Mitchell Kenneth Hughes v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 21, 2007
• Docket: 04-06-00626-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-06-00626-CR

Mitchell Kenneth HUGHES, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 6, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 967387 Honorable Olin B. Strauss, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 21, 2007

AFFIRMED

Mitchell Kenneth Hughes appeals his conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana. In one issue on appeal, Hughes contends that because there was a factual dispute as to whether the arresting officers had probable cause or consent ⁽¹⁾ to search the premises or probable cause to arrest him, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard any evidence it may believe to have been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

On May 17, 2006, the San Antonio Police Department received an anonymous 911 call relating information that a tall black male was selling narcotics from Room 220 at a Roadway Inn in San Antonio. Two officers, Mark Morales and Mark Molter, were dispatched to the scene. While both officers stood outside Room 220, Officer Morales knocked on the door. A tall black male, later identified as Hughes, opened the door and stated that he had been set up. Officer Morales observed baggies of marijuana on a table inside the room. The officers then ordered Hughes to the ground, handcuffed him, and arrested him.

Hughes was charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana. After pleading not guilty to the charge, Hughes was tried before a jury, convicted, and sentenced by the trial court to 160 days in jail and a fine of two-thousand dollars.

During the charge conference, Hughes requested an instruction that would allow the jury to acquit him if it had reasonable doubt his constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. According to Hughes, this instruction was warranted because the facts giving rise to probable cause were disputed. The trial court, however, denied his request. Hughes now appeals.

Standard of Review

In reviewing charge error, we must first determine whether error exists. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). If we find error, we must then determine whether the error caused sufficient harm to require reversal. Id.; see also Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends upon whether the error was preserved. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Error properly preserved by an objection to the charge will require reversal as long as the error is not harmless. Id. The court of criminal appeals has interpreted this to mean that any harm, regardless of degree, is sufficient to require reversal. Id. But when the charging error is not preserved, a greater degree of harm is required, and this standard of harm is described as egregious harm. Id.

Here, Hughes preserved error. Thus, we must first determine whether there was error. If so, we must then determine whether that error caused harm.

Discussion

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Although warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, there are certain exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). One such exception is the "plain view" doctrine, which allows officers to seize items in "plain view" if (1) the initial intrusion was proper, and (2) it is immediately apparent to the officers that they have evidence before them associated with criminal activity. Walter, 28 S.W.3d at 541.

Article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no evidence obtained by an officer in violation of the Texas or United States Constitution or the laws of the State of Texas or the United States shall be admitted in evidence against a defendant in a criminal case. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 2005). Article 39.23(a) further provides that if the evidence raises an issue of the admissibility of evidence because it was unlawfully obtained, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was illegally obtained, then the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained. Id. This instruction is required only if there is an actual factual dispute about how the evidence was obtained. Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Hughes contends that such a factual dispute exists in this case because of the inconsistencies in the two arresting officers' testimony. We disagree.

Both Officers Morales and Molter testified at trial. Officer Morales, in recounting the events leading up to Hughes's arrest, testified that he and Officer Molter were dispatched to Room 220 at the Roadway Inn in response to an anonymous 911 call indicating a tall black man was selling narcotics from the hotel room. According to Morales, he and Officer Molter went to Room 220 and knocked on the door. He does not recall them going to the information desk before knocking on the door of Room 220. As they knocked on the door, they announced their presence as San Antonio police officers. Officer Morales was standing in front of the door, and Officer Molter stood to the side of the door. At that point, Hughes opened the door and stated that he had been set up. Officer Morales saw that Hughes had both hands on the door. He scanned the room and saw narcotics on a table located about ten to twelve feet from the door. According to Officer Morales, because Hughes was standing to the side of the door, he could see everything in the room. When Officer Morales saw the narcotics, he ordered Hughes down to the ground on his knees. The two officers then double-handcuffed Hughes because of his large size. Officer Morales estimates that from the time Hughes opened the door until he was down on the ground, about thirty seconds elapsed.

Officer Molter also testified regarding the events surrounding Hughes's arrest. As did Officer Morales, Office Molter testified that they were dispatched to a hotel where a tall black male was dealing narcotics. According to Officer Molter, he and Officer Morales first went to the hotel office to find out who was renting the room that they were assigned to investigate. They were told that it was rented to a tall African American male, which matched the description they had been given. They then went to the hotel room. According to Officer Molter, he stood to the left side of the doorway while Officer Morales knocked on the door. They announced their presence as police officers, and then Hughes opened the door. When Hughes opened the door, Officer Molter was standing off to the side of the door. Officer Molter testified that Officer Morales had his gun out and ordered Hughes to the ground. Officer Molter was then asked by the prosecutor whether he had heard Hughes "say anything prior to that." Officer Molter replied that he had: Hughes stated that he had "been set up." According to Officer Molter, from the time the door opened until Hughes was on the ground was a matter of seconds. After they handcuffed Hughes, Officer Molter then looked inside the room and saw marijuana on a table.

