M.J. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 30, 2019
• Docket: 19A-JV-215
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 30 2019, 7:27 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Alan K. Wilson Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Benjamin J. Shoptaw Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

M.J., July 30, 2019 Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-JV-215 v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Appellee-Petitioner. Kimberly S. Dowling, Judge The Honorable Amanda Yonally, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 18C02-1809-JD-116

Kirsch, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-215 | July 30, 2019 Page 1 of 8 [1] M.J. appeals his placement with the Indiana Department of Correction

(“DOC”) following his admission to theft,1 which would be a Class A

misdemeanor if committed by an adult. M.J. raises the following restated issue

for our review: whether placement in DOC was an abuse of discretion because

it prevents him from completing his HSE program and obtaining employment

to support his newborn child.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [3] On August 8, 2018, M.J. was placed on Electronic House Arrest and was

required to wear an electronic ankle bracelet as a result of a separate

delinquency adjudication under a different cause number. Appellant’s App. Vol.

II at 3. On August 14, 2018, M.J. cut off his ankle bracelet and broke the terms

of his house arrest. Tr. Vol. I at 8.

[4] On September 20, 2018, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that M.J.

committed escape, which would be a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult,

and theft, which would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult due

to M.J. cutting of his ankle bracelet. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 2. At the

October 9, 2018 initial hearing, M.J. admitted to committing theft as a Class A

misdemeanor. Tr. Vol. I at 9. M.J. admitted that he knew he was not supposed

1 See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-215 | July 30, 2019 Page 2 of 8 to cut off his ankle bracelet or take it off of his person. Id. at 8. Count I, escape,

was dismissed. Id. at 10.

[5] On January 9, 2019, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing. Tr. Vol. II

at 2. At the hearing, Stacy Bell (“Bell”), M.J.’s probation officer, testified as to

her recommendation that M.J. should be incarcerated in DOC. Id. at 7. Bell

explained that commitment to DOC was necessary because M.J. had a low

likelihood of appearing at subsequent proceedings, M.J. was a threat to himself

and the community, and the likelihood was low that M.J. would accept

treatment offered. Id. at 5. Bell also informed the juvenile court of M.J.’s

criminal history, which included: a pending charge of illegal consumption as a

Class C misdemeanor if committed by an adult; a delinquency adjudication for

what would be robbery as a Level 3 felony if committed by an adult; the current

case; and a pending case for battery as a Class A misdemeanor if committed by

an adult. Id. at 6-7; Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 23, 28. Bell further explained that

M.J. frequently ran away and remained a flight risk. Tr. Vol. II at 6; Appellant’s

App. Vol. II at 40. She mentioned that on one occasion when M.J. ran away, he

was driving and got in a serious car accident that resulted in his hospitalization.

Tr. Vol. II at 6. Later, M.J. ran away again and wrecked his father’s truck. Id.

at 7. Bell concluded that M.J. demonstrated “criminal thinking errors” and that

commitment to DOC would rehabilitate these errors. Id.

[6] The juvenile court issued its findings on January 11, 2019. Appellant’s App. Vol.

II at 38-40. The court found that M.J. had “failed less restrictive attempts at

intervention and continues to commit delinquent acts.” Id. at 40. The court Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-215 | July 30, 2019 Page 3 of 8 further found that M.J. engages in behavior that puts himself and his

community at risk. Id. The juvenile court concluded that M.J. was “beyond

rehabilitation within the community resources” and ordered that M.J. be

committed to DOC. Id. M.J. now appeals his commitment to DOC.

Discussion and Decision [7] In making this claim, M.J. argues that M.J.’s sentence is inappropriate under

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) because placement with local detention was a

more appropriate remedy and that placement with DOC will prevent him from

completing his high school education, supporting his child, and securing a job.

He also argues that the standard of review for this case is whether his sentence

is inappropriate. M.J. is incorrect. The correct standard is whether the trial

court abused its discretion. T.K.., 899 N.E.2d at 678. Because juvenile

proceedings are civil in nature, Indiana Appellate Rule 7 does not apply to

juvenile dispositions. T.K. v. State, 899 N.E.2d 686, 687-88 (Ind. Ct. App.

2009). Furthermore, the commitment of a juvenile is not a sentence. Jordan v.

State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).

