-cv-2096-LAB (MSB), 2022 WL 827123, 1 *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2022)). 2 In ruling on Defendants’ first rounds of motions to dismiss, the Court found that 3 “Plaintiff pleads no facts which allege any Doe personally violated Plaintiff’s rights” and 4 granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss as to the Doe Defendants accordingly. Doc. 5 No. 10 at 10. Plaintiff has not cured this deficiency. The Court can locate two references 6 to the Doe Defendants’ identities in his complaint. The first identifies that Doe 7 Defendants are “agent[s], servant[s], employee[s], or contractor[s] for SDMSD and the 8 City of San Diego” and that they were acting in that scope during the events described. 9 SAC ¶ 17. The second comes in Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligence, stating 10 that “Defendant’s employees and agents whose names are currently unknown and will be 11 added as DOES had a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of 12 the profession commonly possess . . . .” Id. ¶ 58. What Plaintiff does not allege, 13 however, is what role any individual Doe Defendant played in any event or action he 14 describes in the Second Amended Complaint. He does not allege whether they are 15 officers who allegedly handled and released the canine, jail custodial staff who denied his 16 requests for care, jail medical staff, or anonymous participants in acts yet unknown. As 17 to his negligence claim, Plaintiff does no better. As discussed above, if proceeding 18 against defendants of unknown names Plaintiff may use the “Doe” moniker. However, 19 he must still plead with some specificity how that particular defendant violated his rights 20 if he seeks to bring a claim against them individually. Est. of Arroyo by & through 21 Wilson v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:21-cv-01956-RBM-SBC, 2024 WL 1627221 *8 22 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2024). He does not do so here. 23 As Plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the Court’s previous order, 24 the Court GRANTS Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss as to the Doe Defendants 25 and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe Defendants without prejudice. 26 B. Violation of Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim One) 27 Both City Defendants and County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s first 28 claim on the grounds that he insufficiently pleads a cause of action under 42 U.S.C 1 § 1983, and that he fails to sufficiently plead an excessive force claim against City 2 Defendants and constitutionally inadequate medical care against County Defendants, 3 respectively. Doc. No. 12 at 4–8; Doc. No. 13-1 at 9–12. In its prior dismissal order, the 4 Court found that: 5 Plaintiff’s allegations in Claim One could form the basis for either an 6 inadequate medical care claim or an excessive force claim. More confusingly, 7 Plaintiff’s Opposition to City Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss argues that the FAC states a § 1983 claim because SDPD “deprived Plaintiff of his 8 constitutional right to unlawful searches and seizures,” which would be a 9 Fourth Amendment claim. Doc. No. 5 at 4. Plaintiff must provide more clarity regarding the constitutional basis for Claim One in order to plausibly 10 allege a § 1983 claim. 11 12 Doc. No. 10 at 6. The Court then construed his claim, as County Defendants do, as a 13 claim for constitutionally inadequate medical care against County Defendants. Id. 14 Upon repleading, Plaintiff somewhat remediates this issue—though not wholly. 15 See SAC ¶ 35–55. Plaintiff still fails to explicitly plead what rights he seeks to vindicate, 16 merely titling the action Violation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)4 and referencing the 17 Fourteenth Amendment in a cursory manner. SAC ¶¶ 48. However, it does appear from 18 his pleadings that Plaintiff attempts to allege constitutionally inadequate medical care 19 during his confinement against County Defendants. FAC ¶¶ 12–19, 47–50. As County 20 Defendants brief the issue in its motion and Plaintiff responds accordingly, the Court will 21 analyze Claim One as a Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claim. See Doc. 22 No. 13-1 at 9–12; Doc. No. 15. Based upon this pleading, and because Plaintiff has not 23 24
25 26 4 As the Court discussed previous order, Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 40 27 U.S. 386 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of state law, violate federal 28 1 made any other meaningful changes to his complaint in this respect, the Court 2 DISMISSES this claim to the extent he seeks to press any other constitutional violations. 3 County Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead that he received 4 constitutionally inadequate medical care, nor does he successfully plead municipal 5 liability. Doc. No. 13-1 at 8–12. Plaintiff counters that he sufficiently pleads that County 6 Defendants unconstitutionally denied his requests for medical care, that he establishes a 7 custom or policy of unconstitutional medical care as evidenced by several outside sources 8 regarding the County’s jail system, and that he sufficiently demonstrates a causal nexus 9 between the two. Doc. No. 15 at 2–3. 