Mitchell v. J. P. Morgan Chase Bank

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedMay 3, 2007
DocketKENcv-06-241
StatusUnpublished

This text of Mitchell v. J. P. Morgan Chase Bank (Mitchell v. J. P. Morgan Chase Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mitchell v. J. P. Morgan Chase Bank, (Me. Super. Ct. 2007).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-06-241 J"

ELIZABETH H. NrrTCHELL and JAMES E. MITCHELL,

Plaintiffs

v. ORDER ON MOTION

J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK,

Defendant

This matter is before the court on defendant's motion to set aside default under

M.R. Civ. P. 55(c).

On October 6, 2006, plaintiffs, husband and wife, represented by attorney

husband, filed a complaint with the court regarding a credit transaction with defendant

issuer of a Visa credit card alleging violation of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act

and breach of contract. By certified mail delivered September 18, 2006, a copy of

complaint and summons was served on Anthony J. Horan, Secretary, J.P. Morgan Chase

Bank, N.A., 270 Park, 35 th Floor, New York, NY 10017. Certified mail receipt was filed

with the court October 6, 2006. On September 7, 2006, the complaint and summons was

served on the Secretary of State of the State of Maine for purposes of affecting service on

the J.P. Morgan Chase Bank. Return of service was filed with the court on October 6,

2006. Mr. Mitchell also represented to the court that a copy of the complaint had been

sent directly to the defendant.

On October 12, 2006, the plaintiffs filed application with the clerk for default

alleging return of service perfected on September 18, 2006, and the defendant failing to 2

appear or plead in the action. Entry of default was entered by the clerk on October 16,

2006.

By motion filed October 24, 2006, plaintiffs moved for judgment of default

asserting that while the account in question showed a credit of $1,194.81, the account

entry did not address the lawsuit and plaintiffs allege entitlement to attorney's fees

under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 213(2). The plaintiffs sought

judgment in the amount of $4,469.45. Request for attorney's fees was supported by

filings of appropriate affidavits.

On November 17, 2006, the court entered judgment for the plaintiffs in the

amount of $4,469.45 plus interest representing attorney's fees and costs. The order

further provides that because plaintiffs received a reversal of finance charges after suit

was filed that no extra damages were awarded.

On December 11, 2006, defendant's counsel entered his appearance and a motion

to set aside default was filed. Defendant alleges a failure of lawful service of process in

the matter thereby establishing good cause for untimeliness of its answer as well as the

existence of a meritorious defense.

The court is satisfied that appropriate service of process was made in the matter.

Unfortunately, the defendant chooses to do business by separating the functions of its

bank between offices in different locations in the far reaches of the United States. There

has been no rebuttal of plaintiffs' assertion that conflicting arrangements for satisfying

the plaintiffs' demand were met. Accordingly, neither the insufficient service nor

meritorious defense has been presented to the court.

The matter of great concern to the defendant in its motion is the judgment for the

plaintiffs for attorney's fees. The underlying facts are that Elizabeth H. Mitchell is the

wife of James E. Mitchell and she is the primary user of the credit card even though 3

James E. Mitchell is on the account. Defendant asserts that plaintiffs cannot be entitled

to attorney's fees because he is acting pro se and the co-owner of the account is his

lawful VYife. Defendant argues that there should be no attorney's fees assessed in the

matter as there was no contract that provides for the awarding of attorney's fees and the

plaintiffs had no fair claim for a violation of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Boiled down to its essentials, the circumstances are that plaintiffs routinely made

payments on their Visa account with defendant bank electronically transferring funds

from a local savings bank by way of computer. On a day in May of 2005, the local bank

was having line problems and, unbeknownst to the plaintiffs, the electronic transfer

from that bank to the defendant did not go through. Accordingly, plaintiffs were in

default on that payment. In the subsequent attempts by plaintiffs to explain and

negotiate a resolution to the problem, one office of the defendant bank in one part of the

country engaged in the process of negotiating a mechanism to resolve the deficiency

and restore the credit relationship. At the same time, another officer of the defendant

bank in another part of the country was attempting to place the credit transaction in

default, call the entire balance due with a penalty and otherwise enforce its rights under

the credit arrangements. As a result of this treatment, many months transpired without

resolution of the problem and ultimately resulted in plaintiffs paying the balance in full

absent the interest and penalties. From the perspective of the plaintiffs, the credit for

that interest and penalties was not made to the account until September 10, 2006,

although unknown to plaintiffs until October 16,2006.

This period from May of 2005 to September of 2006 without resolution in spite of

increasing communications from the plaintiffs to defendant is considered by the court

to be an unfair trade practice and the court is satisfied that, at least, statutorily, plaintiffs 4

are entitled to attorney's fees. The question is whether or not James E. Mitchell can

receive attorney's fees to the extent he represented himself as well as his wife.

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a pro se litigant who is

not a lawyer is not entitled to attorney's fees. In examining the question of whether a

lawyer who represents himself should be treated like other pro se litigants or like a

client who has had the benefit of the advice and advocacy of an independent attorney, it

concludes that awarding counsel fees under such circumstances "would create a

disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff considered himself competent

to litigate on his own behalf. The statutory policy in furthering the successful

prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to

retain counsel in every such case." Kay v. Ehrler, et al., 499 U.s. 432 (1991). This rule was

followed by the United States District Court for the District of Maine in Marcello v. State

of Maine, 238 F.R.D. 113 (2006). The United States District Court for the Northern

District of Georgia when presented with the question whether an attorney could

represent his child and receive statutory attorney's fees noted that parents and children

are distinct entities for purposes of that particular federal statute but further suggested

that the attorney operating in such a circumstance was just as responsible to the child in

compliance with the rules of professional conduct as he would be representing a

stranger. Mathew V. v. Dekalb County School System, 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (2003).

In the matter of Schneider v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico, 187 F.3d 30 (lst cir.

1999), an attorney represented himself and another attorney in a civil rights case before

the Puerto Rico Federal Court, the First Circuit Court of Appeals determined the

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Related

Schneider v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico
187 F.3d 30 (First Circuit, 1999)
Marcello v. Maine
238 F.R.D. 113 (D. Maine, 2006)

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