Mitchell Bruce Weingel v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 13 MITCHELL BRUCE WEINGEL, Case No. 24-cv-02111-BAS-DEB 14 Plaintiff, ORDER:

15 v. (1) DENYING MOTION TO WAIVE 16 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of OVERPAYMENT (ECF No. 14); Social Security, AND 17

Defendant. 18 (2) AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION 19

22 Plaintiff Mitchell Bruce Weingel is self-represented. In 2007, he started receiving 23 disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Over the next decade, 24 Mr. Weingel made several attempts to return to work despite his disabling conditions. He 25 found some success working for the Department of the Navy in 2016. Then, starting in 26 2017, Mr. Weingel found lasting success working for the Defense Contract Management 27 Agency. 28 1 Mr. Weingel’s return to work meant he was no longer eligible for disability benefits. 2 But there was a gap between when he started working and when the SSA realized his 3 benefits should stop. Ultimately, the agency determined that it overpaid Mr. Weingel by 4 $53,145.30—approximately twenty months of benefits. 5 Mr. Weingel asked the SSA to waive the requirement that he repay the extra benefits. 6 Although he has enough resources to make the repayment, Mr. Weingel submitted that 7 recovery would be against equity and good conscience. Mr. Weingel showed that he used 8 the extra benefits to support his elderly father, who was in a skilled nursing facility, and 9 his two adult sons, who needed help during challenging periods of their lives. 10 After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) considered all the 11 circumstances of Mr. Weingel’s case and determined that the extra benefits should be 12 repaid. This ruling became the final decision of the Commissioner of the SSA,1 and Mr. 13 Weingel now appeals under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 14 The Court acknowledges that Mr. Weingel faced significant challenges while 15 navigating the transition from receiving disability benefits to returning to the 16 workforce. And the record does not reflect that he squandered the overpaid benefits or 17 exploited the disability system. Nevertheless, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 18 determination that requiring repayment would not be against equity and good conscience. 19 Mr. Weingel did not change his position for the worse or relinquish a valuable right in 20 reliance on the benefits. Further, evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that repayment 21 should not be waived under a broader concept of fairness. Accordingly, for the following 22 reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Waive Overpayment and AFFIRMS the 23 Commissioner’s decision. 24 25

26 1 In May 2025, Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security. He is therefore substituted as Defendant in this suit for Commissioner Martin O’Malley, who occupied the position when 27 this action commenced. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(d) (stating where an action for judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner is instituted, “the person holding the Office of the 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Overpayment of Benefits 3 In 2007, Mr. Weingel began receiving disability benefits under Title II of the Social 4 Security Act.2 (Administrative Record (“AR”) 162, ECF No. 7.) In 2008, he attempted to 5 return to work by testing his ability to work over the course of several months, which is 6 known as a trial work period under the SSA’s regulations. (AR 174.) See Lingenfelter v. 7 Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1039 (9th Cir. 2007). During this period, a claimant like Mr. 8 Weingel is still considered disabled and receives benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592. Further, 9 the work performed during the trial period is not used as evidence that a disability has 10 ended until the claimant works for at least nine months, which do not have to be 11 consecutive. See id. Thus, “a trial work period is provided as an incentive for personal 12 rehabilitation efforts for disabled workers.” 1 Social Security Claims and Procedures § 13 8:27 (6th ed. 2025). 14 By December 2008, Mr. Weingel had completed at least nine months of trial work. 15 (AR 179.) Therefore, the SSA determined that his disability had ended, but notified Mr. 16 Weingel that he was entitled to receive benefits for December 2008, plus an additional two 17 months, under the agency’s rules. (AR 178–80.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592a. 18 In August 2009, however, Mr. Weingel again stopped working due to his disability 19 and requested that his benefits be reinstated. (AR 187, 240.) The SSA approved Mr. 20 Weingel’s request, so he again started receiving benefits from September 2009 onward 21 under his original entitlement to benefits. (AR 187.) In other words, Mr. Weingel did not 22 have to go back to square one. He quickly started receiving benefits again under his 23 original disability application. (See id.) 24 25 26 2 Under Title II, the Government provides disability benefits to individuals who have contributed 27 to the Social Security program and who, because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, are unable to engage in substantial gainful work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a), (d). Title II provides 28 1 In April 2011, the SSA requested information about Mr. Weingel’s work activity. 