MMSP, LLC, et al. v. Minta Mae Stovall, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 27, 2026
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01218
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 MMSP, LLC, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, Case No.: 2:22-cv-01218-GMN-MDC 5 vs. ORDER 6 MINTA MAE STOVALL, et al., 7 Defendants. 8 9 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 10 Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6), (ECF No. 193), filed by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants MMSP, 11 LLC and Gerald Alderson, (collectively “MMSP”). Defendant/Counter-Claimant Susanna 12 Pettis filed a Response, (ECF No. 194), to which MMSP replied, (ECF No. 195). Further 13 pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss under Nevada Revised Statute (“NRS”) 14 41.637, (ECF No. 196), filed by MMSP. Pettis filed a Response, (ECF No. 198), to which 15 MMSP replied, (ECF No. 200). Lastly, pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary 16 Judgment filed by MMSP, (ECF No. 212). Defendants/Counter-Claimants Minta Mae Stovall, 17 an individual, and Minta Mae Stovall Trustee of the Minta Mae Stovall Revocable Living Trust 18 (collectively “Stovall”) filed a Response, (ECF No. 215), to which MMSP replied, (ECF No. 19 222). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS MMSP’s Motion to Dismiss under 20 FRCP 12(b)(6), DENIES as moot its Motion to Dismiss under NRS 41.637, and DENIES its 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Pettis brings a single counterclaim against MMSP for abuse of process. (Counterclaim 24 ¶¶ 20–24, ECF No. 191). MMSP moves to dismiss Pettis’s counterclaim against it. (See 25 generally Mots. Dismiss, ECF Nos. 193, 196). 1 Stovall brings counterclaims for elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud, 2 breach of contract, accounting, and quasi contract/restitution/unjust enrichment arising out the 3 business relationship between herself and MMSP. (Counterclaim, ECF No. 116). Throughout 4 MMSP and Stovall’s business relationship, they would meet at the end of each calendar year to 5 discuss MMSP’s services performed under the consulting service agreements (the “Consulting 6 Agreements”) and developments in Stovall’s financial situation. (Alderson Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. C to 7 Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 212-1). At these meetings MMSP would answer any questions that 8 Stovall had and discuss any of her concerns. (Id.). At the end of these meetings, Stovall, and on 9 occasion her adult daughter Susanna I. Pettis and/or Stovall’s adult son David. R. Pettis, 10 executed a release (collectively, the “Releases”), releasing MMSP from claims arising from or 11 relating to their prior work. (Id. ¶ 9). Each of the Releases state that the release was part of the 12 consideration provided to MMSP in exchange for its financial and professional work. (See 13 Releases, Ex. E to Mot. Summ. J.). 14 The Releases generally provided that: 15 As further consideration for [MMSP] for their activities on our behalf, effective upon the date first written above, [Stovall], individually, and on behalf of their 16 heirs, successors, administrators, trustees and assignees, finally, fully and forever release and discharge [MMSP] and all its past and present predecessors, successors, 17 assignees, corporate parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders, directors, 18 officers, attorneys, employees and agents from any and all causes of action, claims, suits, debts, liens, contracts, liabilities, agreements, costs, or demands for expenses 19 or losses of any type, known or unknown, relative to any act, omission, event, fact or other thing arising out of or in any way related to prior work performed by 20 [MMSP] for [Stovall]. 21 (Id.). 22 MMSP moves for summary judgment on all counterclaims pled against it by Stovall 23 arguing that they are barred by the Releases executed by Stovall. (Mot. Summ. J. 6:13–15, ECF 24 No. 212). In the alternative, MMSP moves for partial summary judgment on all the 25 1 counterclaims to the extent that they are time-barred. (Id. 6:16–21). MMSP also moves to 2 dismiss the counterclaim brought against it by Pettis. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 A. Motion to Dismiss 5 Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) 6 where a pleader fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 7 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A pleading must give fair notice of a 8 legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, and although a court must take all 9 factual allegations as true, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are insufficient. 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, FRCP 12(b)(6) requires “more than labels and 11 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. 12 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 13 true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 14 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 15 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 16 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard “asks for more than a sheer 17 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 18 If the court grants a motion to dismiss, it must then decide whether to grant leave to 19 amend. The court should “freely give” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

20 faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant. . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by 21 virtue of. . . the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman 22 v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is only denied when it is clear 23 that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. See DeSoto v. Yellow 24 Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). 25 1 B. Motion for Summary Judgment 2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when the 3 pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 4 affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 5 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that 6 may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 7 A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to 8 return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. “The amount of evidence necessary to raise a 9 genuine issue of material fact is enough ‘to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ 10 differing versions of the truth at trial.” Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 11 1983) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968)). 12 “Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all inferences in favor of the 13 nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Diaz v. Eagle 14 Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). A principal purpose of summary 15 judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.” Celotex Corp. 16 v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). 17 In determining summary judgment, a court applies a burden-shifting analysis. “When 18 the party moving for summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must come 19 forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went