[8] “A juvenile court is accorded ‘wide latitude’ and ‘great flexibility’ in its dealings

with juveniles.” J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)

(citing J.S. v. State, 881 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). The choice of a

specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated as a delinquent child is a matter

within the sound discretion of the juvenile court and will only be reversed if

there has been an abuse of that discretion. Id. “The juvenile court’s discretion

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-215 | July 30, 2019 Page 4 of 8 in determining a disposition is subject to the statutory considerations of the

welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of favoring the

least-harsh disposition.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile

court’s action is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts

and circumstances before it. Id.

[9] The goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation rather than punishment. Id.

“‘Accordingly, juvenile courts have a variety of placement choices for juveniles

who have delinquency problems, none of which are considered sentences.’” Id.

(quoting R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). Indiana

Code section 31-37-18-6(1)(A) states that “[i]f consistent with the safety of the

community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a

dispositional decree that is in the least restrictive (most family like) and most

appropriate setting available.” “[T]he statute recognizes that in certain

situations the best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive

placement.” J.S., 881 N.E.2d at 29 (citing K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 387

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). The law requires only that the disposition

selected be the least restrictive disposition that is “consistent with the safety of

the community and the best interest of the child.” J.T., 111 N.E.3d at 1026

(citing D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

[10] This case arises from M.J.’s delinquent behavior while on house arrest for

another adjudication. His delinquency record includes a pending charge of

illegal consumption as a Class C misdemeanor if committed by an adult, an

adjudication of robbery as a Level 3 felony if committed by an adult, the current

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-215 | July 30, 2019 Page 5 of 8 case, and a pending charge of battery as a Class A misdemeanor if committed

by an adult. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 23, 28. M.J. has been afforded many

rehabilitative programs: formal probation; home detention; outpatient

counseling; family counseling; residential treatments; and drug screens. Id. at

40. Despite these programs, M.J. frequently ran away from home and

remained a flight risk and at a high risk to reoffend. Id. at 27-28.

[11] M.J. argues that a placement at a local detention facility would have been more

appropriate since Bell, his probation officer, conceded to local detention if the

juvenile court did not place M.J. in DOC. However, even if a less restrictive

alternative exists, the juvenile court is not obligated to choose that alternative.

D.C. v. State, 935 N.E.2d 290, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he availability of a

less restrictive alternative does not mean the juvenile court was required to

order that placement.”), aff’d on trans., 958 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. 2011). Indiana

Code section 31-37-18-6 states that the trial court is only required to consider

the least restrictive placement if that placement comports with the safety needs

of the community and the child’s best interests. See J.B. v. State, 849 N.E.2d

714, 717-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it committed the juvenile to the DOC because the less-

restrictive placement suggested by him would have fallen short of meeting the

community’s safety needs), trans. denied.

[12] Here, the juvenile court found that M.J. was “beyond rehabilitation within the

community resources.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 40. M.J. had participated in

many less restrictive rehabilitation services, but none of these services

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-215 | July 30, 2019 Page 6 of 8 rehabilitated M.J.’s delinquent behavior Even though placement in a local

facility was available, it was within the juvenile court’s discretion to order

placement in DOC because of M.J.’s failure to reform his delinquent behavior.

M.J. remained a risk to himself and the safety of his community, and the

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.

[13] M.J. further argues that placement in DOC will delay his completion of his

HSE program and will prevent his ability to get a job. M.J. claims that he has a

job and wants to support his newborn child. While we sympathize with M.J.’s

desire to provide for his child, M.J. has exhausted his other options of

rehabilitation. See D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App 2005)

(holding that when a juvenile exhausts less restrictive rehabilitation efforts, the

juvenile court does not abuse its discretion in committing the juvenile to DOC).

M.J.’s commitment to DOC was the only remaining rehabilitative option; thus,

it was not an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court to order commitment.

[14] We conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering

placement in DOC. M.J. had ample opportunities to reform his behavior, yet

he remains a risk to himself and his community. M.J. has exhausted all less

restrictive attempts of rehabilitation. Further, he is a flight risk and is at a high

risk to reoffend. It was not an abuse of discretion by the juvenile court to order

placement in DOC as that placement is consistent with the safety of the

community and the best interests of M.J. See Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6(A).

[15] Affirmed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-215 | July 30, 2019 Page 7 of 8 Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-215 | July 30, 2019 Page 8 of 8