Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. Baird Independent School District

478 S.W.2d 847, 1972 Tex. App. LEXIS 3015
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 10, 1972
DocketNo. 4528
StatusPublished

This text of 478 S.W.2d 847 (Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. Baird Independent School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. Baird Independent School District, 478 S.W.2d 847, 1972 Tex. App. LEXIS 3015 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

COLLINGS, Justice.

The Baird Independent School District brought suit against Mobil Pipe Line Company to collect ad valorem taxes, together with penalties and interest thereon for the years of 1969 through 1970, and attorney’s fees. The property of the defendant pipe line company within the school district consisted of more than sixty miles of oil pipe lines. The trial was before the court without a jury and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff school district for the sum of $18,474.92 in delinquent taxes for the years 1969-1970 inclusive, including penalty and interest. The court did not allow a recovery for attorney’s fees. Mobil Pipe Line Company has appealed.

Appellant urges points contending that the court erred in failing to hold that the appellee school district board or equalization did not follow the statutory mandates for arriving at the value of appellant’s property; that the appellee school board adopted an arbitrary plan which was erroneous in arriving at the value of such property, and ignored market value as the basis for valuation of the property; that the court erred in failing to hold that appellant sustained substantial injury because of the board’s illegal method of valuing appellant’s property, erred in failing to determine the amount of damages sustained by appellant, and erred in failing to hold that the assessed valuation of pipe lines should not exceed 45% of their market value and to limit the recovery of appellee school district accordingly.

The record shows that appellee school district called its tax assessor-collector, who identified certified copies of the delinquent tax rolls of the district on personal property for the years 1969 and 1970. She testified that the certified copies in question were true and correct copies of the school district records and showed that the defendant owed taxes on the pipe lines in question in the amount of $8,032.57 for the year of 1969, and $8,032.57 for the year 1970, and that such taxes were due, delinquent and unpaid until July 6, 1971, the date of the trial. She further testified that the value of defendant’s pipe lines was $518,230.00. The school district also called as a witness Mr. Bruce Williams, a member of the school board and the board of equalization, and who had held the position of active secretary of the board for the past two years. He testified that he was familiar with the value of land in Callahan County including that of appellant’s pipe lines, and that the levy and assessment made by the board of education on such pipe lines was just and fair. A Mr. F. E. Neel, also a member of the board of equalization of appellee school district, testified that on real estate the board would take a percentage of the value put on the property by a Mr. B. H. Freeland for the assessed value, and that such value would vary from year to year; that the last year the board used approximately 45% of Mr. Freeland’s values. Mr. Neel further testified that on personal property the board did not find any market value or apply any percentage to the values found, but that these properties were put on the tax rolls at the value presented by the tax assessor, which was [849]*849so much per cow or other item of property, etc., all cows or items of property being' of the same value.

Appellant pipe line company introduced in evidence the testimony of Mr. E. T. Compere, a qualified appraiser. Mr. Compere testified that he was employed by appellant to estimate the fair market value of real properties of Baird Independent School District as of January 1, for each of the years 1969, 1970 and 1971. Of the properties so appraised as of January 1, 1969 and 1970, assessed values on the school district tax roll was an average of 20% of the market value at those times; that he investigated values of property in the district, comparing actual selling prices to assessed values during the period of time in question. He stated that on rural properties the assessed values ranged from 9% to 16% of the selling price or an average of 13%; that on residential properties the assessed value ranged from 26% to 30% of the selling price, or an average of 29%; that the average of assessed valuation on the properties actually sold was 21% of the selling price, and that on the appraised properties and the actual sales properties the percentage of fair market value of real estate that got on the tax rolls as tax valuations was 20%.

A Mr. W. D. Davis also testified as an expert appraiser for appellant pipe line company. He testified that the market value of appellant pipe line in the Baird District on January 1, 1969, was $944,100.00 and that on January 1, 1970, the market value was $894,500.00. He testified that if 45% of the market value was used in 1969 the taxes of appellant pipe line company would have been $6,584.40, and if 45% of the market value was used in 1970, the taxes for appellant in that year would have been $6,238.75. Appellant contends that the facts developed upon the hearing demonstrate that the board of equalization did not ever ascertain a market1 value of the subject properties for the two years in question; did not ascertain the market value of personal properties for the two years in question; did not ascertain the market value of oil and gas properties for the two year period and probably did not ascertain any market value for real estate for the two years.

The Supreme Court of Texas in the case of City of Waco v. Conlee Seed Company, Inc., 449 S.W.2d 29, in an opinion by Justice Pope stated as follows:

“Article VIII, § 1 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon’s Ann. Const., provides that taxation shall be equal and uniform and all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained as may be provided by law. The Legislature has provided for the means to enforce the uniform taxation required by the Constitution. Articles 7148 and 7161, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Civ.St, provide for the rendition for taxation by the taxpayer, of the value of merchandise and personal property in his hands some time after January 1 of each year. Article 7193 provides that the assessor of taxes shall assess the property for the taxpayer, if he fails to render it. Article 7212 provides for a board of equalization to supervise and equalize the assessment of taxes, and to fix the final valuation. Article 1060a makes the above statutes applicable to municipal corporations and school districts. Thus, to insure the uniformity in taxation the boards of equalization have been established as the final equalizing factor.
“It is our opinion that the controlling principles which govern our decision are found in this statement in State v. Whittenburg, 153 Tex. 205, 265 S.W.2d 569, 572-573 (1954).
‘It is now well settled that the assessment of property for tax purposes is a quasi-judicial function of boards of equalization and that no attack on valuations fixed by such boards can or will be sustained in the absence of proof of fraud, want of jurisdiction, illegality or the adoption of an arbitrary and fundamentally erroneous plan or scheme of valúa[850]*850tion. State v. Houser, 138 Tex. 28, 156 S.W.2d 968, 970-971; Druesdow v. Baker, Tex.Com.App., 229 S.W. 493, 495. Moreover, when their official action is attacked it will be presumed that such boards discharged their duties as public agencies according to law and acted in good faith. Zachary v.

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Related

Baker v. Druesedow
263 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1923)
City of Waco v. Conlee Seed Company
449 S.W.2d 29 (Texas Supreme Court, 1969)
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271 S.W.2d 414 (Texas Supreme Court, 1954)
State v. Whittenburg
265 S.W.2d 569 (Texas Supreme Court, 1954)
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Simkins v. City of Corsicana
86 S.W.2d 792 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1935)
City of Sweetwater v. Biard Development Co.
203 S.W. 801 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1918)
French Independent School District of Jefferson County v. Howth
134 S.W.2d 1036 (Texas Supreme Court, 1940)
Howth v. French Independent School Dist.
115 S.W.2d 1036 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1938)
Johnson v. Holland
43 S.W. 71 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1897)
State v. Houser
156 S.W.2d 968 (Texas Supreme Court, 1941)
Druesdow v. Baker
229 S.W. 493 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1921)
Rowland v. City of Tyler
5 S.W.2d 756 (Texas Commission of Appeals, 1928)
Zachary v. City of Uvalde
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Bluebook (online)
478 S.W.2d 847, 1972 Tex. App. LEXIS 3015, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mobil-pipe-line-co-v-baird-independent-school-district-texapp-1972.