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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 M.M., Case No. 2:25-cv-02074-TMC 8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 ATTORNEY’S FEES v. 10 LAURA HERMOSILLO, et al.,1 11 Respondents. 12 13
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Petitioner M.M. obtained habeas relief when this Court held he had been unlawfully 16 subject to mandatory immigration detention without an opportunity for bond. Dkt. 17. He now 17 moves for an award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 18 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Dkts. 19, 20. Respondents agree that M.M. is the prevailing party, and they do 19 not dispute the amount of fees sought. Dkt. 21. Instead, they argue that fees should be denied 20 because their legal position was substantially justified. Id. But at the time M.M. was denied bond 21 in immigration court, this Article III Court had already entered a declaratory judgment that 22 1 Laura Hermosillo, Seattle Acting Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations, 23 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is substituted for Cammilla Wamsley under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). The Clerk is directed to amend the caption to 24 reflect this change. 1 applying mandatory detention to noncitizens such as M.M. violated the law. Rodriguez Vazquez 2 v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1336 (W.D. Wash. 2025). Because that declaratory judgment 3 was binding on the parties to the case, and the defendants did not seek a stay of the judgment
4 pending appeal, there was no reasonable basis for the government to ignore the judgment and 5 force detainees to file habeas petitions as their only means of seeking relief from unlawful 6 detention. Respondents’ position was therefore not substantially justified, and the Court 7 GRANTS M.M.’s motion for attorney’s fees. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD “The EAJA provides . . . that in an action brought by or against the United States, a court 9 must award fees and expenses to a prevailing non-government party ‘unless the court finds that 10 the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an 11 award unjust.’” Medina Tovar v. Zuchowski, 41 F.4th 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 12 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was 13 substantially justified.” Id. Substantially justified means “justified to a degree that could satisfy a 14 reasonable person.” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pierce v. 15 Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). “Put differently, the government’s position must have a 16 ‘reasonable basis both in law and fact.’” Id. (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565). The court 17 examines “both the government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action giving rise 18 to the civil action.” Id. Whether the government’s position was substantially justified is a matter 19 of discretion for the district court. Id. at 869. 20 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(C), when ruling on a motion for 21 attorney’s fees, the Court “must find the facts and state its conclusions of law as provided in Rule 22 52(a),” meaning “the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law 23 separately.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1), 54(d)(2)(C). 24 1 III. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Petitioner M.M. lives in Alaska and has resided in the United States since 2010. 2 He is married to a U.S. citizen and has one U.S. citizen child. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 45–48. 3 2. M.M. was arrested by Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers on 4 or about September 27, 2025 and detained at the Northwest Immigration and 5 Customs Enforcement Processing Center (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, Washington. 6 Id. ¶ 46. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) placed M.M. in removal 7 proceedings before the Tacoma Immigration Court, charging him as being 8 inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as having entered the United 9 States without inspection. Id. ¶ 47. 10 3. Respondents detained M.M. under the mandatory detention provisions in 8 U.S.C. 11 § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Dkt. 17 at 1–2. 12 4. On September 30, 2025, in a case then captioned Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 13 this Court granted summary judgment to members of a certified Bond Denial 14 Class, defined to include the following individuals: 15 [A]ll noncitizens without lawful status detained at the Northwest 16 ICE Processing Center who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection, (2) are not apprehended upon arrival, (3) 17 are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the noncitizen is scheduled for 18 or requests a bond hearing. 19 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1336 (W.D. Wash. 2025). 20 5. The Court issued the following declaratory relief: 21 The Court declares that Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and are not subject to mandatory detention 22 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Court further declares that the Tacoma Immigration Court’s practice of denying bond to Bond 23 Denial Class members on the basis of § 1225(b)(2) violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. 24 1 Id. 2 6. The Court entered judgment in favor of the Bond Denial Class the same day. 3 See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Hermosillo, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, at Dkt. 66.