20 uncontroverted at trial. In such a case, the moving party has the initial burden of establishing 21 the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its case.” C.A.R. Transp. 22 Brokerage Co. v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citation 23 and quotation marks omitted). In contrast, when the nonmoving party bears the burden of 24 proving the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden in two ways: (1) by 25 presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by 1 demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an 2 element essential to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 3 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323–24. If the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, 4 summary judgment must be denied, and the court need not consider the nonmoving party’s 5 evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–60 (1970). 6 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing 7 party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 8 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of a factual dispute, 9 the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is 10 sufficient that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the 11 parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors 12 Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the nonmoving party “may not rely on 13 denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible 14 discovery material, to show that the dispute exists,” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 15 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 16 doubt as to the material facts,” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 17 2002). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will 18 be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In other words, the nonmoving party cannot avoid 19 summary judgment by relying solely on conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual

20 data. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, the opposition must go 21 beyond the assertions and allegations of the pleadings and set forth specific facts by producing 22 competent evidence that shows a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. 23 At summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the 24 truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 25 The evidence of the nonmovant is “to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn 1 in his favor.” Id. at 255. But if the evidence of the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is 2 not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at 249–50. 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 The Court addresses MMSP’s Motions to Dismiss before turning to its Motion for 5 Summary Judgment. 6 A. Motions to Dismiss 7 MMSP seeks dismissal of Pettis’s counterclaim on the following grounds: (1) Pettis fails 8 to allege an abuse of process claim, (see generally 12(b)(6) Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 193), and 9 (2) Nevada’s Anti-SLAPP statute, NRS 41.637, protects the activity that forms the basis of the 10 abuse of process claim, (see generally NRS 41.637 Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 196). The Court 11 begins with MMSP’s FRCP 12(b)(6) arguments. 12 Pettis alleges a single counterclaim against MMSP: abuse of process. (Counterclaim 13 ¶¶ 20–24). Pettis alleges that MMSP wrongfully misused the legal process by asserting claims 14 against her that are frivolous. (Counterclaim ¶¶ 20, 21). 15 In Nevada, the elements of an abuse of process claim are “(1) an ulterior purpose by the 16 defendants other than resolving a legal dispute, and (2) a willful act in the use of the legal 17 process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.” LaMantia v. Redisi, 38 P.3d 877, 18 879 (Nev. 2002). “An ulterior purpose is any improper motive underlying the issuance of legal 19 process.” Posadas v. City of Reno, 851 P.2d 438, 445 (Nev. 1993). It is not necessary to show

20 malice or want of probable cause to recover for abuse of process. Id. Under Nevada law, the 21 filing of a complaint itself does not constitute an abuse of process. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. 22 Supp. 737, 752 (D. Nev. 1985). Rather, it is “the action[ ] which the [filer takes] (or fail[s] to 23 take) after the filing of the complaint” that constitutes abuse of process. Id. (emphasis in 24 original). “[T]he gist of the tort [of abuse of process] is . . . misusing or misapplying process 25 justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish.” Id. at 751 n. 1 3 (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts 856 (4th ed. 1971)); see also Nevada Credit Rating Bureau, 2 Inc. v. Williams, 503 P.2d 9, 12 (Nev. 1972) (“The action for abuse of process hinges on 3 the misuse of regularly issued process . . .” (emphasis added)). 4 To the extent that Pettis’s abuse of process claim is premised on actions that took place 5 prior to the FAC being filed, the claim fails as a matter of law. See Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 752 6 (explaining an abuse of process claim focuses on the action the filer takes after the filing of the 7 complaint); (see Counterclaim ¶ 17). Moreover, to the extent the abuse of process claim is 8 premised on MMSP filing the FAC against Pettis, the claim also fails as a matter of law. See 9 Laxalt, 622 F. Supp. at 752 (explaining the filing of a complaint alone is insufficient to support 10 an abuse of process claim); (see Counterclaim ¶ 9). Further, none of Pettis’s specific 11 allegations as to why MMSP’s FAC is improper support an abuse of process claim; they merely 12 dispute the merits of MMSP’s claims against Pettis. (See Counterclaim ¶¶ 11–14, 16, 18). 13 Finally, Pettis alleges that MMSP’s counsel insisted on conducting Pettis’s deposition on 14 dates they had already been informed were unworkable for Pettis’s counsel due to conflicting 15 professional and personal obligations. (Id. ¶ 15). Pettis further alleges that MMSP’s counsel 16 threatened to unilaterally notice the deposition despite the unavailability of Pettis’s counsel. 17 (Id.). But these allegations merely amount to disputes over scheduling that do not give rise to 18 acts “so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate function as a reasonably justifiable 19 litigation procedure.” Momot v. Mastro, 2:09-cv-00975-RTH-LRT, 2010 U.S. Dist. 2010 WL

