Mizell v. State

197 S.W. 300, 81 Tex. Crim. 241, 1917 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 113
CourtCourt of Criminal Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 2, 1917
DocketNo. 4397.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 197 S.W. 300 (Mizell v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mizell v. State, 197 S.W. 300, 81 Tex. Crim. 241, 1917 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 113 (Tex. 1917).

Opinions

DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted of rape by force and given twelve years confinement in the penitentiary.

The indictment contains two counts, one charging rape and the other incest. The facts show that the prosecutrix was appellant’s niece. His wife was in bad health and appellant induced prosecutrix, with the consent of her mother, to come from her home in another county to stay with his, appellant’s, wife. After remaining at appellant’s home about three weeks she and appellant’s wife disagreed so that prosecutrix concluded to return home. Appellant took her to Lufkin to meet a night train. After arriving there they went to the hotel owned by the *242 witness Fuller, engaged a room and retired. They occupied the same room. Appellant put in a call for himself about 5 o’clock in the morning. It seems that the train passed Lufkin at about that hour. The State’s theory is that he had intercourse with the girl while in the room and over her protest. She testified to those facts, and also to. some matters which tended to excuse her for not making an outcry. She gave as a reason for not making an outcry that defendant made certain statements to her which tended to terrorize her. Mr. Fuller, a. State’s witness, testified that he heard noises in the room occupied by them, and among other things that somebody was sobbing or crying. The next morning when the girl was questioned about the matter, and perhaps taken in charge by the authorities, she gave her name as Lillian Jones, and stated that her brother, Charley Jones, spent the night in the room with her, and that she was sobbing and crying because her brother had notified her of her mother’s death. She was carried before the grand jury and made these or similar statements. After being informed that an accusation would be brought against her brother for-incest in another county, she changed her testimony and imputed the whole matter to appellant. This was a case of rape by force and without the consent of the prosecutrix. If she agreed to it or did not make sufficient resistance to come within the statute of rape by force, this case would not be one of rape under that count in the indictment, but. if the act of intercourse was consummated it could and would be a. case of incest. This was one of the serious questions and perhaps the most serious question in the case.

There are several bills of exception in the record. That with reference to the application for continuance is not discussed as it may not. arise upon another trial. The witnesses can be obtained.

Bill No. 8 was reserved and this quotation is made from it: “I will ask you if they did not talk to you for some time about the fact that it would put your brother in the penitentiary, and if they did not indicate to you that if you would tell on this defendant they would drop and would not consider any further action about your brother,, and what you had said about it (this had reference to the testimony of prosecutrix before the grand jury and the contention of defendant, that before she told on defendant they had offered her brother immunity from a charge of incest in Montgomery County) and the State: objected to the admission of said proposed testimony, to permitting the witness to answer such question, and the court sustained same, to which the defendant then and there excepted and tenders this his bill of exception, for the reason that he expected to prove by the witness, that she was promised immunity for her brother, or that in some way it was substantially indicated to prosecutrix that if she would disclose: on this defendant she and her brother would be given immunity and no punishment would follow, otherwise her brother would be subject-to a prosecution for incest, and an affidavit would be forwarded to the. *243 district attorney of Montgomery County to enable Mm to base the charge.”

While this bill is somewhat indefinite and not sufficiently full, yet upon another trial this matter should be permitted to go to the jury if denied by the prosecuting witness. These remarks with reference to this matter are made in passing so that upon another trial if the matter comes up it will be proper for the defendant to show this as attacking the truthfutoess of the prosecuting witness and as to her reasons for changing from her original statements showing that her' brother was with her in the room and not the defendant.

Another bill alleges misconduct on the part of the jury in-two respects: First, that they received testimony with reference to the character and standing of the witness Fuller that was not in evidence on the trial; and, second, comment and discussion of the failure of the. defendant to testify in his own behalf. The testimony shows beyond question that whatever there is in this case occurred in Fuller’s hotel,, and that he was an important witness and heard some of the noise which he testified was carried on in the room occupied by appellant and the. girl. His reputation for veracity and as being a man of good reputation was not placed in evidence. There was nobody in the room with appellant and the girl; they occupied it alone, and no witness could have known what occurred except the two. Fuller overheard some noises and confusions and sobbing and crying, but was not present in the room, and interposed no interference in these matters, although they occurred in his hotel, and he and the girl both knew that no outcry was made. There was nobody then who could testify to the immediate facts except the girl and the defendant, and Fuller was the. State’s main corroborating witness.

The affidavit of Chester Davis was attached to the motion for new-trial setting up misconduct of the jury in both respects. This affidavit was introduced in evidence on the trial of the motion in addition to the affiant’s evidence} and several of the jurors testified in regard to-these matters. Among other things, it is shown: “I was on the jury that tried George Mizell. He was sentenced for twelve years. During the deliberations of the jury the fact that the defendant did not testify was discussed by the jury. Some of the jurors said that the defendant did not get on the stand and deny anything. They argued what the prosecutrix and others swore against defendant must be true or else defendant would have gotten on the stand and denied it. They said he must be guilty or he would have gotten on the stand and testified that he pleaded not guilty and then would not get on the stand and testify or deny anything that was testified to against him. Several times when an argument was being advanced in favor of defendant against the truth of some statement testified to against defendant some of those jurors favoring rape and the highest punishment would meet the argument by saying that if it was not so defendant ought to have taken the stand and denied it. About three of the jurors were in favor of find *244 ing the defendant guilty of incest omy, while the others wanted to find him guilty of rape. Several of the jurors wanted to give him fifty years, and some were for twenty-five. Some of the jurors were for as low as ten years, before the conversations above set out about the defendant’s failure to testify. In discussing the evidence of prosecutrix some of the jurors said that if it was not true, defendant ought to have gone on the stand and explained it.

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86 S.W.2d 220 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1935)
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45 S.W.2d 213 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1932)
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248 S.W. 695 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1923)
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222 S.W. 1106 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1920)
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216 S.W. 395 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1919)
Mizell v. State
203 S.W. 49 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1918)
Boozer v. State
198 S.W. 295 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1917)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
197 S.W. 300, 81 Tex. Crim. 241, 1917 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 113, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mizell-v-state-texcrimapp-1917.