Modica v. Incorporated Village of Saltaire

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Modica v. Incorporated Village of Saltaire

202 A.D.2d 376, 609 N.Y.S.2d 597, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3108

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 31, 1994

StatusPublished

This text of 202 A.D.2d 376 (Modica v. Incorporated Village of Saltaire) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Modica v. Incorporated Village of Saltaire, 202 A.D.2d 376, 609 N.Y.S.2d 597, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3108 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1994).

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Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lester Gerard, J.), entered December 18, 1991, in a proceeding pursuant to RPAPL article 15, which denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted defendant The Incorporated Village of Saltaire’s cross motion for summary judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We agree with the IAS Court that the language in the deed is clear and unambiguous and that there is no need to look outside the instrument to ascertain the intention of the parties (see, Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v Evans, 306 NY 297, 305). The deed states that "the party of the second part”, defendant Saltaire, is to use Parcel 2 "as a means of ingress and egress” from Maple Avenue to Parcel 1, there being no provision for ingress to or egress from any other parcel or use by any other party.

Accordingly, plaintiffs do not have a right of access to their parcel by way of Parcel 2. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Wallach, Rubin and Nardelli, JJ.

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Judgment, Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lester Gerard, J.), entered December 18, 1991, in a proceeding pursuant to RPAPL article 15, which denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted defendant The Incorporated Village of Saltaire’s cross motion for summary judgment, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

We agree with the IAS Court that the language in the deed is clear and unambiguous and that there is no need to look outside the instrument to ascertain the intention of the parties (see, Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v Evans, 306 NY 297, 305). The deed states that "the party of the second part”, defendant Saltaire, is to use Parcel 2 "as a means of ingress and egress” from Maple Avenue to Parcel 1, there being no provision for ingress to or egress from any other parcel or use by any other party.

Accordingly, plaintiffs do not have a right of access to their parcel by way of Parcel 2. Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Wallach, Rubin and Nardelli, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

202 A.D.2d 376, 609 N.Y.S.2d 597, 1994 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/modica-v-incorporated-village-of-saltaire-nyappdiv-1994.

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