4 7. M.M. is a member of the Bond Denial Class. See Dkt. 17 at 3–4. 5 8. Despite the Court’s declaratory judgment, on October 22, 2025, an immigration 6 judge (“IJ”) at the Tacoma Immigration Court denied bond to M.M. on the basis 7 that he was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt. 1 ¶ 51. 8 The IJ set an alternative bond amount of $25,000. Id. 9 9. That same day, M.M. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing his 10 detention was unlawful. Dkt. 1. 11 10. On October 28, 2025, Respondents appealed the Rodriguez Vazquez declaratory 12 judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Rodriguez Vazquez,
13 No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, at Dkt. 71. That appeal remains pending. 14 11. Respondents have not sought a stay of the declaratory judgment from either this 15 Court or the Court of Appeals. 16 12. On October 31, 2025, the Court granted M.M.’s habeas petition and ordered that 17 Respondents either release him or allow his release upon payment of the 18 alternative bond. Dkt. 17. 19 13. M.M. now seeks an award of $7,041.09 in attorney’s fees and costs under the 20 EAJA. Dkts. 19, 20. 21 14. Respondents do not dispute that M.M. is a prevailing party or the amount of fees 22 sought. Dkt. 21 at 2. Instead, Respondents argue only that attorney’s fees should
23 be denied because their position was substantially justified. Id. at 2–4.
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 M.M., Case No. 2:25-cv-02074-TMC 8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 ATTORNEY’S FEES v. 10 LAURA HERMOSILLO, et al.,1 11 Respondents. 12 13
14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Petitioner M.M. obtained habeas relief when this Court held he had been unlawfully 16 subject to mandatory immigration detention without an opportunity for bond. Dkt. 17. He now 17 moves for an award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 18 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Dkts. 19, 20. Respondents agree that M.M. is the prevailing party, and they do 19 not dispute the amount of fees sought. Dkt. 21. Instead, they argue that fees should be denied 20 because their legal position was substantially justified. Id. But at the time M.M. was denied bond 21 in immigration court, this Article III Court had already entered a declaratory judgment that 22 1 Laura Hermosillo, Seattle Acting Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations, 23 United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, is substituted for Cammilla Wamsley under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). The Clerk is directed to amend the caption to 24 reflect this change. 1 applying mandatory detention to noncitizens such as M.M. violated the law. Rodriguez Vazquez 2 v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1336 (W.D. Wash. 2025). Because that declaratory judgment 3 was binding on the parties to the case, and the defendants did not seek a stay of the judgment
4 pending appeal, there was no reasonable basis for the government to ignore the judgment and 5 force detainees to file habeas petitions as their only means of seeking relief from unlawful 6 detention. Respondents’ position was therefore not substantially justified, and the Court 7 GRANTS M.M.’s motion for attorney’s fees. 8 II. LEGAL STANDARD “The EAJA provides . . . that in an action brought by or against the United States, a court 9 must award fees and expenses to a prevailing non-government party ‘unless the court finds that 10 the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an 11 award unjust.’” Medina Tovar v. Zuchowski, 41 F.4th 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 12 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). “It is the government’s burden to show that its position was 13 substantially justified.” Id. Substantially justified means “justified to a degree that could satisfy a 14 reasonable person.” Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pierce v. 15 Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). “Put differently, the government’s position must have a 16 ‘reasonable basis both in law and fact.’” Id. (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565). The court 17 examines “both the government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action giving rise 18 to the civil action.” Id. Whether the government’s position was substantially justified is a matter 19 of discretion for the district court. Id. at 869. 20 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(C), when ruling on a motion for 21 attorney’s fees, the Court “must find the facts and state its conclusions of law as provided in Rule 22 52(a),” meaning “the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law 23 separately.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1), 54(d)(2)(C). 24 1 III. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Petitioner M.M. lives in Alaska and has resided in the United States since 2010. 2 He is married to a U.S. citizen and has one U.S. citizen child. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 45–48. 3 2. M.M. was arrested by Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers on 4 or about September 27, 2025 and detained at the Northwest Immigration and 5 Customs Enforcement Processing Center (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, Washington. 6 Id. ¶ 46. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) placed M.M. in removal 7 proceedings before the Tacoma Immigration Court, charging him as being 8 inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as having entered the United 9 States without inspection. Id. ¶ 47. 10 3. Respondents detained M.M. under the mandatory detention provisions in 8 U.S.C. 11 § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Dkt. 17 at 1–2. 12 4. On September 30, 2025, in a case then captioned Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 13 this Court granted summary judgment to members of a certified Bond Denial 14 Class, defined to include the following individuals: 15 [A]ll noncitizens without lawful status detained at the Northwest 16 ICE Processing Center who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection, (2) are not apprehended upon arrival, (3) 17 are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the noncitizen is scheduled for 18 or requests a bond hearing. 19 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1336 (W.D. Wash. 2025). 20 5. The Court issued the following declaratory relief: 21 The Court declares that Bond Denial Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and are not subject to mandatory detention 22 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Court further declares that the Tacoma Immigration Court’s practice of denying bond to Bond 23 Denial Class members on the basis of § 1225(b)(2) violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. 24 1 Id. 2 6. The Court entered judgment in favor of the Bond Denial Class the same day. 3 See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Hermosillo, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, at Dkt. 66.
