Mitchell v. Cramer
This text of Mitchell v. Cramer (Mitchell v. Cramer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CORREY MITCHELL, No. 24-1106 D.C. No. 4:23-cv-00141-JSW Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
CRAMER, Assistant Principal; MEREDITH, Assignment Lieutenant,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2025**
Before: SILVERMAN, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Correy Mitchell appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First
Amendment retaliation claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). review de novo. Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th
Cir. 2021). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
We affirm the district court’s summary judgment on Mitchell’s retaliation
claim arising out of his removal from a teacher’s aide position, because Mitchell
does not challenge that portion of the district court’s decision in his opening brief.
See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[O]n appeal, arguments
not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.”).
We vacate the district court’s summary judgment on Mitchell’s retaliation
claim arising out of Cramer and Meredith’s alleged delay in reassigning Mitchell
to a new position. The district court dismissed this claim at screening and did not
inform Mitchell that it would reinstate the claim before granting summary
judgment for Cramer and Meredith. Because Mitchell did not have the opportunity
to conduct discovery or present evidence on this claim, we vacate the judgment on
this claim only and remand for further proceedings. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (providing that entry of summary judgment is
appropriate “after adequate time for discovery”); Texas Partners v. Conrock Co.,
685 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the district court “erred in
granting summary judgment for appellees without affording plaintiffs-appellants
the opportunity to proceed with discovery,” and noting that “when . . . motives and
intent are important, ‘[p]utting plaintiffs to the test . . . without ample opportunity
2 24-1106 for discovery is particularly disfavored’” (citation omitted) (alteration in original));
cf. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that “[a] complaint guides the parties’ discovery”).
The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
3 24-1106
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