The only argument advanced by the State to justify the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was the "plain view" doctrine. Hughes argues that the inconsistencies between Officer Morales's and Officer Molter's testimony create a fact issue as to whether Officer Morales was able to view the marijuana from the doorway so that it was immediately apparent to him that it was, in fact, marijuana. In support of this argument, Hughes points to the fact that although Hughes, a man six foot five and weighing three hundred pounds, opened the door, Officer Morales claims he was able to see everything inside the room because Hughes stood to the side similar to the hostess on the game show "Wheel of Fortune." According to Hughes, Officer Molter's testimony disputes this description and "present[s] a drastically different picture" because Officer Molter testified that "[Hughes] opened the door almost the entire way" and that "[Hughes] was kind of standing off to the side of the door, wasn't blocking the door, sort of say [sic]." According to Hughes, this discrepancy might have given the jury reasonable doubt as to whether Officer Morales was immediately aware that the objects on the table were narcotics the moment he forced Hughes to the ground and handcuffed him. We disagree with Hughes's contention.

Although the testimony from the two officers is not exactly the same, it is certainly consistent. It is clear from their testimony that when Hughes opened the door, he was standing to the side and was not blocking the doorway. Both officers also testified that from the time Hughes opened the door until he was ordered to the ground was a very short period of time. Officer Molter testified it was a matter of seconds whereas Officer Morales was more precise and testified that it was approximately thirty seconds. Again, this testimony is not inconsistent and does not raise a fact issue as to whether Officer Morales was able to see and identify the substance on the table as narcotics before ordering Hughes to the ground and handcuffing him.

Hughes additionally points to the fact that Officer Morales testified that he did not have his gun drawn when he knocked on the door to the hotel room, but Office Molter testified that he did. Thus, according to Hughes, the jury could have believed that Officer Morales seized Hughes the moment the door was opened and before he could have viewed anything inside that would give him probable cause to arrest Hughes. In support of this argument, Hughes points to the testimony of Officer Molter, wherein he is asked, after testifying that Hughes had opened the door, what happened next. Officer Molten testified that "Officer Morales had his gun out, ordered the suspect on to the ground." Again, we do not perceive an inconsistency between Officer Morales's and Officer Molter's testimony. That Officer Molter testified Officer Morales had his gun out and ordered the suspect to the ground does not mean that Officer Morales did not have an opportunity to observe the narcotics on the table inside the room before drawing his gun.

Similarly, Hughes points to the testimony of the two officers regarding the reason for the arrest. Hughes argues that according to Officer Morales's version of the events, the arrest was effectuated because Officer Morales was able to view the narcotics from the doorway and perceive that they were narcotics. Office Molter was asked whether he heard Hughes say anything to which Molter answered that Hughes said, "I've been set up." Officer Molter was then asked how much time elapsed from the time Hughes made this statement until he was on the ground, to which Officer Molter responded "seconds." According to Hughes, this testimony from Officer Molter amounts to a statement that Hughes was ordered to the ground because he made the statement that he had been set up. Again, we see no inconsistency between the two officers' testimony. Although Officer Molter testified to the amount of time that elapsed between Hughes's statement and him being ordered to the ground, he did not testify that Hughes was arrested because he made the statement. Thus, the evidence at trial was consistent in showing that Officers Morales and Molter approached the hotel room and knocked on the door. Nothing in the Constitution prevents a police officer from "knocking politely on any closed door." State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The evidence then shows that Hughes voluntarily opened the door, allowing Officer Morales to see the marijuana on the table. Thus, because the marijuana was in plain view, there was no illegal search and seizure of the marijuana. Finally, once Officer Morales saw that Hughes possessed marijuana, he lawfully arrested him without a warrant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon ) ("A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view."); see also Miles v. State, No. PD-1047-06, 2007 WL 3010420, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 17, 2007).

Thus, we conclude it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give the instruction Hughes requested.

Conclusion

Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Do Not Publish

1. We note that although Hughes states in his first issue that there was no consent to search the premises, consent to search is not an issue in this appeal. The State does not argue that Hughes consented to the search.