Mitchum v. Honea

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 27 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL ERNEST MITCHUM, Jr., No. 24-5777 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:22-cv-02313-DAD-CKD v. MEMORANDUM* KORY L. HONEA, Butte County Sheriff; HAL BROOKS; AL SARACINI; JANE DOLAN; HILDA WHEELER; BERTHA MOSELEY; LEN FULTON; D. HOVEY, Butte County Sheriff Captain and Jail Commander; BRIAN MEYERS, Butte County Sheriff Jail Lieutenant; L. NILES, Jail Sergeant; HANCOCK, Jail Sergeant; ADAMSON, Butte County Jail Correctional Deputy; K DUNN, Butte County Jail Correctional Deputy; COUNTY OF BUTTE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 9, 2026 San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ, TALLMAN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Mitchum (“Mitchum” or “Plaintiff”) filed a pro

se complaint (“the Complaint”) alleging that Butte County and individual

Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”) violated the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The district court dismissed the Complaint for

failure to state a claim. Plaintiff timely appealed.

Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we review de novo the

district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We

accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as true, adopt all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and liberally construe filings of pro se

plaintiffs. Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., 965 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2020);

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010).

To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: “(1) he is a

‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) he was either excluded from

participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or

activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.”

Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.

1997)). To recover monetary damages, a complaint must plausibly allege the

public entity acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 1138. Because the

2 24-5777 Complaint plausibly alleges an ADA claim and deliberate indifference, we reverse

and remand.

1. The Complaint plausibly alleges a qualifying disability. The ADA defines

“disability” as a “physical or mental impairment,” and establishes that its definition

of disability must be “construed in favor of broad coverage.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(1)(A); id. § 12102(4)(A). The disability must “substantially limit[] one or

more major life activities.” Id. § 12102(1)(A).

The district court erred in concluding that the Complaint failed to state an

ADA claim because it did not name a “specific, recognized mental or physical

illness.” A plaintiff is not required to name a specific diagnosis to state a claim

under the ADA. Instead, the ADA defines disability in relation to limitations on

specific life activities. See id.

Adopting a broad reading of disability (as the ADA requires, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(4)(A)) and construing all facts in the light most favorable to Mitchum (as

this court’s pleading standards require, Heineke, 965 F.3d at 1012), the Complaint

plausibly alleges a physical impairment that substantially limits Mitchum’s major

life activities. The Complaint alleges that Mitchum suffered mobility limitations

for more than four years, that both his knees dislocate spontaneously, and that he

cannot walk distances without a cane or a wheelchair. The Complaint also alleges

that Mitchum’s knee impairment affects his ability to shower safely. The

3 24-5777 Complaint thus plausibly alleges that Mitchum’s knee impairment limits his ability

to care for himself, perform manual tasks, stand, and walk—qualifying major life

activities under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 28 C.F.R.

§ 35.108(d)(1)(v).

2. The Complaint plausibly alleges that Mitchum was “denied the benefits of

the services, programs, or activities” of Butte County Jail (“the Jail”). 42 U.S.C

§ 12132. The district court concluded that the Complaint failed to state a claim

because Mitchum was provided with a shower and toilet. But the ADA mandates

more than bare access to a public entity’s facilities. The ADA requires meaningful

access to “assure” individuals with disabilities receive “equality of opportunity”

and “full participation,” id. § 12101(a)(7), and establishes that such access may be

achieved through “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices” or “the

provision of auxiliary aids and services.” Id. § 12131(2).

Here, Mitchum sought accommodations—handrails in showering and

toileting facilities, a shower chair, a cane, and an exemption from any cleaning

requirement—to facilitate meaningful access to “toilet and bathing facilities, and

elementary mobility” within the Jail. Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d

1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010). Because he was denied accommodations, Mitchum

was only able to access these facilities on par with non-disabled detainees by

risking injury and humiliation. The Complaint thus plausibly alleges denial of

4 24-5777 meaningful access to showering, toileting facilities, and elementary mobility within

the Jail, which constitutes a denial of services under the ADA.

3. To state a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must allege “such exclusion,

denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Duvall, 260

F.3d at 1135 (emphasis added). The Complaint alleges that Mitchum’s knee

impairment prevented him from accessing the benefits of the Jail’s toileting and

hygiene services and elementary mobility within the Jail equally to non-disabled

inmates. See Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 276 (2d Cir. 2003). This is

sufficient to plausibly allege that the denial of benefits was “by reason of

[Mitchum’s] disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

4. To state a claim for damages, the Complaint must allege deliberate

indifference. A defendant acts with deliberate indifference when it has

“knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and []

fail[s] to act upon that [] likelihood.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139. We hold that the

Complaint plausibly alleges deliberate indifference.