10 To allege liability against a municipal entity, like County Defendants, under 11 Section 1983, Plaintiff must first sufficiently allege that his constitutional rights were 12 violated. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam). 13 When examining allegations of inadequate medical care in pre-trial detention, the 14 Fourteenth Amendment governs a plaintiff’s substantive rights. See Gordon v. Cnty. of 15 Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2018); Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 16 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021).5 As such, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: 17 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions 18 under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff 19 at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable 20 official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 21 involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 22
23 Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070– 24 71 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up); see Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 669. “The ‘mere lack of due 25 care by a state official’ does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under 26
27 5 For this reason, the Court dismissed with prejudice any inadequate medical claims Plaintiff attempts to 28 1 the Fourteenth Amendment.’ Thus, the plaintiff must ‘prove more than negligence but 2 less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.’” Id. 3 Though he does not identify the Doe Defendants sufficient to plead individual 4 liability against them, presuming that through discovery Plaintiff can identify—to some 5 specificity— the custodial staff with whom he interacted, the Court finds that Plaintiff 6 pleads a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. For clarity, the Court will discuss 7 the elements in somewhat different order. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered “serious bite 8 wounds” from a police canine bite during his arrest. SAC ¶ 23. After his arrest, he was 9 “was brough[t] into the county jail facility with open wounds to his injured arm. This 10 condition exposed him to the infections that occurred and ultimately resulted in extensive 11 hospitalizations.” SAC ¶ 16. Plaintiff “repeatedly asked for the custodial staff to advise 12 the medical staff that he needed emergency medical care.” Id. Ultimately, lack or delay 13 of treatment caused sepsis, requiring hospitalization and near amputation. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. 14 From these factual allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff plausibly alleges that his 15 wounds were sufficiently serious to the reasonable prison official and that it was obvious 16 that serious consequences would follow for failing to treat them immediately. Plaintiff 17 also alleges that “[h]e repeatedly asked for the custodial staff to advise the medical staff 18 that he needed emergency medical care” but that “[t]he custodial staff repeatedly denied 19 said requests stating he did not need that care.” SAC ¶ 16; see also SAC ¶ 49. Despite 20 the seriousness of his injury custodial staff initially denied and, ultimately, substantially 21 delayed sending him to a hospital though it was necessary to do so. Id. Through these 22 allegations, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads the third element. See Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125; 23 Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 670; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976) 24 (finding, in the Eighth Amendment context, that intentionally delaying care can amount 25 to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights); Trejo v. Cnty. of Imperial, No. 20-CV- 26 1465-LAB-DDL, 2023 WL 4194442 *6 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2023) (“A custom or practice 27 of delaying medical care can constitute deliberate indifference to . . . constitutional 28 rights.”). 1 Throughout the events, custodial staff made several conscious decisions as to 2 Plaintiff’s condition and care, including that “[t]he custodial staff repeatedly denied” his 3 requests for care and initially failed to send him to a hospital. SAC ¶ 16, 49. This 4 satisfies the first element. Because of this denial, Plaintiff’s wounds became infected. Id. 5 ¶ 25. These allegations—that the failure to provide him medical care placed him in a 6 position for his wound to worsen and become infected—also satisfy the second element. 7 See Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125; see, e.g., Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 670. Finally, Plaintiff 8 alleges that the delay in care and initial refusal to send him to the hospital caused 9 infection, sepsis, later hospitalization, and “near amputation.” SAC ¶¶ 23–27, 49. Thus, 10 Plaintiff pleads the fourth element. 11 However, to state a claim against a municipal entity under Section 1983, Plaintiff 12 must plausibly allege that: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the County 13 has a policy, custom or practice which amounted to deliberate indifference to that 14 constitutional right; and (3) the policy, custom or practice was the moving force behind 15 the constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900–01 (9th Cir. 16 2011) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). 