20 2696635, at *4 (D. Nev. July 6, 2010). Pettis therefore fails to sufficiently allege a willful act 21 in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. 22 23 24 25 1 Accordingly, Pettis’s counterclaim for abuse of process fails and is DISMISSED with 2 prejudice,1 and MMSP’s Motion to Dismiss Pettis’s counterclaim is GRANTED.2 3 B. Motion for Summary Judgment 4 MMSP first moves for summary judgment arguing that all of Stovall’s counterclaims 5 against it are barred by the Releases executed by Stovall. (Mot. Summ. J. 6:13–15, ECF No. 6 212). In the alternative, MMSP moves for partial summary judgment on all the counterclaims 7 to the extent that they are time-barred. (Id. 6:16–21). The Court begins by determining whether 8 the Releases bar Stovall’s counterclaims. 9 1. Releases of Liability 10 MMSP contends that summary judgment should be granted against Stovall on all of her 11 counterclaims because they are barred by the Releases. Because release is an affirmative 12 defense, In re Cellular 101, Inc., 539 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2008), MMSP, as the moving 13 party, “must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the 14 evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co., 213 F.3d at 480. This 15 means MMSP has the “initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on 16 each issue material to its case.” Id. 17 Unambiguous releases supported by consideration are enforceable under Nevada law 18 and are governed by principles of contract law. Chwialkowski v. Sachs, 834 P.2d 405, 406 19 (Nev. 1992). The Court begins by considering whether the Releases were supported by

20 consideration. To be enforceable, a release, like any contract, must be supported by 21 consideration. Pink v. Busch, 691 P.2d 456, 459 (Nev. 1984). “Consideration is the exchange 22

23 1 Pettis requests leave to amend arguing that she “can amend her Counterclaim to allege additional specific facts 24 regarding the willful acts and ulterior motive of [MMSP] to support her claim.” (Resp. 8:19–20). But Pettis does not offer any examples of additional facts she could plead to support her claim. The Court therefore finds that 25 amendment would be futile. 2 Because the Court grants MMSP’s Motion to Dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6), MMSP’s Motion to Dismiss under NRS 41.637 is DENIED as moot. 1 of a promise or performance, bargained for by the parties.” Cain v. Price, 415 P.3d 25, 28 2 (Nev. 2018). “A party’s affirmation of a preexisting duty is generally not adequate 3 consideration to support a new agreement.” Id. “Consideration is not adequate when it is a 4 mere promise to perform that which the promisor is already bound to do.” Clark Cnty. v. 5 Bonanza No.1, 615 P.2d 939, 944 (Nev. 1980). Summary judgment based on a release must be 6 denied where there is an issue of fact regarding whether a release was supported by 7 consideration. Shapro v. Forsythe, 747 P.2d 241, 243 (Nev. 1987). 8 MMSP argues that the Releases are supported by consideration because, in order for 9 MMSP to perform the services under the Consulting Agreements, Stovall had to release MMSP 10 from liability. (Mot. Summ. J. 16:17–27). But the Releases themselves do not identify any 11 consideration—apart from boilerplate language stating consideration exists—that Stovall 12 received in exchange for the Releases, nor do they obligate MMSP to do anything except 13 continue to perform under the Consulting Agreements. (See Releases, Ex. E to Mot. Summ. J.). 14 Because MMSP was already obligated to perform under the Consulting Agreements, the 15 continued performance cannot be considered new consideration to support the Releases. See 16 Cain, 415 P.3d at 28; Clark Cnty., 615 P.2d at 944. MMSP fails to demonstrate that Stovall 17 received any new consideration under the Releases. MMSP therefore fails to meet its initial 18 burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact on each issue material to its 19 defense. See Shapro, 747 P.2d at 243. Because MMSP fails to meet its burden, the Court need

