M.M. Winter v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Burlington Northern Railroad Company, Intervenor-Respondent

828 F.2d 1320, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12357
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 16, 1987
Docket86-1704
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 828 F.2d 1320 (M.M. Winter v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Burlington Northern Railroad Company, Intervenor-Respondent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
M.M. Winter v. Interstate Commerce Commission and United States of America, Burlington Northern Railroad Company, Intervenor-Respondent, 828 F.2d 1320, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12357 (8th Cir. 1987).

Opinion

*1321 WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition to review a decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission granting Dakota Rail, Inc. (DRI) an exemption from the regulatory requirements under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10901, with respect to DRI’s operation of a 43.66 mile railroad line between Hutchinson and Wayzata, Minnesota (the “Hutchinson line”). Dakota Rail, Inc. —Petition for Exemption From, 49 U.S.C. 10901, 10903, and 11301, Finance Docket No. 30721 (Oct. 31, 1985), petition to reopen denied, April 3, 1986, (LEXIS, TRANS library, ICC file). The Hutchinson line had previously been owned and operated by Burlington Northern Railroad Co. (BN) before it abandoned the line and sold it to DRI. In addition to excepting DRI from the regulatory requirements under section 10901, the Commission further declined to impose any employee protective conditions on DRI with respect to its operation of the Hutchinson line. 1 We have jurisdiction to review this decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2321 and § 2342(5).

I.

On June 28, 1985, BN filed with the Commission a formal application to abandon the Hutchinson line. It also notified all affected shippers and other interested parties of its intent to abandon. The application went unopposed, and on August 12, 1985, the Commission authorized BN to abandon the line, subject to the Oregon Short Line employee protective conditions. 2 BN then canceled tariffs, terminated service, and notified the Commission that abandonment had occurred.

When shippers on the Hutchinson line learned of BN’s proposed abandonment, they formed the Central Prairie Railway Association (CPRA) to devise a way to continue rail service. Following negotiations between CPRA, local rail authorities, and BN, a plan was proposed for an experienced operator to take over the Hutchinson line.

DRI was the experienced operator chosen to operate the property. Because of DRI’s limited funds, it negotiated a conditional sale agreement with BN. Under the agreement, DRI would lease the line from BN for five years for a nominal sum and then purchase it, provided that all terms of the agreement had been met.

After the negotiations were completed, DRI filed a petition seeking exemption from the requirement under section 10901 of prior approval for the initiation of operations over an abandoned rail line. In granting DRI’s exemption request the Commission did not impose employee protective conditions on DRI’s operation of the line. The Commission found that the requested exemption was fully consistent with the stated purposes of 49 U.S.C. § 10505, 3 and that the imposition of employee protection was unnecessary. 4

*1322 United Transportation Union (UTU) filed a petition to reopen the Commission’s decision exempting DRI from section 10901, contending that because there had been no bona fide abandonment of the Hutchinson line the Commission had erred in failing to impose mandatory employee protective conditions on DRI’s operation of the rail line.

Finding no changed circumstances, material error, or new evidence, the Commission denied UTU’s petition to reopen. 49 C.F.R. § 1115.3(b). It found that BN had complied with the regulatory requirements and had properly abandoned the Hutchinson line. The Commission stated that “BN has been forthright about its intentions, revealing from the outset its plan to abandon its line and arrange for another entity to provide service.” The Commission further affirmed its decision to refuse to impose employee protective conditions on the transaction. It found that UTU had failed to make the necessary “exceptional showing” required for the imposition of labor protection in a section 10901 transaction. 5

UTU thereafter instituted this appeal. BN was permitted to intervene. DRI elected not to participate in the appeal.

II.

The principal dispute in this case centers on the Commission’s failure to impose employee protective conditions on DRI’s commencement of operations over the Hutchinson line. Petitioner, the General Chairman for the UTU, 6 argues that DRI’s purchase and operation of the line was and “acquisition” pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 11343 that subjected the transaction to the mandatory employee protective conditions guaranteed under 49 U.S.C. § 11347. UTU contends that to satisfy the requirements of section 11347 the employee protective conditions fashioned in New York Dock Ry. —Control —Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 360 I.C.C. 60, aff'd sub nom. New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.1979), should be imposed. 7

UTU acknowledges that BN employees affected by the abandonment are protected by the employee protective conditions found in Oregon Short Line R. Co.— Abandonment —Goshen, 360 I.C.C. 91, 98 (1979). 8 UTU contends, however, that the New York Dock conditions would give BN employees more protection than the Oregon Short Line conditions because DRI would have to participate in employee negotiations with former BN employees and perhaps hire them to work on the line.

Our standard of review of a Commission decision is narrow. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 441-47, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974). We may set aside a Commission decision only if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Humphrey v. United States, 745 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.1984). “The reviewing court is not to substitute its conclusions for those of the Commission. Our duty is simply to *1323

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Bluebook (online)
828 F.2d 1320, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 12357, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mm-winter-v-interstate-commerce-commission-and-united-states-of-america-ca8-1987.