M.J. v. State

67 So. 3d 1189, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 13338, 2011 WL 3687405
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedAugust 24, 2011
DocketNo. 3D11-153
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 67 So. 3d 1189 (M.J. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
M.J. v. State, 67 So. 3d 1189, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 13338, 2011 WL 3687405 (Fla. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

SUAREZ, J.

M.J. appeals from an adjudication of delinquency for resisting a police officer without violence. We affirm, as there was competent substantial evidence to support a prima facie case of resisting an officer without violence.

On June 25, 2009, City of Opa Locka police officers Sorano, Vega, and Steel were dispatched in response to a burglary in process. After setting up a perimeter, they observed M.J. running through an alleyway. Dressed in full uniform and identifying himself as a police officer, Officer Sorano called M.J.’s nickname, “Skeeter,” and told him to stop. M.J. turned around, smiled, and continued running in the opposite direction. Also dressed in full police uniform, Officer Vega, who was able to identify M.J. from a previous encounter, observed him coming up from the bushes where he was hiding in the alleyway. After being chased by both officers down the alley, over some fences and into buildings — all the while being told by officers to “stop” — M.J. was apprehended and placed in handcuffs by Officer Steel.

M.J. argued below and on appeal that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the stop and thus the officers were not executing a legal duty required to sustain the charge of resisting arrest without violence. We disagree.

To support a conviction for resisting arrest without violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2007), the State must prove that: (1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty; and (2) the defendant’s actions, by his words, conduct, or a combination thereof, constitute obstruction or resistance of the lawful execution of a legal duty.1

The element of lawful execution of a legal duty is satisfied if an officer has either a founded suspicion to stop the person or probable cause to make a warrant-less arrest. E.A.B. v. State, 851 So.2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). A stop is justified when an officer observes facts giving rise [1191]*1191to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. C.E.L. v. State, 24 So.3d 1181 (Fla.2009). Whether an officer’s suspicion is reasonable must be determined from the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the investigative stop, based on the facts known to the officer before the stop. C.E.L., 24 So.3d at 1186.

Based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officers before they stopped M.J., we find that there was reasonable suspicion for them to stop M.J.; the officers were lawfully executing a legal duty sufficient to satisfy the charge of resisting an officer without violence. We therefore affirm MJ.’s adjudication for resisting an officer without violence.2

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
67 So. 3d 1189, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 13338, 2011 WL 3687405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mj-v-state-fladistctapp-2011.