17 Municipal entities like County Defendants cannot be held liable under Section 1983 18 through respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also Bagdasaryan v. City of 19 Los Angeles, No. 215CV01008JLSKES, 2020 WL 2770193 *14 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2020), 20 R.&R. adopted, No. 215CV01008JLSKES, 2020 WL 2770689 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020). 21 [A] local government body can be held liable under § 1983 for policies of 22 inaction as well as policies of action . . . . In inaction cases, the plaintiff must 23 show, first, that [the] policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right. This requires showing that the defendant was 24 on actual or constructive notice that its omission would likely result in a 25 constitutional violation. Second, the plaintiff must show that the policy caused the violation in the sense that the municipality could have prevented 26 the violation with an appropriate policy. 27 28 Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations and quotation 1 marks omitted). 2 A plaintiff must “specify the content of the policies, customs, or practices the 3 execution of which gave rise to [his or her] Constitutional injuries.” Estate of Kong v. 4 City of San Diego, No. 22-cv-1858-BAS (DDL), 2023 WL 4939370, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 5 Aug. 2, 2023) (quoting La v. San Mateo Cnty. Transit Dist., No. 14-CV-01768-WHO, 6 2014 WL 4632224 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “A 7 custom or practice can be inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated 8 constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or 9 reprimanded.” Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011). 10 As discussed above, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a Fourteenth Amendment 11 violation, and thus he has adequately pleaded the first element for municipal liability. 12 While the County Defendants focus on several conclusory statements within Plaintiff’s 13 SAC regarding medical policies, Doc. No. 13-1 at 9–10, Plaintiff elucidates on the policy 14 he alleges at length: in summary, policies or customs that amount to chronically 15 understaffing county jails, inadequate screening of detainees with medical needs (caused 16 by understaffing), and the use of staff without medical training to make medical decisions 17 related to screening and care—including who is sent to see medical providers. SAC 18 ¶¶ 13–15, 49. Plaintiff supports these allegations by further alleging that these practices 19 have led to dozens, if not more, of inmate deaths in San Diego County jails due to 20 “systemic deficiencies” within the past several years. Id. ¶¶ 12–15. Specifically, 21 Plaintiff points to a report by the California State Auditor and a letter by nurses within 22 one such facility to the jail’s civilian oversight board substantiating (at least, as alleged) 23 these issues. Id. The Auditor’s report, according to Plaintiff, includes findings that: 24 ‘the Sheriff’s Department has failed to adequately prevent and respond to the 25 deaths of individuals in its custody . . . that ‘systemic deficiencies’ in Jail 26 policies and practices for ‘intake screenings, medical and mental health care, safety checks, and responses to emergencies likely contributed to these 27 deaths’ . . . [and] that until meaningful changes are made, “the weaknesses in 28 1 [the Sheriff’s Department’s] policies and practices will continue to jeopardize the health and lives of the individuals in its custody. 2
3 SAC ¶ 13. Likewise: 4 [The] October 2021 letter from the Service Employees International Union . . 5 . Local 221, which represents Jail health care workers, to the Citizens Law 6 Enforcement Review Board . . . explained that understaffing created ‘dangerous and inhumane’ conditions for incarcerated people and medical 7 staff alike. As of late 2021, 216 medical positions at the Jail—more than 41% 8 of authorized positions—remained vacant, and existing medical staff have been on mandatory overtime for weeks. Compounding the problem, custody 9 staff, rather than health care professionals, can and do make final decisions 10 about the health care services that incarcerated people receive. People at the Jail are not adequately screened for medical needs and do not timely receive 11 essential medication or treatment. 12 13 SAC ¶ 15. “All of these conditions existed when Mr. Moffit was incarcerated in the 14 county jail in or around January of 2023.” Id. These allegations describing such past 15 incidents are sufficient to plead that County Defendants were put on notice that its 16 policies were likely to cause constitutional injury through evidence of past such incidents 17 and County staff’s knowledge of systemic deficiencies. 18 In sum, Plaintiff alleges a series of failures caused by a custom or policy of 19 understaffing medical personnel at the County’s jail facilities. Id. ¶ 15. These types of 20 allegations of understaffing and a resulting systemic failure to provide care are 21 cognizable as a policy or custom for which Plaintiff can attach the County’s liability. 22 See, e.g., Trejo, 2023 WL 4194442 at *6 (citing Oyenik v. Corizon Health Inc., 696 F. 23 Appx. 792, 794 (9th Cir. 2017)); Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 685–87 (11th 24 Cir. 1985); Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 1000–01 (10th Cir. 2019) (Eighth 25 Amendment supervisory liability context). 