Mockler v. Skipper

942 F. Supp. 1364, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15563, 1996 WL 599711
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedOctober 11, 1996
DocketCivil No. 93-1117-FR
StatusPublished

This text of 942 F. Supp. 1364 (Mockler v. Skipper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mockler v. Skipper, 942 F. Supp. 1364, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15563, 1996 WL 599711 (D. Or. 1996).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

FRYE, Judge:

The matter before the court is the plaintiffs petition for attorney fees (# 343).

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Lana Mockler, filed this action against six defendants alleging claims for sexual harassment, retaliation, the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the violation of her equal protection rights under the United States Constitution. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict against the defendants, Dennis Fitz, Multnomah County, and Dan Nolle, the Multnomah County Sheriff, in his official capacity (the Multnomah County defendants). A jury awarded Mockler $185,-000 in damages for emotional distress, and $40,000 in punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, the Multnomah County Sheriffs Association. The court awarded Mockler $473.92 in back pay under O.R.S. 659.030 against the defendant, Multnomah County.

Mockler has filed a petition for attorney fees seeking $249,959.70 for legal services rendered, along with a claim for expert witness fees in the sum of $1,262.00, and costs and out-of-pocket expenses in the sum of $975.09, for a total fee award of $252,196.79 against the Multnomah County defendants. Mockler has submitted evidence that her attorney spent 908.21 hours on the merits of this case at the hourly rate of $225 per hour. She seeks a multiplier of 1.2. In addition, Mockler seeks reimbursement for the 21.08 hours spent by her attorney in preparation of the petition for attorney fees at the hourly rate of $225 per hour.

Defendant Multnomah County contends that (1) the requested hourly rate of $225 per hour is unreasonable; (2) the lodestar sum should be reduced to reflect that Mockler was unsuccessful in her claims against defendant Multnomah County Sheriffs Association and the common law claim for which attorney fees are not available; and (3) a multiplier enhancement is not appropriate.

APPLICABLE STANDARD

In addressing a petition for attorney fees, the court must first determine the “lodestar” by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. D’Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 904 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir.1990). There is a “strong presumption” that the lodestar fee is a reasonable fee. Id. at 1384. Nevertheless, in rare cases, this strong presumption may be rebutted through the application of those factors not subsumed in the lodestar calculation. Id. The factors subsumed in the lodestar calculation are set out in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1726, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976), as follows:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the “undesirability” of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar eases.

Id. at 70 (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974)).

ANALYSIS

1. The Lodestar Fee

The factors used to determine the reasonable hourly rate for use in a lodestar calculation are: “the novelty and complexity of the issues, the special skill and experience of counsel, the quality of the representation, the results obtained and the superior performance of counsel.” D’Emanuele, 904 F.2d at 1383 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548-50, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)). Mockler contends that the hour[1367]*1367ly rate of $225 per hour is a reasonable fee for an attorney with the skill, experience and reputation of her attorney. Defendant Mult-nomah County contends that an hourly rate of $150 per hour is reasonable.

Undisputably, this was a case which required the special skills and the extensive experience that counsel for Mockler has. Every aspect and every phase of this action was vigorously contested by a pair of counsel for the defendants who brought to the defense the special skills and the extensive experience that counsel for Mockler has. Counsel for Mockler was required to address complex issues, and counsel for Mockler obtained excellent results for her. Based on the factors set out in D’Emanuele, the court finds that an hourly rate of $210 per hour is appropriate. See Bain v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., Civil No. 92-600-FR, Opinion dated June 24, 1994, p. 2, 1994 WL 377757 ($200 per hour was a reasonable hourly attorney fee rate in an employment case).

The lodestar fee of $195,150.90 is reached by multiplying 929.29 hours of time spent at a rate of $210 per hour for the sum of $195,150.90.

2. Reduction of the Lodestar Fee

A reduction of the lodestar fee may be justified when the plaintiff fails “to obtain relief on all claims, and if hours spent on unsuccessful claims were not needed to pursue successful claims.” Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 539 (9th Cir.1988). In Gates v. Deukmejian, 977 F.2d 1300, 1312 (9th Cir.1992), the court explained:

The district court first asks if the plaintiff did not prevail on claims that were unrelated to those on which he succeeded and excludes any fees associated with those unsuccessful claims. Second, the court makes further reductions when plaintiffs’ success on any remaining interrelated unsuccessful and successful claims was limited.

The Multnomah County defendants contend that the lodestar fee should be reduced by thirty-five percent to reflect that Mockler was unsuccessful in her claims against defendant Multnomah County Sheriffs Association, and that the lodestar fee should be reduced by an additional ten percent to reflect the state common law claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress for which fee shifting is not authorized.

The Multnomah County defendants ask the court to conclude that a thirty-five percent reduction is required. They list a number of pleadings and depositions which they contend would not have been necessary had the Multnomah County Sheriffs Association not been a defendant.

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942 F. Supp. 1364, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15563, 1996 WL 599711, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mockler-v-skipper-ord-1996.