Mitrano v. Martin

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: January 22, 2002
• Docket: CV-01-153-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mitrano v. Martin CV-01-153-M 01/22/02 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Peter Paul Mitrano, Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 01-153-M

Willard G. Martin, Jr., Defendant

O R D E R

Although acting in a pro se capacity, plaintiff is a member

of both the New Hampshire and Virginia bars. He is a party to

child custody litigation that has been carried on in at least

three different states, see, e.g., Mitrano v. Kelly, 785 A. 2d 191

(Vt. Aug. 29, 2001) (unpublished table decision), ce r t . denied,

S.Ct. __ , 70 USLW 3384 (Jan. 22, 2002), and is currently

pending in New Hampshire. In this federal suit, plaintiff seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, against a

sitting New Hampshire judge - the judge who presides over his

child custody case. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While it is not

entirely clear from his pleadings, it seems that plaintiff's

basic complaint is that the state judge found him to be in

contempt of court (erroneously according to plaintiff) for

removing his two minor sons from New Hampshire to Virginia while the case was pending and without prior court permission. See

Exhibit Q to defendant's memorandum, Mitrano v. Kelly, No. 2000-

M-0193 (N.H. Superior C t ., Family Div. at Lebanon). Plaintiff

also challenges the New Hampshire court's jurisdiction to resolve

issues related to custody of his minor children, and vaguely

asserts that his various complaints all add up to an actionable

deprivation by the judge of his federal due process rights.

Plaintiff's federal claims are without merit, as he no doubt

suspects. Accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, and

construing the complaint in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, his claims are that the New Hampshire Superior Court

has incorrectly determined its own jurisdiction over the custody

issues pending before it; that this court should declare the

state judge wrong in finding plaintiff in contempt of the state

court; that the state contempt finding violated his federal

constitutional rights; that this court should enjoin the state

court from violating federal law; and, that money damages should

be awarded against the state judge (though plaintiff makes clear

that he is suing the judge only in his "official capacity").

Extensive analysis and discussion are not warranted.

Plaintiff is a trained attorney and presumably knows, or

2 certainly should know, that his claims are nonstarters. Briefly,

the New Hampshire Superior Court's exercise of jurisdiction over

his child custody case, whether legally correct or incorrect, and

its order finding him in contempt of that court, whether legally

correct or incorrect, are matters which he can fully litigate in

the state courts — appeals lie in the New Hampshire Supreme Court

and, if cognizable federal issues warrant it, in the United

States Supreme Court. Lower federal courts, however, do not sit

in review of state court decisions, particularly when the state

proceedings are ongoing, as is the case here. See, e.g..

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923);

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J.,

concurring); Lancellotti v. Fav, 909 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

Once a state court issues a judgment, a federal district court

lacks jurisdiction to review the decision, even if the state

judgment is patently wrong or was entered following patently

unconstitutional proceedings. See Young v. Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225,

1231 (7th Cir. 1996). (Plaintiff here apparently did seek a form

of interlocutory appellate relief in the New Hampshire Supreme

Court, but relief was denied.)

3 Plaintiff's complaint stresses that he sues the state judge

only in his official capacity (Complaint, Para. 10), yet seeks

money damages. As plaintiff surely knows, claims against state

actors in their official capacities are, in effect, claims

against the state itself. See Negron Gaztambide v. Hernandez

Torres, 145 F.3d 410, 416 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Official-capacity

suits . . . 'generally represent only another way of pleading an

action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.' . . .

[A]n official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,

to be treated as a suit against the entity.")(quoting Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). Consequently, plaintiff

cannot bring a § 1983 claim for monetary damages against the

state judge in his official capacity because the judge is

shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Moreover, of course, the state judge is entitled to absolute

judicial immunity, and immunity not just from liability for money

damages, but immunity from suit as well. See Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9 (1991). All of the acts complained of by plaintiff

were unarguably taken by the defendant judge in his judicial

capacity (i.e., determining the court's jurisdiction, exercising

jurisdiction, and finding plaintiff in contempt of court), and

4 none of the acts complained of was taken in the complete absence

of all jurisdiction (the Family Court Division of the Superior

Court obviously has subject matter jurisdiction over family law

issues, such as child custody). See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.

349 (1978).

And, of course, the Younger abstention doctrine plainly

precludes granting the declaratory or injunctive relief plaintiff

seeks in this case. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);

Chaulk Services Inc. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 70

F.3d 1361, 1368 (1st Cir. 1995). Plaintiff is, again, fully able

to litigate his jurisdictional theories, claims of innocence

regarding the contempt finding, and federal constitutional issues

in the ongoing state proceedings.

For the reasons given, and those advanced by the Attorney

General in his memorandum in support of defendant's motion to

dismiss, defendant's motion to dismiss (document no. 5) is

granted and plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed for failure

to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The

Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this order

and close the case.

5 SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

January 22, 2001

cc: Peter P. Mitrano, Esq. Andrew B. Livernois, Esq. Elizabeth Cazden,Esq.