A. Shower and Toilet Access. Construed in the light most favorable to

Mitchum, the Complaint plausibly alleges that the Jail was on notice of Mitchum’s

need for accommodations and “fail[ed] to act upon that [] likelihood.” Id. The

Complaint alleges that Mitchum sent the Jail his medical records establishing his

prior ADA-qualified status, requested mobility accommodations, and filed

5 24-5777 repeated grievances over the lack of mobility accommodations. Adopting all

inferences in favor of Mitchum, the Complaint also alleges that the Jail “failed

despite repeated requests to take the necessary action” and failed to give “primary

deference” to his requests, as Mitchum was never assigned a housing unit with

handrails in the shower and toilet facilities. See id. at 1140; Updike v. Multnomah

County, 870 F.3d 939, 958 (9th Cir. 2017).

B. Elementary Mobility. We reject Defendants’ arguments that Mitchum

forfeited consideration of whether the district court erred in dismissing his

allegations that Jail officials physically dragged him when he could not walk

unassisted. Mitchum’s Notice of Appeal was sufficient under Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 3(c)(4), and the Opening Brief “specifically and distinctly”

argues that these allegations state an ADA claim. Chadd v. United States, 794

F.3d 1104, 1109 n.4 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977

(9th Cir. 1994)).

The allegations plausibly allege deliberate indifference. Construed in the

light most favorable to Mitchum, the Complaint alleges that the Jail was on notice

of Mitchum’s need for mobility accommodations, and that on one occasion,

Defendants confiscated Mitchum’s cane and a deputy physically dragged him

down the hallway when he could not walk unassisted, and on another occasion, a

Defendant confiscated Mitchum’s temporary wheelchair due to a command “from

6 24-5777 the top,” and physically dragged him on the ground when he could not walk

unassisted. Such abrupt terminations of accommodations and the subsequent

affirmative action of physically dragging a person unable to walk plainly evince

“an element of deliberateness,” rather than proper consideration of whether the

requested aid “would be unreasonable or could not be accommodated.” See

Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139; Updike, 870 F.3d at 957. The Complaint thus plausibly

alleges more than “bureaucratic slippage that constitutes negligence rather than

deliberate action or inaction.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139.

5. The district court erroneously construed the facts alleged in the Complaint

against Mitchum in dismissing the Complaint based on his assumed employment

status. The district court found that it was unclear from the Complaint whether

Mitchum was employed by the Jail when he fell in 2019 and 2020: “While not

entirely clear, it appears that plaintiff worked as an inmate/janitor at the time.

Also, while not entirely clear, the court assumes that plaintiff was required to work

as a janitor.” The district court then inferred from Mitchum’s Complaint, which

stated that the Jail’s handbook “required” him to clean, that he was employed as a

janitor. Even assuming without deciding that employment status in carceral

settings could bear on an inmate’s ability to state a claim under the ADA, the

district court should have adopted the inference in Mitchum’s favor that the Jail

imposed a general duty to maintain the cleanliness of communal spaces on

7 24-5777 detainees, not that Mitchum was employed. Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058,

1062 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he court must . . . draw[] all reasonable inferences from

the complaint in h[is] favor.”).

6. The district court erred in dismissing the Complaint based on

distinguishable cases. First, the question in this case is not whether the ADA is a

public safety statute for purposes of determining whether the negligence per se

doctrine applies. See Hunter ex rel. A.H. v. District of Columbia, 64 F. Supp. 3d

158, 189 (D.D.C. 2014). The district court erred in suggesting that under the

ADA, disabled persons denied benefits may recover if they risk injury to access

services, but not if they are injured. Injury does not preclude recovery under the

ADA. See, e.g., Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008).

Second, the basis for Mitchum’s ADA claim, unlike the plaintiff in Simmons v.

Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), is not that he received

“inadequate treatment” for his disability. See, e.g., Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t, 933 F.3d

285, 291 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[C]omplaints about not being provided an accessible

shower are not . . . disagreements about medical treatment . . . . They are requests

for reasonable accommodations so that inmates with disabilities can take a

shower—just like able-bodied inmates.”).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

8 24-5777