2 (AR 194–95.) In May 2011, the agency notified Mr. Weingel that his benefits would 3 continue and requested that he “promptly report any changes which may affect [his] 4 benefits. Failure to do so could mean [he] may have to repay any benefits not due.” (AR 5 478.) 6 In October 2017, the SSA sought information about Mr. Weingel’s work activity 7 since January 2014. (AR 205.) A month later, Mr. Weingel submitted a Work Activity 8 Report with the requested information, which showed earnings for several months between 9 2013 and 2016. (AR 207–21; see also AR 471–72.) 10 In January 2018, the SSA notified Mr. Weingel that he may no longer be eligible for 11 benefits based on his work activity. (AR 226–29.) The SSA confirmed this outcome in 12 February 2018, stating that Mr. Weingel had been overpaid by $53,145.30 for the period 13 from May 2016 to January 2018. (AR 233.) 14 During the time when he was both working and receiving disability benefits, Mr. 15 Weingel made payments to support his elderly father and two adult sons. (AR 35–41.) 16 Among these expenses were payments to an assisted care facility for his father (AR 586– 17 88) and payments to his sons in connection with a divorce, restitution, a drug treatment 18 program, and other expenses (AR 37–41). 19 In March 2018, Mr. Weingel filed a request for reconsideration, where he disputed 20 that he was overpaid and at fault for causing the overpayment. (AR 238–57.) His request 21 for reconsideration was denied. (AR 258.) In August 2018, Mr. Weingel requested a 22 hearing with an ALJ. (AR 259–66.) The hearing was repeatedly delayed due to, among 23 other things, scheduling conflicts, the COVID-19 pandemic, and requests from Mr. 24 Weingel for time to seek counsel. (See generally AR 49–59, 60–63, 72–141, 274–77, 291– 25 359.) Ultimately, almost five years later, ALJ Howard Treblin held a hearing on the merits 26 on June 26, 2023. (AR 26.) 27 28 1 B. Administrative Decision 2 On September 29, 2023, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, which concluded 3 that Mr. Weingel is responsible for repaying $53,145.30 in overpaid benefits. (AR 18.) In 4 reaching this outcome, the ALJ made five determinations. 5 First, the ALJ found that Mr. Weingel was overpaid. (AR 13–14.) The ALJ 6 reasoned that Mr. Weingel engaged in substantial gainful activity while working for the 7 Department of the Navy from May 2016 through December 2016, and then again while 8 working for the Defense Contract Management Agency from October 2017 through 9 January 2018—the end of the period at issue. (Id.) Mr. Weingel’s work during this period 10 “rendered him ineligible for disability benefits.” (AR 14.) But because his “benefits were 11 not stopped until February 2018, an overpayment of $53,145.30 was created during the 12 period from May 2016 through January 2018.” (Id.) 13 Second, the ALJ found that Mr. Weingel was without fault in causing the 14 overpayment. (AR 14–15.) Although Mr. Weingel claims that he fulfilled his obligation 15 to report his work activity to the SSA, the ALJ found this assertion is unsubstantiated. (AR 16 14.) Nevertheless, the ALJ acknowledged that multiple factors contributed to the 17 overpayment, including accounting errors made by Mr. Weingel’s employer in 2016. (AR 18 15.) Further, the ALJ addressed Mr. Weingel’s belief that he was entitled to a second trial 19 work period. (Id.) The ALJ explained that this belief was incorrect because Mr. Weingel’s 20 payments had been resumed in 2009 under his original entitlement to benefits. (Id.; see 21 also AR 14.) In other words, Mr. Weingel had already exhausted the full trial work 22 incentive for this period of disability. Even so, the ALJ gave Mr. Weingel the benefit of 23 the doubt and found he was not at fault for the overpayment. (AR 15.) 24 Third, the ALJ found that recovery of the overpayment would not defeat the 25 purposes of Title II of the Social Security Act. (AR 15.) The ALJ based this conclusion 26 on Mr. Weingel’s testimony demonstrating that he “has the means to repay the 27 overpayment based on his steady income (working for Defense Contract Management 28 Agency) and his assets and other material resources.” (Id.; see also AR 44–45.) 1 Fourth, the ALJ found that recovery of the overpayment would not be against equity 2 and good conscience. (AR 15–18.) The ALJ found that Mr. Weingel did not change his 3 financial position for the worse because he did not incur a debt in reliance on the 4 overpayments and then “do something he would not have done, if he had not been entitled 5 to benefit payments.” (AR 16.) The ALJ also found that Mr. Weingel did not relinquish a 6 valuable right under the definition in 20 C.F.R. § 404.509. