MMM, INC. v. Mitchell

265 S.W.2d 584
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 3, 1954
DocketA-4403
StatusPublished

This text of 265 S.W.2d 584 (MMM, INC. v. Mitchell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MMM, INC. v. Mitchell, 265 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1954).

Opinion

265 S.W.2d 584 (1954)

M. M. M., Inc.
v.
MITCHELL.

No. A-4403.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 3, 1954.
Rehearing Denied March 31, 1954.

Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Searls and B. Jeff Crane, Jr., Houston, for petitioner.

Gavin Ulmer and J. H. Burr, Houston, for respondent.

GARWOOD, Justice.

The primary question in this proceeding is whether an engineer, who has been issued an original certificate under Section 15 of the statute regulating the practice of professional engineering, Art. 3271a, Vernon's Tex.Civ.Stats.Ann., is yet illegally practicing when he contracts to and does render engineering services during a year for which he has failed to pay his annual certificate renewal fee as required by Section 16 of the same law. Both mentioned sections are copied in the footnote.[1] The suit *585 is one by the respondent, A. J. Mitchell, for the $5,250 balance of a sum which our petitioner, M. M. M. Incorporated (defendant below), agreed in writing to pay him for the services in question. Since we determine the primary issue adversely to the respondent-plaintiff, we need not decide the subsidiary question of whether he is entitled to recover attorney's fees under Art. 2226, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.Stats.

At the close of the evidence both sides moved for an instructed verdict, which was granted to the respondent-plaintiff in respect of his claim for services but to the petitioner-defendant in respect of its alleged liability for attorney's fees. Both parties appealed upon an agreed "statement of the case and of the facts proven" therein, Rule 378, Tex.R.Civ.Proc., and the Court of Civil Appeals (on rehearing) affirmed the trial court judgment after reforming it so as also to allow the respondent-plaintiff his attorney's fees. Tex.Civ.App., 261 S.W. 2d 472.

The agreed statement above mentioned establishes that: (a) the services of respondent-plaintiff as contracted for and rendered "constituted the `practice of professional engineering' within the meaning of that term as defined in Section 2 of * * * Article 3271a * * *"; (b) the respondent-plaintiff "was duly registered as a professional engineer by the State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers on June 10, 1938, under and in accordance with the provisions of Article 3271a, V.A.C.S., and on August 18, 1938, said Board issued to the plaintiff a certificate of registration in conformity with the provisions of said article"; (c) neither said registration nor certificate has ever been "revoked under the provisions of said Article 3271a"; (d) the contract sued on was made "in the month of July 1949" and the services in question duly performed thereafter prior to an unspecified day in November 1949 when payment was demanded and, of course, prior to the filing of the suit, which occurred on April 6, 1951; (e) the respondent-plaintiff during the period from January 1, 1948 through December 31, 1949 failed to "pay the fee of Five ($5.00) dollars or any other fee provided for in Section 16" above mentioned.

The stipulation thus omits reference to when, if ever, the renewal fee was paid either before or after the calendar years 1948 and 1949. It likewise fails to state whether the notice required in Section 16 was sent to the respondent-plaintiff, although this subject is not stressed in the briefs.

It was further stipulated that the judgment of the trial court for the $5,250 balance in question should be affirmed, or reversed and rendered against the respondent-plaintiff accordingly as the payment by the latter of the annual fee above mentioned "for the renewal of his certificate for the year 1949 was and is" (or was and is not) "a condition precedent to the Defendant's liability * * *."

The question as last above presented is for our purposes the same as whether the respondent-plaintiff could lawfully practice his profession under the circumstances, because, if he could not, he is, and seems admittedly to be, barred from recovery under decisions such as Kadane v. Clark, 135 Tex. 496, 143 S.W.2d 197, dealing with the Securities Act. ("While the law does not specifically provide that a contract made in violation of this Act shall be void, * * *. Any other construction would nullify the very purpose for which it was enacted." 143 S.W.2d 197, 200.) Since the declared purpose of Art. 3271a, supra, § 1, "to safeguard life, health and property" from dangers arising from the "unlawful" practice of engineering, is obviously more *586 important than the fraud prevention purposes of the Securities Act, and since the penalties, Section 23, are certainly no less severe, we easily conclude that a contract for engineering services to be rendered by one prohibited under Art. 3271a from rendering them is unenforceable.

The critical question of the effect of default in payment of the annual fee requires at least an abbreviated review of the entire act in question, which was passed in 1937, was the first such regulation of general engineering and has not been amended.

Section 1 in general terms forbids the practice of engineering unless the practitioner shall have previously proved his qualifications and been "registered as hereinafter provided". Section 2 defines professional engineers and engineering.

Sections 3 through 11 provide for the body to administer the Act ("State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers") with numerous details as to its organization, duties and operation. From these provisions, especially Section 9, which includes establishing the "Professional Engineers' Fund", it is quite plain that the continued operation of the Board depends upon its receiving the "moneys derived under the provisions of this Act," none of which consist of appropriations from the State. Section 11 requires the Board to prepare an annual "roster showing the names and places of business of all registered professional engineers" and to mail a copy thereof "to each person so registered".

Section 12 deals with qualifications "for registration as a professional engineer"; Section 13 with "applications for registration" and the corresponding "registration fee" (maximum $25); and Section 14 with examinations to determine "the qualifications of applicants for registration".

Sections 15 and 16 have been heretofore quoted in footnote 1. In connection with the private seal required in the second paragraph of Section 15 to be obtained by each engineer "upon registration," there is the further requirement that it shall be affixed to documents issued by a registrant if the latter are filed with public authorities "during the life of the registrant's certificate" and a provision that use of said seal while the certificate stands expired or revoked "shall be unlawful".

Section 17 permits the practice of professional engineering by partnerships, corporations, and joint stock associations through individual engineers "registered in this State." Section 18 provides that, during the year following the effective date of the Act, and under certain conditions, "the Board shall issue a certificate of registration, without oral or written examination, to any professional engineer" then practicing in the state.

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Related

Kadane v. Clark
143 S.W.2d 197 (Texas Supreme Court, 1940)
M. M. M., Inc. v. Mitchell
265 S.W.2d 584 (Texas Supreme Court, 1954)
Stokes v. Sundermeyer
170 S.W.2d 583 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1943)

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Bluebook (online)
265 S.W.2d 584, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mmm-inc-v-mitchell-tex-1954.