26 Plaintiff also sufficiently alleges that these policies of understaffing and inadequate 27 medical screening were the “moving force” behind his constitutional violation. See 28 Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. He first alleges that the policies described above were still 1 in place when he arrived at the county jail. SAC ¶ 15. “[W]hen he complained that his 2 serious dog bite injuries were getting worse, the sheriff’s ignored him, then delayed 3 access to medical treatment.” Id. ¶ 49. Taking all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as it 4 must at this stage, he alleges he received an inadequate medical screening. This inference 5 is likewise warranted by Plaintiff’s statement that he “repeatedly asked for the custodial 6 staff to advise the medical staff that he needed emergency medical care. The custodial 7 staff repeatedly denied said requests stating he did not need that care.” Id. ¶ 16. Making 8 an inference in Plaintiff’s favor, he sufficiently connects this to allegations that non- 9 medical staff were conducting medical screenings, exceeding acceptable duties in doing 10 so. Id. at ¶ 16, 49. Plaintiff’s argument, in sum, is that: 11 As stated in [SAC] paragraphs 14-17 Defendant[s’] policy in treating injured 12 prisoners was clearly either intentional or acts of deliberate indifference to 13 plaintiff’s constitutional right. In [Plaintiff’s] case . . . when he complained that his serious dog bite injuries were getting worse, the sheriff[]s ignored 14 him, then delayed access to medical treatment. Once he was provided access 15 to medical treatment, his injuries were significantly worse. Still, when he saw any medical provider, they did not provide adequate care, nor did they timely 16 send him to the hospital. 17 18 SAC ¶ 49. 19 Thus, the Court determines that Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a Fourteenth 20 Amendment inadequate medical care claim against the County Defendants and 21 therefore DENIES County Defendants’ motion to dismiss to that extent. 22 C. Negligence – Professional (Claim 2) 23 As it dismissed the entirety of Plaintiff’s federal claims in its previous order, the 24 Court previously declined to exercise jurisdiction on his negligence claims. Doc. No. 10 25 at 11–12. Because Plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claim now remains against County 26 Defendants, the Court will address this claim as well. At the outset, Plaintiff titles this 27 action as “Negligence – Professional,” and states that “[Defendants’] employees and 28 agents whose names are currently unknown and will be added as DOES had a duty to use 1 such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of the profession commonly possess 2 and exercise when arresting Plaintiff and when diagnosing and treating Plaintiff.” SAC 3 ¶ 58. However, Plaintiff cites only to California’s general negligence statute, California 4 Civil Code § 1714(a). Id. ¶ 57. Both County and City Defendants address this claim as 5 one for common-law negligence. Doc. No. 12 at 9; Doc. No. 13-1 at 12–13. Plaintiff, in 6 his oppositions states that he establishes negligence claims under California Civil Code 7 § 1714.” Doc. No. 14 at 5. Thus, the Court will analyze this claim as one arising as a 8 claim of negligence under section 1714. 9 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim on the grounds that, in 10 effect, the claim is one for common law negligence and that both County Defendants and 11 City Defendants are immune from such liability absent specific statutes to the contrary. 12 Doc. No. 12 at 8–9; Doc. No. 13-1 at 12–13. Plaintiff does not appear to cite contrary 13 legal authority in response but argues that he adequately pleads the elements of a 14 negligence claim pursuant to the duty imposed by California Civil Code § 1714. See 15 Doc. No. 15 at 4; Doc. No. 14 at 5. County Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to 16 plead an applicable exception to law providing immunity for injury to prisoners. Doc. 17 No. 13-1 at 13–14. 18 Section 1714 provides California’s general tort duty: that each person has a duty 19 not to act negligently with respect to their own actions. Bousman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 20 No. 3:23-CV-1648-W-JLB, 2024 WL 1496220 at *10 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2024); Cal. Civ. 21 Code § 1714(a) (“Everyone is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his 22 or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . 23 . .”). California Government Code § 820 further provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise 24 provided by statute . . . a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or 25 omission to the same extent as a private person.” Cal. Gov. Code § 820(a); Bousman, 26 2024 WL 1496220 at *10. Additionally, “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately 27 caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his 28 employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a 1 cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” Cal. Gov. Code 2 § 815.2(a); Bousman, 2024 WL 1496220 at *10. Together, these statutes “provide a basis 3 for negligence liability against public employees, and vicarious liability for public entities 4 for negligent acts by their employees that occur within the scope of their employment.” 