Mitch C. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MITCH C., 1 Case No. 5:24-cv-02147-MAA

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER REVERSING DECISION OF v. THE COMMISSIONER AND FRANK BISIGNANO,2 Commissioner of Social Security, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Defendant.

On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff Mitch C. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint seeking review of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) final decision denying his application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States

1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 2 Frank Bisignano became Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), he is automatically substituted for Carolyn Colvin as Defendant in this suit. Magistrate Judge. (ECF Nos. 6, 9.) On December 9, 2024, Defendant filed an Answer (Answer, ECF No. 11) and Certified Administrative Record (“AR,” ECF Nos. 11-1–11-30). On January 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Brief. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 13.) On March 6, 2025, Defendant filed a Response Brief. (Def.’s Br., ECF No. 17.) On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief. (Pl.’s Reply Br., ECF No. 18.) This matter is fully briefed and ready for decision. The Court deems the matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the reasons discussed below, the Court reverses the decision of the Commissioner and remands the matter for further administrative proceedings. On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application alleging disability beginning November 1, 2019. (AR 231–240.) 3 The Commissioner denied this claim initially on August 1, 2022 (id. at 56–80), and upon reconsideration on November 3, 2022 (id. at 81–99). On December 6, 2022, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 120.) ALJ Amy Chao conducted a video teleconference hearing on August 8, 2023. (Id. at 35–55.) The ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff (id. at 39–50), who was represented by counsel, and from an impartial vocational expert (id. at 50–53). On December 6, 2023, after making findings under the Commissioner’s five-step evaluation process, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 14–34.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 7, 2022, the application date. (Id. at 19 ¶ 1.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 3 Citations to the Administrative Record are to the AR number. Pinpoint citations to other docketed documents are to the page numbers in the CM/ECF-generated headers. “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type; major depressive disorder; and substance addiction disorders (drugs) with stimulant induced psychosis, in reported remission.” (Id. at 20 ¶ 2.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the agency’s listed impairments. (Id. at 20 ¶ 3.) Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”): [T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; unable to perform work requiring a specific production rate, such as assembly line work or work that requires hourly quotas; occasionally interact with coworkers, but not tandem or teamwork; no interactions with the public; occasionally deal with changes in a routine work setting; and avoid concentrated exposure to moving mechanical parts and high exposed places.

(Id. at 22 ¶ 4.) At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work as an “outside deliverer.” (Id. at 27 ¶ 5.) The ALJ classified Plaintiff as a younger individual on the date the application was filed. (Id. at 28 ¶ 6.) The ALJ categorized Plaintiff as having a limited education. (Id. at 28 ¶ 7.) The ALJ concluded the “[t]ransferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant’s past relevant work is unskilled.” (Id. at 28 ¶ 8.) At step five, the ALJ noted that the vocational expert testified that an individual of Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity could perform occupations such as: “hospital cleaner,” with 34,771 jobs; “laundry worker,” with 209,330 jobs; and “hand packer,” with 71,409 jobs. (Id. at 28–29 ¶ 9.) The ALJ concluded that, “considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the claimant is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” (Id. at 29 ¶ 9.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act, since February 7, 2022. (Id. 29 ¶ 10.) On August 30, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at 1–6.) Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, which stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether the Commissioner’s “decision to deny benefits . . . ‘is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009–1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,’ the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). “If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s conclusion, [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882. A. Disputed Issues Plaintiff raises two disputed issues: 1. Whether the ALJ failed to provide clear, convincing, and well- supported reasons for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 2. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to evaluate the treating medical source opinion of David Dobos, M.D. (Pl.’s Br. 4.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that reversal and remand for further administrative proceedings are warranted for Issue One, based on the ALJ’s failure to articulate clear, convincing, and well-supported reasons for discounting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Having found that remand is warranted, the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s remaining argument. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to reach [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for remand.”); see also Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[The] Court need not address the other claims plaintiff raises, none of which would provide plaintiff with any further relief than granted, and all of which can be addressed on remand.”). B. Applicable Law When assessing a claimant’s credibility regarding subjective symptom testimony or allegations, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014 (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035–36). “In this analysis, the claimant is not required to show ‘that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.’” Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Nor must a claimant produce ‘objective medical evidence of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity thereof.’” Id. (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282). If the claimant satisfies this first step, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony about the symptom severity. Id. at 1014–15; see also Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883 (“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an applicant not credible by making specific findings as to credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.”). “This is not an easy requirement to meet: ‘The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). The ALJ must evaluate “the intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit [the claimant’s] ability to perform work-related activities for an adult . . . .” Social Security Ruling 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, at *4 (Mar. 16, 2016). While the ALJ cannot “delve into wide-ranging scrutiny of the claimant’s character and apparent truthfulness,” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678 n.5, the ALJ may consider “prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; . . . unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and . . . the claimant’s daily activities,” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284). Inconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and conduct, or internal contradictions in the claimant’s testimony, also may be relevant. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2014). In addition, the ALJ may consider “the claimant’s work record and observations of treating and examining physicians and other third parties regarding, among other matters, the nature, onset, duration, and frequency of the claimant’s symptom; precipitating and aggravating factors; [and] functional restrictions caused by the symptoms . . . .” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. However, it is improper for an ALJ to reject subjective testimony based “‘solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate’ the claimant’s allegations.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991)). The ALJ must make “a credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant’s testimony.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002)); see Brown- Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A finding that a claimant’s testimony is not credible ‘must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony regarding pain.’” (quoting Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345–46)). Although an ALJ’s interpretation of a claimant’s testimony may not be the only reasonable one, if it is supported by substantial evidence, “it is not [the court’s] role to second-guess it.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). C. Background During the August 8, 2023 hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified about his problems and limitations as follows: Plaintiff was thirty-seven years old. (AR 28, 44.) Plaintiff was placed in special education in the second grade and had not obtained his General Education Development degree (“GED”) because it was “too hard.” (Id. at 50.) Plaintiff suffered from bipolar disorder, depression, and schizophrenia. (Id. at 20, 44–45, 48.) He was diagnosed with these conditions when he was eighteen years old and had taken medication to treat them since that time. (Id. at 44–45, 48.) Plaintiff experienced tactile, auditory, and visual hallucinations of spiders crawling on his body and hostile voices. (Id. at 39, 41, 48–49.) Plaintiff often felt spiders crawling “in his groin . . . and penis area” as if he was being “sexually assaulted by spiders.” (Id. at 49.) Some days, he felt spiders crawling on him “all day long,” and other days, he felt them “maybe just three or four hours maybe two, but it happens every morning, every night, and during the middle of the day.” (Id. at 43.) Plaintiff did not sleep at night and stated that he felt spiders “98 percent of the time” that he tried to sleep. (Id. at 49.) These symptoms prevented Plaintiff from doing work and homework. (Id.) He stated that every time he tried to get a job or do his homework, he heard voices talking to him that stopped him from doing these things. (Id.) Plaintiff previously worked as a driver for Orange Courier for one year, a driver for Pact National Messenger for one year, a telemarketer salesperson for DISH Network for two-and-one-half or three years, in an unstated position at RadioShack for less than one year, and in various jobs for months at a time. (Id. at 40.) As a driver, Plaintiff spent a majority of the workday seated and occasionally lifted fifty-five-pound boxes with the assistance of a wheel device but regularly lifted ten-pound boxes. (Id. at 41–42.) Plaintiff enjoyed these jobs and stated that he stopped working due to his hallucinations that made him a “hazard on the road.” (Id. at 42–44.) Plaintiff no longer had a driver’s license. (Id. at 44.) Plaintiff lived with his mother who assisted him with his medication and drove him to his treatment. (Id. at 43.) Plaintiff experienced depression when his mother left the house. (Id. at 49.) His mother did not work and received social security income. (Id. at 43.) Plaintiff had no additional income for the last five years. (Id.) Plaintiff had been treated by psychiatrist Dr. Dobos for at least three years and as long as five years; Plaintiff could not remember when he started seeing Dr. Dobos. (Id. at 48.) Plaintiff received