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ looked 7 to the Ninth Circuit’s guidance on this issue, which includes the general concept of fairness, 8 and found a broader inquiry likewise supports repayment of the benefits. (AR 16–17 9 (citing Quinlivan v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1990)).) 10 Overall, the ALJ concluded that waiving the statutory requirement for Mr. Weingel 11 to repay the benefits is not appropriate. (AR 18.) The Appeals Council denied Mr. 12 Weingel’s request for review, making the ALJ’s ruling the final decision of the 13 Commissioner. (AR 1–3.) Mr. Weingel now seeks judicial review, and the Court finds 14 this matter suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument.3 15 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 “Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 18 made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision.” 19 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision. Id. 20 “The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial 21 evidence, and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by 22 substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th 23 Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a 24 preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 25 to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 26

27 3 Because Mr. Weingel is proceeding pro se, the Court has held his pleadings to “less stringent standards” than those drafted by lawyers in resolving this dispute. See, e.g., Stanard v. Dy, 88 F.4th 811, 28 1 1997)). The court must “consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence 2 that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may 3 not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Lingenfelter, 4 504 F.3d at 1035 (citation modified). “If the evidence ‘is susceptible to more than one 5 rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 6 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 7 2005)). 8 III. ANALYSIS 9 Mr. Weingel challenges the ALJ’s finding that recovery of the overpayment would 10 not be against equity and good conscience. (See generally Mot., ECF No. 14.) Mr. 11 Weingel argues that because he was without fault in causing the overpayment, and because 12 he used the overpaid benefits to pay for his father’s elder care and expenses for his two 13 adult sons, recovery would be against equity and good conscience and thus should be 14 waived. (Id. at 13–15.) 15 When Title II benefits are overpaid, the law requires the SSA to recover the 16 overpayment “under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of Social Security.” 42 17 U.S.C. § 404. “To recover overpayments, the Commissioner must show that the claimant 18 actually received benefits beyond the period of disability or in excess of the correct 19 amount.” McCarthy v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 42 U.S.C. 20 § 404(a)). 21 After the SSA determines that benefits have been overpaid, the claimant may request 22 waiver of the recovery of the overpayment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.506(b); see also Califano v. 23 Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 686–87 (1979) (describing the general process for obtaining 24 review of an overpayment determination). To obtain a waiver, two conditions must be 25 satisfied: “(1) [the] claimant is without fault in receiving the payment, and (2) requiring 26 repayment would either defeat the purposes of Title II or would be against equity and good 27 conscience.” Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 526 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 404(b)). 28 1 A. Overpayment 2 The first step in determining whether a claimant is entitled to a waiver of repayment 3 is to confirm that an overpayment occurred. See McCarthy, 221 F.3d at 1124. The 4 Commissioner has the burden on this point. Id. 5 Here, as summarized above, the ALJ determined that Mr. Weingel was overpaid 6 $53,145.30 from May 2016 through January 2018 in light of his return to work. (AR 13– 7 14.) The record reflects these payments (AR 268–269), and Mr. Weingel has never taken 8 the position that he did not receive the money. The Court also agrees with the 9 Commissioner that, on appeal, “Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that he had 10 been overpaid, and instead argues that this overpayment should be waived.” (Opp’n 3–4, 11 ECF No. 15; accord Mot. 13–22.) Indeed, “[i]n the usual overpayment case, a claimant 12 does not contest the fact or amount of the overpayments.” McCarthy, 221 F.3d at 1124. 13 Nevertheless, the Court confirms that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 14 determination that Mr. Weingel was overpaid $53,145.30 in Title II benefits. 15 B. Without Fault 16 If the ALJ confirms that an overpayment occurred, the next step is to determine if 17 the claimant was without fault in receiving the payment. See 42 U.S.C. § 404(b); 18 McCarthy, 221 F.3d at 1126. “Fault” for this inquiry “applies only to the individual.” 