5 Lallemand v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. LACV1700781JAKSSX, 2018 WL 6136816 *9 6 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2018). 7 As to City Defendants, while it is true that a plaintiff must identify a specific 8 statute to allege direct liability against a municipal entity, public entities are still 9 vicariously—rather than directly—liable for “employee[s’] negligent acts or omissions 10 within the scope of employment . . . .” Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. Auth., 80 P.3d 656, 11 658 (Cal. 2003); see also Lallemand, 2018 WL 6136816 at *9. Plaintiff is clear in his 12 SAC that he seeks to hold the City Defendants vicariously liable for the on-duty actions 13 of their police officers while arresting Plaintiff. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 61–66. Thus, at this 14 juncture, City Defendants’ arguments cannot defeat Plaintiff’s negligence claims. See, 15 e.g., Chambers v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 221CV08733MCSJEM, 2022 WL 19076765 16 * 15 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2022); see also Golick v. State of California, 299 Cal. Rptr. 3d 17 238–240 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022) (collecting cases in which police officers were subject to 18 negligence tort liability). 19 Turning to County Defendants, California law provides that, absent enumerated 20 exceptions, “a public entity is not liable for an injury to any prisoner.” Cal. Gov. Code 21 § 844.6(a)(2). However, “a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is 22 acting within the scope of [their] employment, is liable if the employee knows or has 23 reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and . . . fails to take 24 reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Id. at § 845.6 (excepting certain 25 situations involving mental illness and addiction). As the Bousman court concludes: 26 (1) public entities cannot be held liable for wrongfully or negligently injuring 27 prisoners but public employees can be; unless (2) the prisoner’s injury resulted 28 from a failure to furnish medical care (in which case, neither the public 1 employee or public entity are liable); except (3) when the public employee knew or had reason to know that the injured prisoner was in need of immediate 2 medical care and failed to take reasonable action to summon such medical 3 care (in which case, both the public employee and the public entity are liable).
4 5 Bousman, 2024 WL 1496220 at *11; see also Villarreal v. Cnty. of Monterey, 254 F. 6 Supp. 3d 1168, 11187 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“a public entity or public employee is liable for 7 an injury proximately caused to a prisoner where: (1) the employee is acting within the 8 scope of [their] employment, (2) the employee knows or has reason to know that the 9 prisoner is in need of immediate medical care, and (3) [they] fail[] to take reasonable 10 action to summon such medical care.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Castaneda v. 11 Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 648, 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 12 As discussed in assessing his first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered 13 “serious bite wounds” from a police canine during his arrest. SAC ¶ 23. After his arrest, 14 he was “was brough[t] into the county jail facility with open wounds to his injured arm. 15 This condition exposed him to the infections that occurred and ultimately resulted in 16 extensive hospitalizations.” SAC ¶ 16. While in custody, he “repeatedly asked for the 17 custodial staff to advise the medical staff that he needed emergency medical care.” Id. 18 Plaintiff also alleges that “[h]e repeatedly asked for the custodial staff to advise the 19 medical staff that he needed emergency medical care” but that “[t]he custodial staff 20 repeatedly denied said requests stating he did not need that care.” SAC ¶ 16; see also 21 SAC ¶ 49. Lack of treatment to his wounds caused sepsis, requiring hospitalization and 22 near amputation. Id. ¶¶ 25–27 23 At the pleadings stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that his 24 wounds were serious enough that certain jail custodial staff, acting in their capacity as 25 such, knew or had reason to know that he needed immediate medical care but failed to 26 take reasonable action to summon such medical care. Reviewing the cases the County 27 Defendants cite in their motion, none direct another result. Cf. Scalia v. Cnty. of Kern, 28 308 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1084–88 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (discussing the evolution of case law 1 concerning Cal. Civ. Code § 845.6); Castaneda, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 663–66. Therefore, 2 assuming that, through discovery, Plaintiff can identify—to some specificity—the 3 custodial staff who failed to take reasonable action to summon care, the Court finds that 4 he sufficiently pleads this claim. For these reasons the Court DENIES Defendants’ 5 motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim so far as he brings a case for negligence 6 under California Civil Code § 1714. 