Mobley v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES
This text of 594 So. 2d 914 (Mobley v. DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Barbara MOBLEY
v.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES and Department of State Civil Service.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
*915 Mark E. Falcon, Avant and Falcon, Baton Rouge, for appellants.
Joyce Fisher, Staff Atty., Dept. of Social Services, Bureau of Legal Services, Baton Rouge, for appellee Dept. of Social Services.
Robert R. Boland, Jr., Civil Service General Counsel, Dept. of State Civil Service, Baton Rouge, for appellee Dept. of State Civil Service.
Before COVINGTON, C.J., and SAVOIE and LeBLANC, JJ.
SAVOIE, Judge.
This Civil Service case involves the issue of whether a permanent classified employee is entitled to a pay increase based on a change in position which the employee contends was a promotion. The facts of the case are not in dispute. Ms. Barbara J. Mobley, a permanent classified employee of the Department of Social Services, was laterally displaced in lieu of a September 10, 1988 layoff. She later took a voluntary demotion without any reduction in pay: she went to a GS-6 level position from her previous position at a GS-8 level. She then returned to her pre-layoff GS-8 position by appointment from a department preferred reemployment list (a list of employees who have been laid off or affected by a layoff, i.e., displaced and/or demoted). She did not receive promotional pay, but continued to receive the pay appropriate to a GS-8 position.
Ms. Mobley filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (Commission) complaining of pay discrimination. She alleged that two other classified employees who were appointed from department preferred reemployment lists had received promotional pay increases. The Commission denied Ms. Mobley's appeal, finding that she was not entitled to a promotional pay increase.
From this decision, Ms. Mobley appeals. She asserts three assignments of error:
1. The Commission erred in failing to conclude that Ms. Mobley was entitled to promotional pay due to then existing Civil Service Rules.
2. The Commission erred in failing to follow its own precedent as set forth in the Appeal of Marilee C. Standiford.
3. The Commission erred in failing to award reasonable attorney's fees.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
Ms. Mobley argues that she is entitled to a pay increase as set forth in Civil Service Rule 6.7 because she was promoted as defined by Civil Service Rule 1.27.[1] Rule 1.27 states: "`Promotion' means a change of a permanent employee in the Classified Service from a position of one job to a position of another job which is assigned to a higher pay grade." Rule 6.7 reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Rate of Pay upon Promotion
(a) When an employee is promoted to a position in a higher grade, his pay shall increase by at least 7 percent.
(b) When an employee is given a one grade promotion his pay shall increase by 7 percent. When an employee is given a two grade promotion his pay may be increased in an amount not to exceed 10½ percent.... An employee shall not be paid below the minimum of the higher range.
Ms. Mobley contends that she changed jobs from the position of one job to a position of another job which was assigned to a higher pay grade, and thus was promoted as defined by Rule 1.27.
We agree with the Commission's ruling that Ms. Mobley is not entitled to a pay increase because she was not promoted as contemplated by Rule 1.27. We find *916 that a promotion would not include an employee such as Ms. Mobley who is already receiving the higher pay grade (of the newer job to which she is appointed) while working at another job of a lower pay grade, in lieu of being laid off.[2] We find that the redactors intended promotion to cover the situation where an employee in a job at a lower pay grade who is actually receiving pay at the lower grade changes position to a job at a higher pay grade so that his pay increases to that of the higher pay grade.
Ms. Mobley correctly points out that the Civil Service Rules must be construed according to the rules of interpretation applicable to legislation in general. Department of Health and Human Resources, Office of Family Security v. Perry, 423 So.2d 1266 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982). One of the civil code articles dealing with the interpretation of laws reads, "When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature." LSA-C.C. art. 9. Additionally, as this court in the Perry case pointed out, "courts should interpret statutes in light of their true intent and also to avoid absurd results." Perry, 423 So.2d at 1269. Ms. Mobley's application of the rule in this case would lead to absurd consequences and would ignore the rule's true intent. See Perry, 423 So.2d at 1269.
Ms. Mobley was not deprived of the pay she was entitled to and accustomed to receiving when she took a voluntary demotion; Civil Service Rule 6.10(d) authorizes a demotion in lieu of layoff without a pay reduction. Thus, Ms. Mobley continued to receive pay at a GS-8 level although the position she was demoted to was at a GS-6 pay grade. She then returned to a GS-8 position due to reemployment preference. However, Ms. Mobley now seeks to use that reemployment preference from which she already benefitted to obtain an increase in pay to which she otherwise would not be entitled.
Furthermore, a promotion is constitutionally mandated to be based on "merit, efficiency, fitness, and length of service." LSA-Const. art. X § 7. If a department preferred reemployment list exists for a particular classification, an appointing authority must hire from that list when filling a vacancy. An appointment from a department preferred reemployment list is not based upon the factors set forth in the Constitution, but rather is based strictly upon length of state service.[3] The argument *917 that Ms. Mobley was on the department preferred reemployment list for the GS-8 position because she had previously met this constitutional requirement when she was originally promoted to the position must be met with the argument that she has already been compensated for such promotion. That is, her recent move was not a "re-promotion", but was a preferential appointment based on seniority only. If Civil Service Rule 1.27 defining promotion is read as Ms. Mobley would have us interpret it, then constitutional problems arise. If a statute or rule is broad enough to be applied both validly and invalidly, the valid interpretation should be used when it conforms to the legislative intent or purpose of the statute. See Callais Cablevision v. Houma Cablevision, 451 So.2d 6, 12 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 452 So.2d 1175 (La.1984). Therefore, we reject Ms. Mobley's interpretation of Rule 1.27.
Additionally, we note that in Hill v. DHHR, 457 So.2d 781 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1984), we recognized that the Civil Service Commission's interpretation of its own rules becomes part of the rule, as long as the interpretation is not unreasonable. Assignment of Error No. 1 is meritless.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
Ms. Mobley claims that she is entitled to an increase in pay based on another Civil Service case, the Appeal of Marilee C. Standiford. The Commission acknowledged in its opinion in the case before us that Ms.
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