Mitchell v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Mitchell v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc.

279 A.D. 877, 110 N.Y.S.2d 423, 1952 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5178

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 25, 1952

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 279 A.D. 877 (Mitchell v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mitchell v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 279 A.D. 877, 110 N.Y.S.2d 423, 1952 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5178 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1952).

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Opinion

The recitation in the order of the Compensation Board that appellant was a special employer is not binding in the light of the fact that it was made after all compensation had been paid by the general employer as to whom the claimant alone sought redress. No refund nor apportionment of the award is directed to be made. The determination was unnecessary and academic and was not binding. (Donahue v. New York [878]*878Life Ins. Co., 259 N. Y. 98, 102.) Irrespective of the conclusive effect of the determination, however, the appellant, on the undisputed proof was the special employer of the plaintiff wife at the time of the accident and was an employer within the contemplation of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. (Matter of De Noyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N. Y. 273; Matter of Dennison v. Peckham Road Corp., 295 N. Y. 457.) The remedy afforded under the Workmen’s Compensation Law was exclusive in that plaintiff wife had exercised her election and had procured an award thereunder. (Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 11.) Carswell, Acting P. J., Adel, Wenzel, MaeCrate and Schmidt, JJ., concur. [See post, p. 931.]

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The recitation in the order of the Compensation Board that appellant was a special employer is not binding in the light of the fact that it was made after all compensation had been paid by the general employer as to whom the claimant alone sought redress. No refund nor apportionment of the award is directed to be made. The determination was unnecessary and academic and was not binding. (Donahue v. New York [878]*878Life Ins. Co., 259 N. Y. 98, 102.) Irrespective of the conclusive effect of the determination, however, the appellant, on the undisputed proof was the special employer of the plaintiff wife at the time of the accident and was an employer within the contemplation of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. (Matter of De Noyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N. Y. 273; Matter of Dennison v. Peckham Road Corp., 295 N. Y. 457.) The remedy afforded under the Workmen’s Compensation Law was exclusive in that plaintiff wife had exercised her election and had procured an award thereunder. (Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 11.) Carswell, Acting P. J., Adel, Wenzel, MaeCrate and Schmidt, JJ., concur. [See post, p. 931.]

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Bluebook (online)

279 A.D. 877, 110 N.Y.S.2d 423, 1952 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mitchell-v-adam-hat-stores-inc-nyappdiv-1952.

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