an Invega Sustenna injection and took Hydroxyurea and Deficol each morning and Zyprexa, Rexulti, and Deficol each night. (Id. at 46–47.) These medications made Plaintiff less argumentative but very tired. (Id. at 47.) Plaintiff also attended individual therapy once a week and group therapy, called “Alternative Perceptions” for people that experience hallucinations, twice a week. (Id. at 48.) Plaintiff stated that he felt an improvement over the last few years but still dealt with the hallucinations every day. (Id. at 49.) Plaintiff stated that he last used methamphetamine one year and two months or four months prior to the hearing. (Id. at 45.) D. Analysis At the first step of the two-step evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (Id. at 23.) At the second step, however, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Id.) As the ALJ found no evidence of malingering, she was required to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom statements. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15. The Court may review only those reasons that the ALJ specifically cited as grounds to reject Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We are constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010 (“We review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.”). /// The ALJ provided three reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony: (1) his statements were inconsistent with his failure to follow prescribed treatment that might improve symptoms; (2) his statements were inconsistent with his daily activities; and (3) his statements were inconsistent with other information in the case record. (AR 23–24.) For the reasons stated below, the ALJ failed to provide a clear and convincing reason based on substantial evidence in the record to reject Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 1. Failure to Follow Prescribed Treatment A claimant’s “unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment” is a factor that “can cast doubt on the sincerity of the claimant’s pain testimony.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(v), 416.929(c)(3)(v) (providing that an ALJ may consider claimant’s treatment for pain or other symptoms in evaluating symptom evidence). However, an ALJ also must “consider and address reasons for not pursuing treatment that are pertinent to an individual’s case.” SSR 16-3p, 2016 LEXIS 4, at *25; see also Orn, 495 F.3d at 638 (noting that an ALJ is required to consider “any explanations that the individual may provide, or other information in the case record, that may explain” the individual’s failure to follow a treatment plan). In considering mental health issues, the Ninth Circuit has expressly stated that “it is a questionable practice to chastise one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1018 n.24. “In other words, we do not punish the mentally ill for occasionally going off their medication when the record affords compelling reason to view such departures from prescribed treatment as part of claimants’ underlying mental afflictions.” Id. /// Additionally, an ALJ may discount a claimant’s testimony where evidence shows that his symptoms were under control with treatment. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a claimant’s favorable response to conservative treatment undermined the claimant’s reports regarding the disabling nature of his pain); Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that an ALJ “reasonably noted that the underlying complaints upon which her reports of pain were predicated had come under control”); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for [disability] benefits.”) (citing Odle v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming a denial of benefits and noting that the claimant’s impairments were responsive to medication)). However, an ALJ may not “pick out a few isolated instances of improvement over a period of months or years and . . . treat them as a basis for concluding a claimant is capable of working.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017. In considering mental health issues, the Ninth Circuit has expressly stated “it is error to reject a claimant’s testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment” as “[c]ycles of improvement and debilitating symptoms are a common occurrence.” Id. Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “failure to follow prescribed treatment that might improve symptoms was inconsistent with the claimant’s statements regarding the alleged intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms.” (AR 23.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “complained of disabling mental health symptoms,” but “failed to comply with the treatment in a manner consistent with the alleged complaints.” (Id.) In support of this finding, the ALJ relied on three examples of noncompliance. First, the ALJ cited to a June 8, 2021 Progress Note documenting “partial compliance” with medications and other therapy. (Id. at 23, 433.) Second, the ALJ cited to a September 27, 2021, Progress Note documenting that “[w]hile Plaintiff is away from his mother’s home, [he] spends time with homeless people and uses street drugs, . . . is not consistent with his mental health services and has not accepted mental health services in the past.” (Id. at 23, 1052.) Third, the ALJ cited to a March 20, 2023 Progress Note documenting that Plaintiff was “[n]ot using meds.” (Id. at 23, 2362.) Then, the ALJ compared these incidents to periods of compliance and self-reported improvement in July and September 2021 (id. at 1266, 1276, 1278, 1724) and January 2023 (id. at 2331) and concluded that “[t]his indicates that the alleged intensity and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms are inconsistent with the overall evidence of record” (id. at 23). The ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony based on his purported failure to comply with prescribed treatment. While the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not “offer a sufficient explanation for not complying with prescribed treatment” (id.), the ALJ failed to consider possible reasons for Plaintiff’s noncompliance. See Romero v. O’Malley, No. 23-5592, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 30305 at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 29, 2024) (finding ALJ erred in discounting claimant’s testimony of mental health symptoms because of alleged failure to comply with prescribed medications where ALJ merely concluded that claimant had not “offer[ed] a sufficient explanation for not complying with prescribed treatment” without considering possible reasons based on the record) (alteration in original). Specifically, the ALJ failed to consider whether Plaintiff’s noncompliance was symptomatic of his underlying mental health disorders. Nowhere in the ALJ’s decision does she consider whether Plaintiff’s decision to not take his medication was, at least in part, the result of his underlying schizoaffective, bipolar, major depressive, or substance addiction disorders. (See generally AR 17–29.) The Court notes that in each of the Progress Notes to which the ALJ cites, Plaintiff reported hallucinations (see id. at 433, 1052, 2362)—the hallmark symptom of his mental delusions that formed the basis of his testimony (see id. at 39–50). The ALJ erred in failing to consider whether this suggests that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with medication was, at least in part, the result of these delusions. See, e.g., Taylor v. Colvin, No. EDCV 12-00819-MAN, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38682, at *24 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2014) (“[E]ven assuming arguendo that plaintiff failed to provide good reasons for her noncompliance, plaintiff’s inability to follow her treatment may have been symptomatic of her mental impairments and, therefore, does not provide an appropriate basis for discrediting her subjective symptom testimony.”); Butts v. Astrue, No. CV-10-7295 RNB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61422, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2011) (finding that claimant’s noncompliance with her treatment plan “could have been symptomatic of the severity of her mental impairments, and therefore does not constitute a clear and convincing reason for not crediting her subjective symptom testimony.”); Clark v. Astrue, No. CV-09-120-JPH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10210, at *12–13 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 5, 2010) (“[I]t was not appropriate for the ALJ to consider plaintiff’s limited mental health treatment as evidence of a lack of a credibility since the failure to follow through with mental health treatment may itself be a symptom of significant mental health problems.”). The ALJ also erred in discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony based on his purported improvement. In support of her finding, the ALJ relied on three examples of improvement. First, the ALJ cited to a July 12, 2021 Progress Note documenting Plaintiff’s statements that “as long as [he] [was] taking [his] medicine, [he] [was] not having problems” and he was “doing much better” and a July 12, 2021 Mental Status Exam that documented Plaintiff’s normal appearance, motor activity, speech, mood, memory, orientation, consciousness, concentration, and memory. (AR 23, 1266, 1276, 1278.) Second, the ALJ cited to a September 14, 2021 Progress Note documenting Plaintiff’s mother’s statement that Plaintiff was “doing better with his injectable medicine, that he was not aggressive anymore [and] that the new medication is helping [him] to be calm.” (Id. at 23, 1724.) Third, the ALJ cited to a January 23, 2023 Progress Note documenting Plaintiff’s /// statement that his close work with psychiatrists and compliance with Rexulti “may be helping him.” (Id. at 23, 2331.) These Progress Notes do not fairly support the suggestion that Plaintiff’s symptoms were under control while under medication. As the ALJ noted, the July 12, 2021 Progress Note was created just two weeks after Plaintiff had been hospitalized. (Id. at 23, 399.) At best, this supports the suggestion that, immediately following that hospitalization, Plaintiff’s condition stabilized with treatment and medication. And the September 14, 2021 Progress Note documented a phone call with Plaintiff’s mother, the “purpose” of which was “[t]o assist, encourage, and support [her] ability” to help Plaintiff reach the goal of his treatment plan. (Id. at 1724.) Notably, that goal was to obtain one year of sobriety; on September 14, 2021, Plaintiff had achieved just four days of sobriety. (Id.) This does not fairly support the suggestion that Plaintiff’s sobriety was under control. Further, in isolating Plaintiff’s mother’s statement, the ALJ ignored the portion of that statement that better describes the broader trend of Plaintiff’s symptoms—that Plaintiff had been “in an out of hospitals for many years” and, while he was “doing better after his injectable medicine . . . he had a[n] issue at work yesterday because he got to work late” because “he is not sleeping [un]til 5:00 AM” and “cannot get up [un]til after lunch.” (Id.) Not only is this consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony— that he experienced some improvement but continued to experience fatigue due to lack of sleep while hallucinating—but Plaintiff’s decade-long pattern of hospitalization followed by temporary improvement suggests the “waxing and waning” of mental health symptoms that the Ninth Circuit has cautioned adjudicators from erroneously relying upon in discrediting subjective symptom testimony. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1017 (“[I]t is error to reject a claimant’s testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment.”). Finally, even assuming Plaintiff’s January 23, 2023 statement that Rexulti “may be helping him” suggests improvement, the ALJ ignored parts of the record from the same time period suggesting—much more emphatically—that medication had not controlled Plaintiff’s symptoms. Most notably, on February 9, 2023—just days after the January 23, 2023 Progress Note was created—Dr. Dobos stated that, “even with being on THREE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATIONS along with other psychiatric medications [Plaintiff] continues to have severe symptomology affecting his ability to function.” (AR 2318 (emphasis in original).) Not only does this contradict the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had improved, but it contradicts her finding that Plaintiff failed to comply with prescribed treatment, and the confluence of both contradictions underscores the error in the ALJ”s reasoning. In relying on some parts of the record—for the assertion that Plaintiff failed to comply with prescribed treatment that might improve symptoms—while ignoring other parts of the record—suggesting that, despite compliance, Plaintiff’s symptoms had not improved—the ALJ failed to provide a clear and convincing reason for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. See V.B.B. v Kijakazi, No. 5:21-cv-01949-SHK, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181952, *17–18 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2022) (finding ALJ erroneously discredited subjective symptom testimony based on noncompliance where ALJ relied on only some evidence that supported rejecting plaintiff’s statements but did not address the evidence showing that plaintiff complied with medication during much of the relevant time period but that symptoms persisted). For the reasons stated above, failure to follow prescribed treatment that might improve symptoms was not a clear and convincing reason based on substantial evidence in the record to reject Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 2. Activities of Daily Living An ALJ may consider activities of daily living in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3). An ALJ properly may reject a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony if the claimant’s conduct or daily activities are inconsistent with the claimant’s expressed limitations. See, e.g., Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2012); see Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009). “Even where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113. A claimant’s testimony regarding daily living activities may undermine a disability claim in two ways: (1) the activity testimony may contradict other testimony about severity of symptoms, or (2) the activities show that the claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his or her day engaged in physical functions transferable to a work setting. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1165. However, it is error to “merely recite[] plaintiff’s activities without taking into account [his] alleged limitations in completing those activities.” See Robinson v. Berryhill, No. ED CV 17-2238-PLA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133911, at *24 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2018). Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony by relying on four parts of the record. First, the ALJ cited to a May 19, 2022 Function Report, completed by Plaintiff’s mother, and concluded that Plaintiff “prepared meals, did laundry, shopped in stores, walked to get around, attended sporting events, and used Zoom to socialize.” (AR 23, 275–286.) Second, the ALJ cited to a July 18, 2022 Department of Social Services Psychiatric Consultative Examination Report which documented that Plaintiff had “no difficulty with dressing, bathing, and hygiene.” (Id. at 23, 1617.) Third, the ALJ cited to February 3, 2022, March 1, 2022, and March 15, 2022 Progress Notes and found that Plaintiff “was able to live with his mother,” “went out for walks,” “engaged in community service work,” and “was able to interact in a group setting and offer support to other members.” (Id. at 23, 1912, 1932, 1950.) Finally, the ALJ cited to an August 10, 2022 Progress Note which documented that Plaintiff “apparently was taking an adult school on-line program to earn his high school diploma.” (AR 23, 196.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ ignored Plaintiff’s significant limitations in completing these activities and, regardless, failed to explain how the identified activities were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s allegations of dysfunction. (Pl.’s Br. 14– 15.) The Court agrees. With respect to Plaintiff’s personal care, the ALJ ignored several limitations documented in Plaintiff’s mother’s Function Report, including but not limited to the following: Plaintiff could dress and bath himself, but wore “mismatched clothing inside out, excessively bath[ed], [did] not care about [his] hair,” and Plaintiff’s mother had to remind Plaintiff “half the time to wear shoes”; Plaintiff could prepare “frozen dinners at times or heat up leftovers” in the microwave, but “left the stove burners on . . . even with [a] beep reminder” such that Plaintiff’s mother “did not trust” him to use the stove; Plaintiff could do laundry, but would leave clothing in the washer or dryer and needed to be reminded of next steps; Plaintiff went outside, but only “to [the] backyard or [on] walks sometimes”; Plaintiff could shop, but only for “one item” and “not a list.” (AR 280–82.) With respect to Plaintiff’s social activities, the ALJ ignored similar qualifying statements. Plaintiff’s mother stated that Plaintiff attended baseball games two times per months during the baseball season, but that Plaintiff had generally “lost interest in sports” and is “reclusive.” (Id. at 283.) With the exception of these occasional baseball games, Plaintiff’s mother listed “engag[ing] in Zoom talks” as Plaintiff’s only social activity. (Id.) Further, the Court sees no clear contradiction between, on the one hand, Plaintiff’s ability to complete basic household chores and attend occasional social events and, on the other hand, the limiting effects of his symptoms. Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1165 (finding “daily activities, which included completing basic chores, sometimes with the help of a friend, and attending occasional social events” did not support ALJ’s adverse credibility of determination). With respect to Plaintiff’s community service and group therapy, the ALJ mischaracterized the record. The Progress Notes documented that Plaintiff attended group therapy sessions, the purpose of which was to “give and receive support from others experiencing” symptoms of schizophrenia and related disorders through the “opportunity for socialization and to practice new social skills.” (AR 1912.) At the February 2, 2022 session, Plaintiff “provided supportive listening to other group members” and shared that “he is required to do community service and will be doing so at the animal shelter.” (Id.) At the March 1, 2022 session, Plaintiff stated, “I’m doing ok, I’m just here for the support today.” (Id. at 1932.) Plaintiff “participated in the group[,] interacted with other members,” and shared that he was experiencing symptoms but “able to go to his community service work at the animal shelter.” (Id.) At the March 15, 2022 session, Plaintiff shared that the community service “gave him purpose,” “spoke about the importance of belonging,” and “interacted with the other group members and was supportive.” (Id. at 1050.) Because the ALJ omits the fact that Plaintiff’s “interaction” with others was the very purpose of his treatment and “engagement” in community service was required and related to such treatment, an adverse credibility finding based on such characterization was erroneous. See Rawa v. Colvin, 672 Fed. App’x 665, 666 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that that ALJ mischaracterized plaintiff’s level of activity because it omitted “a number of salient and dispositive facts and details, and thus concluding that “[s]uch an inaccurate representation of the record can not constitute a specific, clear, and convincing reason for rejecting [the plaintiff’s] testimony.”). In fact, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s participation in these rehabilitative services—i.e., his daily activities—undermined his testimony is, at the very least, inconsistent with her finding that Plaintiff’s insufficient participation in such services—i.e., his failure to comply with prescribed treatment—also undermined his testimony. Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’ schooling, the ALJ cites to nothing in the record indicating that Plaintiff’s participation exceeded the activity to which he testified—namely, that Plaintiff attempted to obtain his GED but could not successfully do so because it was “too hard.” (AR 50.) For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s daily activities were not a clear and convincing reason based on substantial evidence in the record to reject Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. 3. Objective Medical Evidence Defendant contends that the ALJ “reasonably observed that numerous objective findings showed that Plaintiff’s alleged limitations were not as drastic as he alleged.” (Def.’s Br. 12.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ “fail[ed] to explain with any specificity how such findings undercut the many other objective findings in the record substantiating Plaintiff’s alleged dysfunction due to his pervasive hallucinations and mental symptoms.” (Pl.’s Br. 7.) Even if the objective medical evidence did not corroborate Plaintiff’s subjective allegations, lack of objective medical evidence is a legally insufficient reason on its own to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. See, e.g., Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345 (“[A]n adjudicator may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.”); Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883 (“While an ALJ may find testimony not credible in part or in whole, he or she may not disregard it solely because it is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence.”). Here, even assuming the record supports the ALJ's reasoning regarding the lack of support from objective medical evidence, the ALJ did not identify any other clear and convincing reason, supported by substantial evidence, to discount Plaintiff’s subjective symptom statements. Standing alone, the purported lack of support from objective medical evidence is not a legally sufficient reason to discount Plaintiff's symptom testimony. /// * * * In sum, the ALJ’s decision does not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Reversal is warranted. E. Remand for Further Proceedings The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or order an immediate award of benefits is within the district court’s discretion. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. See id. at 1179 (“[T]he decision of whether to remand for further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings.”). However, where, as here, the circumstances of the case suggest that further administrative review could remedy the Commissioner’s errors, remand is appropriate. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011). Specifically, remand is warranted here for reconsideration of Plaintiff’s symptom statements because the ALJ’s failure to provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting such statements in the decision prevents this Court from meaningfully determining whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (“Because ‘the agency’s path’ cannot ‘reasonably be discerned,’ we must reverse the district court’s decision to the extent it affirmed the ALJ’s credibility determination.” (citation omitted)). /// /// /// /// /// Vv. ORDER The Court ORDERS that judgment be entered reversing the decision of the ) Commissioner and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings. DATED: January 6, 2026 we HONORABLE MARIA A. AUDERO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21