20 not consider Stovall’s arguments for this issue. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 158–60. Thus, 21 MMSP’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on its argument that Stovall’s counterclaims are 22 barred by the Releases is DENIED. 23 2. Statute of Limitations 24 Stovall brings counterclaims for elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud, 25 breach of contract, accounting, and quasi contract/restitution/unjust enrichment that are based, 1 among other things, on MMSP’s alleged failure to give to Stovall certain proceeds that she was 2 owed from the 2008 sale of Stovall’s interest in a hotel called Stovall’s Inn (the “Stovall’s Inn 3 Transaction”). (See generally Counterclaim). MMSP moves for partial summary judgment on 4 Stovall’s counterclaims to the extent the actions forming the basis for the counterclaims are 5 time-barred. 6 The statute of limitations applicable to claims for elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, 7 conversion, and fraud is three years. Cantlon Tr. of William & Margaret Cantlon Fam. Tr. 8 Dated Mar. 7, 2000 v. Wells Fargo & Co., 475 P.3d 776, 776 (Nev. 2020) (unpublished 9 disposition) (elder abuse and breach of fiduciary duty); Bemis v. Est. of Bemis, 967 P.2d 437, 10 440 (1998) (conversion); NRS 11.190(3)(c) (conversion); Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(3)(d) (fraud). 11 The statute of limitations applicable to a claim for an accounting is six years. Job’s Peak Ranch 12 Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Douglas Cnty., No. 55572, 2015 WL 5056232, at * 4 (Nev. 2015) 13 (unpublished disposition). The statute of limitations applicable to a claim for quasi 14 contract/restitution/unjust enrichment is four years. In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 15 681, 703 (2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(2)(c). 16 A statute of limitations begins to run at the time a claim accrues. In this case, some 17 portions of Stovall’s counterclaims began to accrue in 2008 when the Stovall Inn Transaction 18 proceeds were distributed, which would make those portions barred by the statute of limitations 19 for all of the counterclaims unless a tolling rule applies.

20 One such tolling rule is the discovery rule. Under the Nevada “discovery rule,” “the 21 statutory period of limitations is tolled until the injured party discovers or reasonably should 22 have discovered facts supporting a cause of action.” Petersen v. Bruen, 792 P.2d 18, 20 (Nev. 23 1990). MMSP contends that Stovall discovered or reasonably should have discovered the facts 24 supporting her counterclaims concerning the Stovall Inn Transaction on April 30, 2008, when 25 the Stovall’s Inn Transaction closed and proceeds were distributed, or at the very latest in June 1 2009 when Stovall expressed concern over where the proceeds at issue from the transaction 2 were allocated. (Mot. Summ. J. 19:17–25). 3 On November 26, 2007, Stovall executed an agreement (the “Offset Agreement”) that 4 detailed the amount of proceeds from the Stovall’s Inn Transaction that she was to receive 5 when the transaction closed. (Offset Agreement, Ex. F. to Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 212-2). 6 The Offset Agreement also detailed where lump sums of funds were to be allocated elsewhere. 7 (Id.). The Offset Agreement makes clear that Stovall knew and agreed to the amount of the 8 proceeds from the Inn Transaction based on the agreement’s language: “[t]he offset of the 9 Indebtedness identified in this agreement shall be absolute, binding and complete. Neither 10 party shall owe the other any amounts whatsoever resulting from the currently existing 11 Indebtedness as a result of this offset.” (Id. at 3). On April 30, 2008, the Stovall’s Inn 12 Transaction closed, and the funds were distributed pursuant to the Offset Agreement. (Alderson 13 Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. C to Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 212-1). But just because Stovall knew, and even 14 agreed to, where the Stovall’s Inn Transaction proceeds were to be allocated, does not 15 necessarily mean she discovered or should have reasonably discovered the facts forming the 16 basis of portions of her counterclaims. A reasonable juror could determine that Stovall did not 17 discover any bad acts related to the Stovall’s Inn Transaction just by knowing the lump sum 18 apportionment of the proceeds. 19 MMSP’s alternative argument is that Stovall discovered or should have reasonably

20 discovered the facts supporting her counterclaims when she began to express concern over 21 where the Stovall’s Inn Transaction proceeds went and requested a spreadsheet from MMSP of 22 the detailed accounting. For example, on June 16, 2009, Stovall wrote to her accountant that 23 “[MMSP] still won’t give me spread sheet so I can see where all the $3,000,000 went.” (Stovall 24 Email to Accountant, Ex. G to Mot. Summ. J, ECF No. 212-2). But MMSP does not contend 25 or offer any evidence to show that Stovall did receive a spreadsheet of the proceed allocations. 1 || That Stovall requested a spreadsheet of the accounting does not conclusively establish that 2 || Stovall discovered or reasonably should have discovered the facts supporting her 3 || counterclaims, especially if no spreadsheet was provided to her. Thus, MMSP fails to meet its 4 || initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact for its statute of limitations 5 ||defense. Because MMSP fails to meet its burden, the Court need not consider Stovall’s 6 || arguments for this issue. MMSP’s request for partial summary judgment based on its statute of 7 || limitations defense is therefore DENIED. 8 CONCLUSION 9 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that MMSP’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 193), is 10 || GRANTED. 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MMSP’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 196), is 12 |} DENIED as moot. 13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MMSP’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 14 is DENIED. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that MMSP and Pettis must file a Joint Status Report 16 || within 14 days of this Order. The Joint Status Report should inform the Court of the status of 17 || discovery on MMSP’s claims against Pettis and whether any discovery remains. 18 DATED this 27 _ day of March, 2026. 19 Yj, " Gp Gloria M. Na arto, District Judge United States District Court 22 23 24 25

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