Mob 90 of Texas, L.P. v. Nejemie Alter, Md., P.A. and Nejemie Alter, M.D.
This text of Mob 90 of Texas, L.P. v. Nejemie Alter, Md., P.A. and Nejemie Alter, M.D. (Mob 90 of Texas, L.P. v. Nejemie Alter, Md., P.A. and Nejemie Alter, M.D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MOB 90 OF TEXAS, L.P., Appellant,
v.
NEJEMIE ALTER, M.D., P.A. AND
NEJEMIE ALTER, M.D., Appellees.
On appeal from the 148th District Court
MOB 90 of Texas, L.P. ("MOB") appeals a judgment of the trial court awarding it $36,782.69 against Nejemie Alter, M.D., P.A and Nejemie Alter, M.D. ("Alter") in a landlord tenant dispute. By five issues, MOB complains that it was entitled to rent owed under the lease through January 2008. MOB also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's determination not to award MOB additional amounts of unpaid rent because it had not taken proper steps to mitigate its damages after Alter defaulted on the lease. We reverse and, as modified, render judgment.
I. Background
On September 14, 2005, MOB entered into a five-year lease with Alter to rent space to be used as Alter's medical office. Alter personally guaranteed the obligation. From March 2006 through December 2006, Alter did not pay the rent. MOB filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Alter. Thereafter, the parties entered into a Rule 11 agreement wherein MOB agreed to delay enforcement of the writ of possession for three weeks in exchange for three weekly payments of $1,000.00, which Alter paid. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11. Alter made two additional payments that were applied to reduce the past balance.
Only damages owed to MOB were in dispute at the bench trial. MOB sought recovery of all rents through January 2008. Alter argued that he should owe rent only until January 2, 2007, when he left the premises. According to Alter, MOB did not properly mitigate its damages because it did not take proper action in order to re-lease the property. Alter testified that his monthly rent on the leased property was $4,677.17. He agreed that he owed rent through January 2, 2007. The amount owed up to that time was $36,782.69. In support of his argument that he did not owe rent after January 2, 2007, Alter testified that he passed by the MOB property often and saw no signage indicating that the property was for lease. He stated that he was unaware of any newspaper advertisements regarding leasing the premises. To his knowledge, there was no visible effort on MOB's part to lease the premises. Alter testified that he unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with MOB for less space and would have been willing to pay weekly amounts to continue leasing the premises. He testified that he currently was renting new space as well as a storage facility and had paid a total of $36,690.81 to his new landlord and the storage facility. Alter noted that he would have been willing to pay that amount toward the leased premises that he entered into pursuant to his lease with MOB. The evidence is undisputed, however, that he did not.
Counsel for Alter called Jean Shivers, MOB's property manager, as a witness. Shivers testified that it was not typical for signs to be hung advertising the availability of space for lease in these types of commercial leases. Shivers stated that she showed the space three times to potential lessees after Alter had been evicted. She said that she had not leased Alter's space or any other space in the building since January 2007. Shivers listed Alter's space with a service called Loopnet, one of the predominant ways to obtain commercial tenants. She also testified that she listed the property on Costar, a similar website. Shivers also worked with a hospital administrator in an attempt to lease the premises. Alter had originally learned of the property in question through hospital contacts. On further examination, Shivers stated that she did not think it would "hurt" to put up signs advertising the property. Shivers testified that she was not aware that the Nueces County Medical Society had a journal in which she could have advertised. Finally, Shivers testified that it was not uncommon for it to take extended periods of time to re-lease commercial premises.
The trial court found that Alter owed MOB $36,782.69 through January 2, 2007, which is not contested in this appeal. The court stated that MOB was not entitled to any further damages because the trial court believed the evidence presented did not rise to the level required to meet MOB's duty to mitigate.
MOB raises five issues on appeal. Primarily, MOB's issues concern the sufficiency and "quality" of the evidence heard by the trial court with respect to mitigation. For instance, MOB disputes the testimony of Alter because he had no experience as a commercial landlord. MOB argues that Alter's evidence failed to explain what efforts a reasonable commercial landlord should have engaged in to release the property. In fact, MOB points out that the evidence showed that Alter, himself, was referred to the leased premises by the hospital. MOB also argues that because Alter had the burden of proof to show the amount by which MOB's damages increased because of its failure to mitigate, there was no evidence to support the trial court's implied finding that the entire amount of rent that accrued could have been avoided.
II. Standard of Review
When no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, an appellate court implies all necessary findings in support of the trial court's judgment. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). However, when a reporter's record is included in the record on appeal, the implied findings may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam). In a legal sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005).
In reviewing factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider and weigh all the evidence and we should set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.
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Mob 90 of Texas, L.P. v. Nejemie Alter, Md., P.A. and Nejemie Alter, M.D., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mob-90-of-texas-lp-v-nejemie-alter-md-pa-and-nejem-texapp-2009.