20 19 C.F.R. § 404.507 (citation omitted). An individual is at fault for causing an overpayment 20 if: (1) he made an incorrect statement that he knew or should have known was incorrect; 21 (2) he failed to furnish material information to the SSA; or (3) he accepted a payment that 22 he knew or should have known was incorrect. Id. 23 On this point, the ALJ found in Mr. Weingel’s favor. The ALJ determined he was 24 without fault in causing the overpayment. (AR 14–15.) Thus, the Court considers whether 25 repayment should be waived. 26 C. Grounds for Waiver 27 The last step is to determine whether requiring repayment “would either defeat the 28 purposes of Title II or would be against equity and good conscience.” Quinlivan, 916 F.2d 1 at 526. If either option applies, then the repayment requirement will be waived. 42 U.S.C. 2 § 404(b); 20 C.F.R. § 404.506(a). 3 1. Defeat the Purposes of Title II 4 The primary purpose of disability benefits under the Act is “to give financial 5 assistance to disabled persons because they are without the ability to sustain themselves.” 6 See Gamble v. Chater, 68 F.3d 319, 322 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the Commissioner’s 7 regulations provide that “recovery will defeat the purposes of Title II in . . . situations where 8 the person from whom recovery is sought needs substantially all of his current income 9 (including Social Security monthly benefits) to meet current ordinary and necessary living 10 expenses.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.508(b); see also Harrison v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 480, 483 (9th 11 Cir. 1984) (applying a comparable test for recovering overpaid Title XVI disability 12 benefits). For example, where a claimant was overpaid $5,282 but had sufficient assets to 13 make repayment, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “the Commissioner could properly find 14 that recovery of the overpayment will not deprive [the claimant] of the means of meeting 15 his ordinary and necessary living expenses.” Newton v. Chater, 103 F.3d 139 (9th Cir. 16 1996) (memorandum disposition). 17 The ALJ concluded that requiring Mr. Weingel to repay the overpaid benefits would 18 not defeat the purposes of Title II. (AR 15.) Mr. Weingel testified that if he is required to 19 make repayment, doing so would not cause his monthly expenses to exceed his monthly 20 income: 21 ALJ: “[M]y concern is does paying back any aspect of that overpayment put you in a financial disadvantage whereby your monthly income would then 22 drop below your monthly expenses[?]” 23 Mr. Weingel: “I can’t honestly say that it would.” 24 25 26 27 28 1 (AR 44.) Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that repayment 2 would not defeat the purposes of Title II. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.508(b). 3 2. Against Equity and Good Conscience 4 Mr. Weingel’s core argument is that recovery of the overpayment would be against 5 equity and good conscience. (See Mot. 2.) To demonstrate that requiring repayment would 6 be inequitable, the claimant must show that he “changed his . . . position for the worse” or 7 “relinquished a valuable right” because he relied upon “a notice that a payment would be 8 made or because of the overpayment itself.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.509(a)(1). The SSA’s 9 Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”) further explains: “To establish a change in 10 position for the worse, the beneficiary would have to show that he or she did something he 11 or she would not have done, but for the receipt of the overpaid benefits, not simply that he 12 or she had spent the benefits payments received.” Soc. Sec. Admin., POMS, GN 13 02250.150 pt. (B)(2).5 14 The circumstances in which individuals change their position for the worse include 15 moving into more expensive housing, increasing their debt, entering into a long-term 16 contract, reducing their income by reducing work hours or stopping working entirely, and 17 enrolling in school or training that requires payment of tuition. Soc. Sec. Admin., POMS, 18 GN 02250.150 pt. (E). Examples of relinquishing a valuable right include missing an 19 opportunity, turning down or being denied assistance, and changing employment. Id. at pt. 20 (F). To illustrate: 21 • “A widow, having been awarded benefits for herself and daughter, entered her 22 daughter in private school because the monthly benefits made this possible. After 23 4 The ALJ also offered Mr. Weingel the option of completing the SSA’s Request for Waiver form, 24 which would detail his monthly income, recurring expenses, and assets. (See AR 45.) Mr. Weingel 25 declined to provide this information. (Id.) 5 POMS contains agency interpretations that “are entitled to respect, but only to the extent that 26 those interpretations have the power to persuade.” Lockwood v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified); see also Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) 27 (noting POMS does not impose judicially enforceable duties on courts or the ALJ). Thus, the Court references the examples in POMS that are persuasive for interpreting 20 C.F.R. § 404.509, but those 28 1 the widow and her daughter received payments for almost a year, the deceased 2 worker was found to be not insured and all payments to the widow and child were 3 incorrect. The widow has no other funds with which to pay the daughter’s private 4 school expenses. Having entered the daughter in private school and thus incurred 5 a financial obligation toward which the benefits had been applied, she was in a 6 worse position financially than if she and her daughter had never been entitled to 7 benefits.