M.M. v. Islamic Republic of Iran

District Court, District of Columbia·Decided December 22, 2023·No. Civil Action No. 2021-2783·Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

M.M., individually, as the father of JOHN DOE 1, and as the legal representative of the ESTATE OF JOHN DOE 1, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 1:21-cv-2783 (TNM)

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2017, terrorists detonated a bomb near the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan. The blast killed nearly a hundred people, including eight Afghan security contractors employed by the United States (collectively, the Contractors). The Contractors’ estates and relatives (collectively, Plaintiffs) blame the Islamic Republic of Iran. In their view, Iran knowingly and willfully supported, trained, and directed the Taliban and the Haqqani Network—two well-known terrorist organizations—to carry out the attack. So Plaintiffs sued Iran for materially supporting extrajudicial killings in violation of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).

Iran ignored this case, and Plaintiffs now move for default judgment and damages.

Plaintiffs have successfully shown that Iran lacks sovereign immunity under the FSIA’s terrorism exception. They have proven the Court has personal jurisdiction over Iran. And they have established their entitlement to a favorable judgment, although they are not all entitled to the full damages they seek. So the Court will partially grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment and award them damages as allowed by law.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns a 2017 terrorist attack in Kabul. Plaintiffs, the estates and relatives of U.S. contractors killed in that bombing, claim Iran provided material support to the responsible terrorist groups. See Pls.’ Mot. for Default J. (Default Mem.) at 2, 1 ECF No. 27-1. Because of that support, Plaintiffs say, Iran should be held liable.

Under the FSIA, foreign states are generally immune from suit in the United States. See Mohammadi v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 782 F.3d 9, 13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But “that grant of immunity is subject to a number of exceptions.” Id. Plaintiffs say the “terrorism exception” applies here. Default Mem. at 12. Under that exception, victims may sue foreign states that provide material support for extrajudicial killings carried out by terrorist organizations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.

Iran never responded. So Plaintiffs moved for default judgment. See generally Default Mem. To prevail on that motion, Plaintiffs must prove that the Court has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over Iran. See Jerez v. Repub. of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2014). And they must also “establish[] [their] claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).

Plaintiffs primarily rely on two expert reports. See Exp. Rep. of Phillip Smyth (Smyth Rep.), ECF No. 27-3; Exp. Rep. of Abbie Aryan (Aryan Rep.), ECF No. 27-4. This is common in FSIA cases because “firsthand evidence and eyewitness testimony is difficult or impossible to obtain from an absent and likely hostile sovereign.” Owens v. Repub. of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Opati v. Repub. of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601 (2020). The Court has reviewed these experts’ credentials and is satisfied that each is qualified

1 The Court’s page references correspond to the pagination generated by CM/ECF.

to offer the opinions discussed below. Accord Borochov v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 589 F. Supp. 3d 15, 26 (D.D.C. 2022) (accepting expert reports as sufficient to meet plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden); see also Fissler v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 2022 WL 4464873, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2022) (qualifying Smyth as an expert on Iran’s relationship with militia groups and those militia groups’ terrorism tactics).

The Court starts with findings of fact. Then it proceeds to jurisdiction, merits, and damages.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Taliban and the Haqqani Network The Taliban is a “militant group operating mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Selig v.

Islamic Repub. of Iran, 573 F. Supp. 3d 40, 52 (D.D.C. 2021). 2 And as Smyth explains in his expert report, the Taliban and Haqqani Network are closely connected. The Haqqani Network “is a quasi-autonomous organization” that “functions as the Taliban’s core leadership and fighting group.” Smyth Rep. ¶ 27; see also Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (finding that the Haqqani Network and the Taliban “operate as a single entity”). Like the Taliban, the Haqqani Network is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-

2 The Court may not take “judicial notice of the truth of findings and conclusions” from other cases “absent some particular indicia of indisputability.” Murphy v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2010) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). No such indicia appear here given the “one-sided” nature of this proceeding. Id. at 58–59. Still, “the FSIA does not require this Court to relitigate issues that have already been settled in previous decisions.” Id. at 59 (cleaned up). So “the Court may review evidence considered in an opinion that is judicially noticed, without necessitating the re-presentment of such evidence.” Id. The Court does so here, drawing on uncontroverted facts from other cases only when they accord with the evidence presented by Plaintiffs here.

organizations/ (last accessed Dec. 15, 2023). And it “actively work[s] . . . with other terrorist organizations,” especially al-Qaida. Smyth Rep. ¶ 27.

For years, the Taliban and the Haqqani Network were at odds. See Selig, 573 F. Supp. 3d at 52. But they began working together in the 1990s and “grew even closer during the U.S. invasion” of Afghanistan. Id. at 52–53 (recounting various connections). Because of this, “the original distinctions between these two groups . . . collapsed.” Id. at 53.

B. Iran’s Support for the Taliban and Haqqani Network The Court has recently recounted Iran’s history of sponsoring terrorist groups. See generally Roth v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 651 F. Supp. 3d 65, 73–77 (D.D.C. 2023); Brown v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 2023 WL 4824740, at *2–3 (D.D.C. July 27, 2023). The Court nonetheless “expounds on those findings” below with additional evidence presented by Plaintiffs’ experts. Murphy v. Islamic Repub. of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2010).

Iran’s relationship with the Taliban and Haqqani Network began in earnest around 2000.

Smyth Rep. ¶ 34. In the years that followed, Taliban leadership publicly visited Iran “numerous times.” Id. But the links between Iran and the Taliban do not stop there. At one point, a Taliban faction “was based in Iran.” Id. ¶ 22. And Taliban leaders have received “monetary support and individualized training” to “help build Taliban tactical and combat capabilities.” Id. ¶ 24 (cleaned up). As Aryan puts it, “Iran systematically and purposefully provided material support to the Taliban throughout all times relevant to this case, and increasingly so beginning in 2015.” Aryan Rep. ¶ 35.

Iran’s financial assistance to the Taliban and Haqqani Network has taken many forms. One is “direct funding.” Id. ¶ 49. For instance, it paid bounties to the Taliban for each Afghan or American soldier killed—$1,700 for an Afghan soldier and $1,000 for a U.S. servicemember.

See id. And it has sent payments directly to Taliban fighters’ families. See id. Iran has also funded the Taliban indirectly “by enabling the group’s international narcotics trade.” Id. ¶ 48. That money has “allow[ed] . . . the Taliban to rapidly and effectively develop and deploy forces eager to attack U.S. interests within Afghanistan.” Id.

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