Missouri State Life Insurance v. King

57 S.W.2d 400, 186 Ark. 983, 1933 Ark. LEXIS 270
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedFebruary 20, 1933
Docket4-2865
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 57 S.W.2d 400 (Missouri State Life Insurance v. King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Missouri State Life Insurance v. King, 57 S.W.2d 400, 186 Ark. 983, 1933 Ark. LEXIS 270 (Ark. 1933).

Opinion

Smith, J.

Appellee was employed in the shops of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company in North Little Rock, and, by virtue of this employment, had two certificates which had been issued to him under separate group insurance policies issued by appellant, Missouri State Life Insurance Company, to the railway employees. One of these certificates provided for a weekly indemnity, in case of disability to perform the duties of the insured’s avocation, of $15 per week, but not to exceed twenty-six weeks. The other certificate provided for the payment of $2,000 in the event the insured should, after six months ’ disability, be found to be permanently disabled.

Appellee, after making claim, and proof of his disability under the first-named certificate, filed suit on August 26, 1931, to recover on the first-mentioned certificate providing for the payment of $15 per week. A physician representing the insurance company examined appel-lee, and certified that, while he was affected with syphilis, he was not disabled at that time, and upon this examination and report the company filed an answer, denying liability.

The insured’s disability continued, and on December 5, 1931, his attorney, residing in Little Rock, wrote the company the following letter: “In re: Rome King, 0-2377, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, Certificate No. 1101.

“Oentlemen: Rome King, the insured, had been totally and permanently disabled for six months, and we now make demand under the above policy and certificates.

‘‘Please advise immediately your intentions in this matter. ’ ’

On December 10th the company answered and stated that the matter had been referred to their local attorney in Little Rock for investigation and report, and on December 11th the local attorney referred to wrote the insured’s attorney saying that, in order to determine whether the insured was totally and permanently disabled, they would ask to have the insured examined by a physician, whose name was stated. No response being received, a second letter was written, reading as follows:

“Please let us have a response to our letter of recent date. If your client will submit to an immediate examination, we will give you an early decision as to whether the company is liable for the payment of total and permanent benefits.”

In the meantime, the company had furnished the insured’s attorney the blanks .used in making proof of claims of this character, and on December 16th these blanks, properly filled out, were sent to the company, showing that the insured was then totally disabled, and had been so for a period of six months.

On December 17th the insured’s attorney wrote the company’s attorney that it would be agreeable for the insured to be examined, provided a representative of the insured be permitted to be present at the examination, and provided also that a copy of the report be promptly furnished insured’s attorney. This letter was answered the day it was received, and the name of the physician selected for the examination, with his office address, was given. This letter concluded with the following statement:

“Just as goon as he can furnish us his report of his findings, we will admit or deny liability for the total and permanent disability benefits. In the meantime, please refrain from filing suit. We feel that we are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to pass upon the claim without being subjected to the statutory penalty and attorney’s fees.”

This letter advised that arrangements for tlie examination to be made on December 18th had been perfected, bnt the insured did not report for the examination until December 22d. On the day on which this examination was held, the insured’s attorney wrote the company’s attorney as follows:

“Claimant was examined at Trinity Hospital today, and we wish you would furnish us with a copy of the report as soon as it is received. Please file your answer in this ease as soon as possible, so it can be set down for trial.”

On the same day on which this letter was written, to-wit, December 22, 1931, an amendment was filed to the original complaint, in which the plaintiff alleged his permanent disability, and prayed judgment, not only for the weekly disability benefits as was originally prayed, but for the face of the policy for permanent disability.

The final report of the examining physician was mailed to the company’s attorney on December 26th, and a copy thereof transmitted to appellee’s attorney December 28, 1931. The letter transmitting this report reads as follows:

“There is inclosed the original report which we have received from Trinity Hospital. In view of the findings, the company admits liability, and is willing to pay the sum of $2,000 with interest from the date the claim was filed. Kindly inform us if this is acceptable. If so, Mr. Broadaway will be instructed to deliver a draft to you at once.”

This offer was not acceptable, and was not accepted, and the cause went to trial upon the records stated on the issue whether the insured was entitled to receive, in addition to the face of the policy and the interest thereon, the statutory penalty and the attorney’s fee on the two thousand dollar policy. It was not questioned that the insured was entitled to his weekly benefits at the time of the trial, together with the penalty and attorney’s fee in that case, and the judgment rendered in the insured’s favor for these items is not questioned and has been paid.

Upon rendering judgment upon the amended complaint for the amount of the two-thousand dollar policy, with the penalty and the attorney’s fee thereon, the court said:

‘ ‘ It seems to me that this statute ought to he strictly construed as to this policy. Of course, being prepared by the defendant, it ought to be construed more strongly against the defendant than the plaintiff. Under the terms of the policy as written, it required the defendant to pay the insured whenever it receives due proof of loss. I think that that part of the policy was substantially complied with by the plaintiff when he sent in the proof of loss by the doctor’s certificate. There is nothing in the policy, unless you give it a very liberal construction, that would give the company any absolute right to require him to submit to an examination. I think, under our statutes, the plaintiff is entitled to the attorney fee and penalty if the insurance company fails to pay the claim within the time specified by the statute. I think now, according to the construction given to that statute in other cases, that the attorney is entitled to his attorney fee and penalty.”

The declaration of law by the court that, under the terms of the policy as written, the company was required to pay when it received due proof of loss, without having the right to make additional investigation, presents the issue in the case, as there appears to be no substantial dispute in the testimony.

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140 S.W.2d 434 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1940)
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98 S.W.2d 944 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1936)
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95 S.W.2d 1144 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1936)
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Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Harper
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
57 S.W.2d 400, 186 Ark. 983, 1933 Ark. LEXIS 270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/missouri-state-life-insurance-v-king-ark-1933.