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.509. 8 • “Tom purchased a more expensive home because he could afford the home based 9 on his benefit payments. Tom relied on the increased funds to meet his financial 10 commitment to purchase the house. He is unable to withdraw from the 11 commitment without incurring significant financial loss.” POMS, GN 02250.150 12 pt. (B)(2). 13 • “Sara declined a job because she believed the benefit payments would take care 14 of her monetary needs.” Id. pt. (B)(1). 15 In addition, the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that whether repayment is against equity 16 and good conscience under 42 U.S.C. § 404(b) is not strictly limited to the criteria set forth 17 in the regulations. Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 527. In Quinlivan, the claimant was overpaid 18 benefits while incarcerated, and he was “unaware that Congress had changed the law to 19 prohibit payment of disability benefits to incarcerated felons.” Id. at 525. Upon being 20 released from custody, the claimant—who was diagnosed with schizophrenia—had “no 21 material goods, no means of transportation, and no income.” Id. He “spent his 22 accumulated savings, including the overpayment, on clothes, a used truck, and daily living 23 expenses.” Id. He later again qualified “for disability benefits because of a personality 24 disorder, a history of schizophrenia, blindness in one eye, and low back pain.” Id. at 526. 25 The Ninth Circuit held that requiring the claimant to repay the benefits would be 26 against equity and good conscience. Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 527. The court reasoned that 27 “Congress intended a broad concept of fairness to apply to waiver requests, one that reflects 28 the ordinary meaning of the statutory language and takes into account the facts and 1 circumstances of each case.” Id. And applying that broad fairness inquiry to the claimant’s 2 circumstances led to the conclusion that repayment “would be against equity and good 3 conscience as that phrase is commonly understood.” Id. at 527. However, the Ninth Circuit 4 also “emphasize[d] that [its] interpretation of the equity and good conscience standard does 5 not mean that whenever an individual is found to be without fault, it necessarily follows 6 that waiver is appropriate.” Id. Instead, “courts must apply cautiously the equity and good 7 conscience standard to the circumstances of each case.” Id. 8 In this case, the ALJ concluded: (i) Mr. Weingel did not change his position for the 9 worse; (ii) he did not relinquish a valuable right; (iii) a broad concept of fairness does not 10 support waiving recovery of the overpayment; and (iv) Mr. Weingel did not receive or rely 11 on misinformation from the SSA. The Court assesses whether substantial evidence 12 supports each determination. 13 i. Change in Position for the Worse 14 Mr. Weingel argues that his position changed for the worse because he took on a 15 financial burden in reliance on the overpaid benefits. (Mot. 13–14.) He contends his 16 decision to send money to his family is analogous to a long-term contract or commitment 17 described by the regulations and the agency’s guidance. (Id. at 14–15.) He points to 18 POMS, GN 02250.150, which provides “[a]n individual may have entered into a long-term 19 contract or commitment . . . based on the assumption of continued benefits, which could 20 result in financial difficulty had the benefits been later reduced or stopped.” 21 The ALJ reasoned that Mr. Weingel “did not ‘change his position for the worse’ 22 because there is no showing that he reasonably relied on receiving benefit payments and 23 then decided to do something he would not have done, if he had not been entitled to benefit 24 payments.” (AR 16.) Instead, “as the claimant testified and the record indicates, he simply 25 would have paid his family members less if he had not been entitled to benefit payments.” 26 (Id.) 27 Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. For example, with respect 28 to Mr. Weingel’s support for his elderly father, the evidence shows Mr. Weingel 1 contributed to his father’s assisted living facility from 2011 to 2021—during and after the 2 overpayment period. (AR 584–88.) After the extra benefits stopped in 2018, Mr. Weingel 3 continued making payments to the facility. (Id.) Nor does the record show Mr. Weingel 4 otherwise did something that he would not have done, but for the additional payments, to 5 his detriment. These circumstances can be rationally interpreted to show that Mr. Weingel 6 did not change his position for the worse in reliance on the extra benefits between 2016 7 and 2018. