M'Millen v. Miller

3 Ky. 494
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJune 4, 1808
StatusPublished

This text of 3 Ky. 494 (M'Millen v. Miller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
M'Millen v. Miller, 3 Ky. 494 (Ky. Ct. App. 1808).

Opinion

_ , The Opinion of the Court. — M’Millen was complainant in the court below, claiming under the follow-'mS entry: “ December 11th 1782, William Hoy enters three thousand acres of land, adjoining Edward Williams’s pre-emption on Lullbegrud, on the east and southeast, to run east and south-east for quantity.”

Williams 6 pre-emption was granted to him by the commissioners for an actual settlement in the month of June 1779 — “ Lying on the dividing ridge of Small Mountain creek, a branch of Licking creek, and Lull-begrud, including the said settlement.” This certificate pre-emption entitled the owner to a warrant of 400, acres, at the state price ; which warrant was located on jhe 24th of May 1780, in these words — “ Edward Wil-hams enters 400 acres upon a pre-emption warrant, ly~ ing on or near the head branches of Lullbegrud, including a cabin.”

The appellees had judgment in ejectment, upon the elder grant, obtained by force of an entry of Nicholas proctor, in 1783 ; and they rely upon the strength of ^ ¡grant. The circuit court established the ap-petlanrs entry, as valid j directed the manner at survey[495]*495ing; and entered a decree for the complainant, for ia much of the defendants’ claim as was common to the actual survey made for the complainant, and that ordered fey the court.

When an entry does notde* fignate the figure in which it is to be furvey-ed, it fhould be a fquare to the cardinal points. The manner of furveying an entry which calljS to adjoin a fquare to tie cardinal points, on the eaft and fouth-eaft, and to run eaft and fouth-eaft for quantity.

The complainant being dissatisfied with the construction given to his entry, appealed to this court j and has assigned error only as to that construction-.

The first essential, is, to ascertain the locality of Williams’s pre-emption. As this was granted for ab actual settlement, subsequent to the first day of January W78, it was by law attached to such settlement, and to include it. This was his right of pre-emption, and ifhe departed from it in his entry with the surveyor, such entry gave him no claim to pre-emptive privileges. On the'24th of May 1780, Williams was not permitted by law to enter his pre-emption warrant on any vacant land, without regard to his settlement; and if he did so, it cannot be said he had a pre- emptive right to such land. Sis settlement, where he built his cabin, fenced, and planted corn, ⅛ well identified, and ought,prima facia, to be presumed t® have be ett notorious ; and this presumption is fortifed by the evidence.

Whether Williams’s entry shall be attached to his cabin, or to some other of the cabins in that neighborhood, has been questioned in argument. The call is for a cabin. There is nothing in thte entry which evinces an intention to abandon his settlement, and the dignity of his claim. Every thing in the entry, may Weil stand With the requisition of thelaw, “to include his settle-mentand it would seem rigid to give, without clear indication, such construction to the entry, as to change the claim from a pre-emption, to a mere treasury right, or to worse ; sed benigno interpretañda sunt, verba hi-COrum.

Yet if so unfavorable a construction were to be given to the entry, still Williams’s “ pre-empfionn Would remain as before, not being permitted by law, at that time, to be detached from his settlement. This is a strong feature, distinguishing the case-from those of pre-emp-tions, appendant to other actual' settlements, having no locality until entered with the surveyor ; and irt the mean time, itinerant about the settlement claim. And such were the cases, in the general, cited by the appel-lees. The case of Bryant and Owings vs. Wallace, [496]*496(Hughes’s Rep. 194 to 210) was a pre-emption of 1000 acres, granted for marking and improving only. Bryant* in his entry with the surveyor, expressed that his land should lie “ on a branch of Elkhorn, and about four and a half miles southwardly of Bryant’s station.”,. Omitting altogether, to call for any improvement. The improvement which he claimed, was, in fact, nothing but the, cutting of the letters D. B. on a tree in the woods!

The entry was made in 1783, after the privilege of locating on any vacant land, had been expressly given by law. The correct principles of that decison, are clearly explained by the court, in pages 209, 210, of the reported case, as follows : , .

“ The late supreme Court, in the suit Consilla vs. Briscoe, adjudged that because z. settlement right could not be removed from its original location, and the certificate for which being recorded in the surveyor’s office^ where the entry thereon was made, they ought to be taken together, or be allowed to explain eaph other ;, and another reason, with great propriety, might have been added, that the law did not point out in wThat manner such entry should be made. But in the case of a prel emption right, granted for an improvement, it is believed no such opinion has ever been given ; and if there had, it could not be supported by law or equity, the case being evidently different from that of settlement rights. And the entry under consideration, being made subsequent to the passage of the act of 1782, permitting preemption warrants to be located on vacant lands, it would be highly absurd, that the location with the commissioners, and the entry with the surveyor, should be taken together, when the claimant himself, might have made, and intended a discordance between them. Therefore, iii all such cases, it can only be proper to resort to the location with the commissioners, and compare it with the entry with the surveyor, for the purpose of discovering the dignity of the claim.”

In that case, the course from Bryant’s station did not lead near the marked tree ; there was not only a deficiency of proof on the part of Bryant, as to any acquired notoriety of his improvement; but, on the contrary, the obscurity of the tree and marking, was proved, and the Want of notoriety, expressly found by the jury, in the strongest terms. And, notwithstanding, the question [497]*497Vis, whether Bryánt should not be permitted to have Ibis pre-emption ? On either ground, therefore-, Bryant’s entry was properly declared insufficient to give notice to other holder's of warrants, as to the land intended, 1st, because his improvement had no notoriety,, if it had been called for ; and, 2dly, the description in the entry, did not lead within any reasonable distance frorii the improvement.

Williams’s certificate was hot, by law, to be recorded With the surveyor ; but his pre-emption did not depend upon the description which he might choose to give in his entry with the surveyor. His cábin akid improvement were sufficiently notorious ; they áre ill the neighborhood described in his entry ; he was not permitted; by law, to depart from his settlement ; or if he did, it Was no pre-emption.

As the entry is not calculated to give any other figure to the survey, than that which would be given by the certificate, it must belaid down with lines to the cardi-. nal points, with the cabin equidistant from the angles pf the square, as directed by the circuit court; and, thus; to be considered, as called for, as Edward William’s preemption.

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Bluebook (online)
3 Ky. 494, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mmillen-v-miller-kyctapp-1808.