4 7. M.M. is a member of the Bond Denial Class. See Dkt. 17 at 3–4. 5 8. Despite the Court’s declaratory judgment, on October 22, 2025, an immigration 6 judge (“IJ”) at the Tacoma Immigration Court denied bond to M.M. on the basis 7 that he was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt. 1 ¶ 51. 8 The IJ set an alternative bond amount of $25,000. Id. 9 9. That same day, M.M. filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing his 10 detention was unlawful. Dkt. 1. 11 10. On October 28, 2025, Respondents appealed the Rodriguez Vazquez declaratory 12 judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Rodriguez Vazquez,
13 No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, at Dkt. 71. That appeal remains pending. 14 11. Respondents have not sought a stay of the declaratory judgment from either this 15 Court or the Court of Appeals. 16 12. On October 31, 2025, the Court granted M.M.’s habeas petition and ordered that 17 Respondents either release him or allow his release upon payment of the 18 alternative bond. Dkt. 17. 19 13. M.M. now seeks an award of $7,041.09 in attorney’s fees and costs under the 20 EAJA. Dkts. 19, 20. 21 14. Respondents do not dispute that M.M. is a prevailing party or the amount of fees 22 sought. Dkt. 21 at 2. Instead, Respondents argue only that attorney’s fees should
23 be denied because their position was substantially justified. Id. at 2–4. 24 1 IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. M.M. is the prevailing party. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 2 2. The fees and costs sought by M.M. are reasonable and in compliance with the 3 EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(A). 4 3. Respondents’ position was not substantially justified. 5 4. To determine whether the government has met its burden to show that its action 6 was substantially justified, courts examine “both the government’s litigation 7 position and the underlying agency action giving rise to the civil action.” Meier, 8 727 F.3d at 870. 9 5. Here, Respondents cannot meet that burden because of the underlying agency 10 action that required M.M. to file this habeas petition. 11 6. At the time the IJ denied bond to M.M., this Court had already entered a 12 declaratory judgment granting relief to a certified class of detainees such as M.M. 13 and declaring that they were not subject to mandatory detention. See Rodriguez 14 Vazquez, 802 F. Supp. 3d at 1336. 15 7. Although the government appealed that judgment, it has never sought to stay it. 16 8. It is a “basic proposition” that “all orders and judgments of courts must be 17 complied with promptly.” Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975). “If a 18 person to whom a court directs an order believes that order is incorrect the remedy 19 is to appeal, but, absent a stay, he must comply promptly with the order pending 20 appeal.” Id. 21 9. But instead, the federal agency defendants in Rodriguez Vazquez have chosen to 22 ignore the declaratory judgment, forcing class members to file habeas petitions as 23 their only means of seeking relief from unlawful mandatory detention. 24 1 See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Hermosillo, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 102461, at 2 *2–3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 14, 2026). 3 10. This Court recently explained in a detailed order why those agencies are incorrect
4 in their position that the declaratory judgment is merely “advisory.” See id. at *6. 5 That reasoning is incorporated here. 6 11. For those same reasons, M.M. should never have been forced to file this habeas 7 petition. When he sought a bond hearing after this Court’s judgment in Rodriguez 8 Vazquez, there was no reasonable basis in law or fact for the Tacoma Immigration 9 Court to ignore that judgment and deny bond on the basis that he was subject to 10 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See Meier, 727 F.3d at 870. 11 Although Federal Respondents conceded M.M.’s membership in the Bond Denial 12 Class in their return to the habeas petition, see Dkt. 15 at 3, that does not change
13 the reality that the fees and costs incurred here were solely the result of the 14 government’s unreasonable decision to ignore the class judgment in Rodriguez 15 Vazquez. 16 12. Respondents’ position was therefore not substantially justified, and there are no 17 other special circumstances that would make an award of fees under the EAJA 18 unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 19 13. The Court awards M.M. $6,787.09 in attorney’s fees. 20 14. The Court awards M.M. $254.00 in costs. 21 V. CONCLUSION Because Respondents’ position was not substantially justified, the motion for attorney’s 22 fees (Dkts. 19, 20) is GRANTED. Petitioner is awarded fees and costs under the EAJA in the 23 amount of $7,041.09. The judgment shall be amended to include the award in favor of Petitioner. 24 1 2 Dated this 30th day of January, 2026. hy OE 4 Tiffany □□□ Cartwright United States District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24