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.509(a)(1); see also Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154. 8 Mr. Weingel’s circumstances are also dissimilar from the scenarios found in the 9 regulations and the agency’s guidance. For instance, unlike the widow who enrolled her 10 daughter in private school “because the monthly benefits made this possible,” and who had 11 no other means to pay the tuition, Mr. Weingel has not demonstrated that there were no 12 other funds available to pay his father’s assisted living expenses during the overpayment 13 period. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.509. Mr. Weingel’s support of his two adult sons with 14 payments during challenging periods of their lives likewise does not fit into the agency’s 15 guidance. Mr. Weingel did not take on a debt, like a mortgage, where he “is unable to 16 withdraw from the commitment without incurring significant financial loss.” See POMS, 17 GN 02250.150 pt. (B)(2). 18 In short, the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Weingel did not change his position for the 19 worse is supported by substantial evidence. See Hill, 698 F.3d at 1158 (explaining that 20 “substantial evidence” requires “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 21 as adequate to support a conclusion”). 22 ii. Relinquishment of a Valuable Right 23 Second, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Weingel did not relinquish a valuable right. 24 (AR 16.) The record supports this conclusion. Mr. Weingel did not give up his right to 25 employment, pass on state assistance, or miss some other opportunity because he relied on 26 the overpaid benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.509(a)(1); POMS, GN 02250.150 pt. (F). 27 Instead, he chose to make payments to his family using the benefits. These circumstances 28 do not fit within the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.509 (providing examples that include 1 “an individual [who] resigned from employment on the assumption he would receive 2 regular monthly benefit payments,” but because of his age, the individual was “unable to 3 get his job back and could not get any other employment”). Thus, substantial evidence 4 supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Weingel did not relinquish a valuable right in 5 reliance on the overpaid benefits. 6 iii. Broad Concept of Fairness 7 Third, the ALJ applied a broad principle of fairness to the specific facts of Mr. 8 Weingel’s case and concluded that requiring repayment would not be inequitable. (AR 9 16–17.) As in Quinlivan, the ALJ considered the nature of Mr. Weingel’s impairment and 10 found that the impairment did not affect Mr. Weingel’s ability to understand how his return 11 to work would affect his entitlement to disability benefits. (AR 17.) Cf. Higbee v. Sullivan, 12 975 F.2d 558, 561–63 (9th Cir. 1992) (reasoning it would be unfair to consider a claimant’s 13 failure to cooperate with the SSA where he suffered from a severe mental illness, had been 14 hospitalized six times, and did not understand how his disability benefits worked). 15 Further, the Court notes that Mr. Weingel’s circumstances are starkly different from 16 those considered in Quinlivan. There, as mentioned, the claimant had been incarcerated, 17 needed to spend the overpaid benefits for basic living expenses, and was unable to return 18 to employment. See Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 526–27. At the time of the ALJ’s decision, the 19 claimant’s “sole source of income was $314 a month in state welfare benefits.” Id. at 524. 20 By contrast, as noted by the ALJ here, Mr. Weingel testified that he has the means to make 21 the repayment. (AR 17.) Mr. Weingel also declined to provide a complete picture of his 22 financial resources. (AR 45.) Cf. Newton, 103 F.3d at 139 (reasoning where claimant’s 23 assets exceeded the amount to be recovered, the Commissioner could properly find that 24 recovery would not be against equity and good conscience). 25 In short, the ALJ considered the nature of Mr. Weingel’s impairment and the factual 26 circumstances of his situation. There is enough evidence for a reasonable mind to accept 27 that requiring Mr. Weingel to repay the benefits is appropriate under a broad concept of 28 1 fairness. See Quinlivan, 916 F.2d at 527. The ALJ’s determination therefore withstands 2 scrutiny under the substantial evidence standard. See Hill, 698 F.3d at 1158. 3 iv. Reliance on Erroneous Information 4 Last, the Court addresses Mr. Weingel’s argument that he received erroneous 5 information from the SSA, which led to the overpayment. (See Mot. 12; see also Reply 5.) 