Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner

372 So. 2d 1282
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedMay 11, 1979
Docket77-329
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 372 So. 2d 1282 (Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, 372 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1979).

Opinion

372 So.2d 1282 (1979)

MOBILE PRESS REGISTER, INC., a corporation, et al.
v.
Jimmy FAULKNER.

77-329.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 6, 1979.
As Corrected On Denial of Rehearing May 11, 1979.

*1283 C. B. Arendall, Jr., and Edward S. Sledge, III, Mobile, for appellants.

Irvin J. Langford of Howell, Johnston, Langford, Finkbohner & Lawler, M. A. Marsal of Seale, Marsal & Seale, Mobile, and Owen, Ball & Wills, Bay Minette, for appellee.

EMBRY, Justice.

This appeal, by Mobile Press Register, Inc., a corporation and its business manager and publisher, W. J. Hearin, is from a judgment entered against them on a jury verdict in favor of Jimmy Faulkner for the sum of $25,000 in a libel action. We reverse.

The issues for review are manifold. Among them are these crucial questions:

1. Was the issue of plaintiff Faulkner's status as either a private person, public official or public figure, improperly submitted to the jury?

2. Assuming Faulkner's status to be either of those enumerated in one above, did the trial court err in instructing the jury regarding the current law of libel applicable to the status of plaintiff and the facts of the case?

We shall address these issues in light of the landmark decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), its progeny, and the current law of libel in Alabama.[1]

*1284 This action arose as a result of the publication of four news articles by the Mobile Press Register. The articles were published between 29 May 1975 and 18 December 1975. In essence they stated: (1) Faulkner, when stepping down as Chairman of North Baldwin County Hospital Board, gave public indication that he was leaving the hospital in good financial condition when in fact a fiscal crisis was occurring; (2) Faulkner, while President of Bay Minette Mills, Inc., had promised investors that its bonds were a good investment, but then refused to pay off the bonds and threatened to discontinue paying interest if bondholders attempted to convert their bonds to common stock; (3) Faulkner, as Chairman of the Bay Minette Industrial Development Board, had a conflict of interest in his business and public enterprises, made a false oath that he had no interest as stockholder, director, etc., and had no intention of acquiring such interest in Den-Tal-Ez Manufacturing Co., Inc., but after the proceeds of a bond issue of the Board in the amount of 2.5 million dollars went to Den-Tal-Ez, Faulkner was named a director of that company; and (4) Faulkner, while a legislator in the early 1950's had sponsored a presently unpopular captive county road bill[2] for Baldwin County over objection of the County Commission.[3]

On the basis of these publications Faulkner filed a four count complaint alleging that each article libeled him by the meaning conveyed to the reader by the innuendo alleged in counts one, two and four and by means of the words alone contained in the third article. He alleged damage to character, that he was held up to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, together with monetary losses. The defendants answered, denying they had libeled Faulkner and asserting four additional defenses: (1) failure of Faulkner's complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; (2) truth; (3) fair comment; and (4) qualified privilege. After the jury returned a verdict for Faulkner, defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new trial. The trial court denied their motions and then this appeal was perfected.

I

We can dispose of this appeal of a libel action, in which punitive and compensatory damages are claimed, by deciding the threshold issue of whether Faulkner was a public official or public or private figure. This issue must be resolved first because the manner of its resolution determines what elements of proof are necessary for recovery. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), and its progeny mandate that no public figure may recover compensatory or punitive damages for libel unless actual malice as defined in Sullivan is proved: a publication made with actual knowledge of its falsity or made with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.[4] If plaintiff be a private figure, he or she need not prove Sullivan malice unless punitive damages are claimed.[5]Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). Consequently, whether plaintiff must prove Sullivan malice in addition to the other elements of libel depends on determination of his status, as a matter of law, which must be made by the trial court. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); Browning v. Birmingham News, 348 So.2d 455 (Ala. 1977). In the trial of a libel action, at the close of all the evidence, the trial court *1285 must first determine as a matter of law whether the plaintiff is a public official or a public or private figure. Without making this determination the trial court cannot know how to properly instruct the jury.

In this case the trial court charged the jury that it was to determine from the evidence whether Jimmy Faulkner was a public figure. Defendants timely objected to this instruction. This erroneous instruction alone requires reversal. However, we will inquire further into the record in order to determine whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is, in fact, a public figure.

The United States Supreme Court has defined public figures to be:

"* * * [those who are] involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U.S. at 164, 87 S.Ct. 1975 at 1996.

"* * * Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures * * *

* * * * * *

"* * * [those who] have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S. at 342, 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3008-3009.

Thus the threshold issue is resolved by an examination of the plaintiff's standing in society and his activity in the public arena.

An examination of the evidence in this case reveals that few men have obtained the prominence in their community as has Jimmy Faulkner. Throughout his life he has maintained an active role in civic and political activities. His career in public life began approximately 40 years ago when he was elected Mayor of the City of Bay Minette. He was later elected a delegate to the Democratic National Convention and in 1950 he was elected to the State Senate where, in his first year, he was named Outstanding Freshman Senator.

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