7 D. Excessive Force – (Claim 3) 8 As with his prior complaint, Plaintiff does not specifically mention Section 1983 as 9 providing the vehicle for pursuing an excessive force claim via Claim Three. Compare 10 Doc No. 1-2 at 10–11, with SAC at 13–14. However, a Fourth Amendment excessive 11 force claim is brought pursuant to Section 1983, and the Court analyzed this claim as 12 such on the first round of motions to dismiss. Doc. No. 10 at 8–9. Plaintiff alleges City 13 Defendants used excessive force during his arrest when they set loose a canine in his 14 apartment without searching it beforehand, leading the canine to bite and seriously injure 15 Plaintiff’s arm. See SAC ¶¶ 21–23, 69–73. Plaintiff does not make any specific 16 allegations against County Defendants. 17 City Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not met his burden to plausibly allege 18 liability, as he does not specify a right he believes was violated, does not state a cause of 19 action for a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, and insufficiently pleads Monell 20 liability regardless. Doc. No. 12 at 4–10. Plaintiff responds that he sufficiently pleads an 21 unreasonable use of force, and that he demonstrates Monell liability by pleading that “the 22 San Diego Police Department (SDPD) and its officers failed to adhere to mandatory 23 policies regarding the deployment and handling of police canines, resulting in severe 24 injuries to the Plaintiff.” Doc. No. 14 at 2–5. Plaintiff also argues that he “references 25 repeated misconduct, prior incidents, and failures to discipline officers, demonstrating a 26 pervasive unconstitutional custom that led directly to Plaintiff’s injuries,” and that he 27 sufficiently argues a failure to train theory. Id. at 7. 28 To state a claim for Section 1983 liability against a municipal entity, Plaintiff must 1 show: (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the County has a policy, custom 2 or practice which amounted to deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and 3 (3) the policy, custom or practice was the moving force behind the constitutional 4 violation. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900–01 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “[L]iability 5 for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be 6 founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct 7 has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 8 918 (9th Cir. 1996), holding modified on other grounds by Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 9 729 (9th Cir. 2001). Municipalities cannot be held liable under Section 1983 through 10 respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 11 Plaintiff alleges the arresting officers’ actions were not in compliance with the 12 Canine Manual’s provisions use of police dogs in arrests. SAC ¶ 70–72. However, he 13 has not pleaded sufficient facts to plausibly allege City Defendants have a policy, custom, 14 or practice of not complying with the Canine Manual such that this noncompliance 15 amounts to, itself, the actual custom, policy, or practice in place regardless of a formal 16 policy. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970); Trevino, 99 F.3d 17 at 911 (“The custom must be so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a 18 ‘permanent and well settled city policy.’”) (internal citations omitted). Contrary to 19 arguments in his opposition, Plaintiff does not plead any past incidents in which officers 20 have departed from official canine use policy, nor does he allege any facts to this point 21 beyond the events of Plaintiff’s arrest. Instead, he alleges merely that the officers 22 violated the City’s Canine Manual—ostensibly the City’s relevant operative formal 23 policy—and that because they did so, City Defendants are liable. SAC ¶¶ 70–73; see 24 also Doc. No. 14 at 2. That is exactly backwards, and the Court identified this same issue 25 in its prior order. See Doc. No. 10 at 8–9. Thus, the Court GRANTS City Defendants’ 26 motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s third cause of action. 27 28 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 3 || Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss. Dismissal is without prejudice and with 4 ||leave to amend. Any third amended complaint will be the operative pleading and must 5 || be filed on or before March 3, 2025. Defendants must then respond within the time 6 || prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Any claim not re-alleged and any 7 defendant not named in the third amended complaint will be considered waived. See 8 || CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 9 || (9th Cir. 1989); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 10 || after dismissal with leave to amend, claims may be “considered waived if not repled”’). 11 || The third amended complaint must be accompanied by a version of that pleading that 12 || shows—through redlining or similar method—how that pleading differs from the 13 previously dismissed pleading. See CivLR 15.1.c. 14 Additionally, the Court cautions Plaintiff that any further failure to cure these 15 || deficiencies may result in dismissal of his claims without leave to amend. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: February 10, 2025 wT ~f hills 18 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28