6 If an individual relies on erroneous information from the SSA in accepting the 7 overpayment, then the regulations deem that recovery would be against equity and good 8 conscience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.512(a). This situation occurs when “an individual accepts 9 such overpayment because of reliance on erroneous information from an official source 10 within the Social Security Administration . . . with respect to the interpretation of a 11 pertinent provision of the Social Security Act or regulations pertaining thereto.”6 20 C.F.R. 12 § 404.510a; see also Anderson v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 1540 (9th Cir. 1990) (resolving 13 argument based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.510a). 14 Given that the erroneous information must relate to an interpretation of the Social 15 Security Act or its regulations, courts have reasoned that form letters notifying claimants 16 of their entitlement to benefits “do not purport to make any explicit or specific 17 interpretation” and cannot meet the standard for misinformation. See, e.g., Valley v. 18 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 427 F.3d 388, 393 (6th Cir. 2005); Feenster v. Colvin, 220 F. Supp. 19 3d 123, 129 (D.D.C. 2016); see also Stone v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-1952 (CRC), 2019 WL 20 1440130, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2019) (finding that two annual notices “informing [the 21 claimant] of retroactive increases in her monthly benefits” do not qualify as “official 22 interpretation[s]”). Indeed, if form letters or benefits statements “constituted official 23 interpretation[s] of the statute or regulations sufficient to trigger the good conscience 24 exception to repayment, virtually every Social Security benefit recipient would be entitled 25

26 6 To be precise, this regulation addresses whether a claimant is “without fault” in causing the overpayment, as opposed to whether repayment should be waived. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.510a. Here, the 27 ALJ found Mr. Weingel was without fault, but not on this basis, so Mr. Weingel was not entitled to an automatic waiver. (See AR 14–15.) The ALJ nevertheless addressed Mr. Weingel’s misinformation 28 1 to waiver of repayment assuming they received benefits of any kind and a letter describing 2 those benefits.” Valley, 427 F.3d at 393. Thus, more is required for 20 C.F.R. § 404.512(a) 3 to apply. See id. 4 Here, the ALJ found that Mr. Weingel did not rely on erroneous information from 5 the SSA in accepting the overpaid benefits. (See AR 17–18 (applying POMS guidance 6 based on C.F.R. § 404.510a).) Although Mr. Weingel claimed that he relied on incorrect 7 information provided by the SSA, the ALJ noted that there are no records of who Mr. 8 Weingel spoke to or which office advised him. (AR 17; see also AR 32–33; AR 263.) 9 The ALJ further reasoned that Mr. Weingel’s reliance on a “May 22, 2011, notice that his 10 benefits would continue is also not a basis for misinformation.” (AR 17.) The ALJ 11 rationalized that Mr. Weingel had multiple work reviews that detailed the “rules and policy 12 regarding work while collecting disability benefits.” (Id.) Moreover, routine notices are 13 not enough to support a claim of misinformation. (Id.) 14 The Court will not overturn the ALJ’s decision. A review of the record does not 15 reveal the ALJ committed legal error, and there is substantial evidence to support the 16 conclusion that Mr. Weingel did not rely on erroneous information within the meaning of 17 20 C.F.R. § 404.510a. Hence, there is no basis to deem recovery of the overpayment as 18 against equity or good conscience under the regulations. See id. § 404.512(a). 19 * * * 20 Overall, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Mr. Weingel did 21 not change his position for the worse or relinquish a valuable right, as well as the ALJ’s 22 determination that recovery of the overpayment would not violate a broad concept of 23 fairness. There is also substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Weingel did 24 not rely on erroneous information from the SSA. Hence, it is not appropriate to disturb the 25 Commissioner’s decision to deny the request to waive the recovery of the overpayment. 26 See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1153–54. 27 28 1 D. Remaining Challenges 2 Beyond the core issues resolved above, Mr. Weingel raises several additional 3 grounds in support of his request that the Court “relinquish the obligation [that he] repay 4 the amount of the overpayment” or determine that “a substantial reduction” is appropriate. 5 (Mot. 21–22.) The Court has considered these supplementary issues, but they do not 6 change the outcome of this case for the reasons explained below. 7 Good Faith Negotiations. Mr. Weingel first argues that the Commissioner refused 8 to engage in good faith negotiations to settle this dispute. (Mot. 21; see also Reply 2–4.) 9 The Magistrate Judge’s Order Setting Briefing Schedule required that the “parties must 10 engage in good faith settlement negotiations to resolve the case.” (ECF No. 9.) The record 11 reflects that the parties engaged in negotiations, but the negotiations were not successful. 12 (See ECF Nos. 12, 13.) The Magistrate Judge’s Order did not mandate that a settlement be 13 reached. Cf. Delamater v. Anytime Fitness, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1180 (E.D. Cal. 14 2010) (“Although in a mediation, the parties may reach a settlement agreement, the parties 15 are not required to resolve their dispute.”). Further, even though this Court has the inherent 16 power to punish noncompliance with its orders, ruling against the Commissioner on this 17 basis would be “so harsh a penalty [that] it should be imposed as a sanction only in extreme 18 circumstances.” See Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 19 1986). Extreme circumstances are not present here. Thus, this first argument is unavailing. 20 Bias. Mr. Weingel next argues that the SSA and the ALJ were biased against him 21 in various ways, which led to the unfavorable outcome. (Mot. 21.) When reviewing an 22 ALJ’s decision, there is “a presumption that the ALJ was unbiased.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 23 427 F.3d 1211, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). To rebut this presumption, the claimant must show 24 a “conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification.” Rollins v. 25 Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2001). A claimant is “required to show that 26 the ALJ’s behavior, in the context of the whole case, was ‘so extreme as to display clear 27 inability to render fair judgment.’” Id. at 858 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 28 1 540, 555–56 (1994)). The claimant bears a “heavy burden” to show bias. Cope v. Colvin, 2 No. 2:15-CV-01744 JRC, 2016 WL 6439940, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 1, 2016). 3 Having considered Mr. Weingel’s allegations, they do not overcome the 4 presumption that the ALJ was unbiased. He fails to meet the heavy burden of showing that 5 the ALJ’s behavior displayed a conflict of interest or an inability to render fair judgment. 6 Rather, the record shows the ALJ asked open-ended questions, permitted Mr. Weingel to 7 submit additional evidence after the hearing, and invited Mr. Weingel to explain the issues 8 from his point of view. (See, e.g., AR 28 (“[I]n your words, what happened?”), AR 37 9 (“How is your receipt of the benefits, how does that lend itself to the claim of equity and 10 good conscience relative to the two sons?”); AR 40 (“If I gave you 30 days, would that be 11 enough to see if you could try to track that [additional information] down?”).) Mr. Weingel 12 “has pointed to nothing in the record that rises to th[e] level” of actionable bias. See 13 Rollins, 261 F.3d at 858. Thus, this argument is unpersuasive. 14 Obfuscating Policies, Failure to Consider Evidence, and Harm to Plaintiff. Mr. 15 Weingel’s remaining arguments are best considered together. He contends the SSA’s 16 policies and procedures “obfuscated and hampered” his ability to receive a favorable 17 outcome. (Mot. 21.) Further, Mr. Weingel claims the ALJ failed to give “adequate weight” 18 to Mr. Weingel’s evidence, and the SSA relied on “[i]ncorrect supporting information” in 19 reaching its decision. (Id.) Finally, Mr. Weingel argues that requiring repayment of the 20 overpaid benefits will cause him financial harm and potentially impact his ability to retire. 21 (Id. 22.) 22 Mr. Weingel’s contentions about difficult agency policies, the failure to consider 23 certain evidence, and the use of incorrect supporting information are all encompassed by 24 the substantial evidence standard described above. Under that standard, the Court cannot 25 decide this case from scratch or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ and the SSA. 26 See, e.g., Hill, 698 F.3d at 1158. Rather, the Court’s review is limited to determining 27 whether there is enough evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision. Id. Because 28 1 there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s determination 2 || that the repayment obligation should not be waived, these arguments are unavailing. 3 Finally, the Court recognizes that requiring Mr. Weingel to repay a considerable sum 4 || will negatively impact his financial circumstances. However, Congress has determined 5 || that overpaid benefits should be recovered where it would not defeat the purpose of Title 6 || I or be against equity and good conscience. 42 U.S.C. § 404. “It is Congress, not this 7 ||Court, that balances those interests.” Cf Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 15 (2019). 8 || Consequently, this final argument is not a basis for reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 9 || See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (“As 10 || with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations 1s 11 || limited.”). 12 CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Waive 14 || Overpayment (ECF No. 14) and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision. The Clerk of 15 || Court shall enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and close the case. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 18 || DATED: February 17, 2026 (yatta Baha □□ 19 Hd¢n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court

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