Missouri Pac. R. v. Siratt

78 F.2d 253, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3696
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJuly 2, 1935
DocketNo. 10153
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 78 F.2d 253 (Missouri Pac. R. v. Siratt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Missouri Pac. R. v. Siratt, 78 F.2d 253, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3696 (8th Cir. 1935).

Opinion

STONE, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment awarding damages for personal injuries.

There are various assignments of errors, but only two are briefed, so the others must be regarded as waived. Of these two, one is that the verdict is excessive. That matter is not subject to examination here. The other is that the dangerous condition which caused this injury was a risk which was assumed by appellee.

This issue has to do with the condition of a pit wherein the accident occurred. Descriptions of the pit and of how the accident happened are as follows: At Little Rock, Ark., appellant maintains a considerable plant, including a machine shop, pipe shop, boiler shop, car shop, coach shop, paint shop, and blacksmith shop. The blacksmith shop is a large building containing many forges and large steam hammers. Crude oil was used in the forges. This oil was stored in large tanks. To fit this oil for use in the forges it was necessary to heat it. For that purpose it was passed through pipes in a pit and pumped by four pumps, at the bottom of the pit, into auxiliary tanks in the blacksmith shop. This pit was adjacent to the shop. For the most part it was underground, projecting above the surface about 3 feet. It was made of concrete, and was about 30 or 40 feet long, 16 feet wide, and about 14 feet deep. The entrance was through a covered manhole in the roof, which hole was about 3 to 3y2 feet across. Inside the pit were the oil pumps at the bottom and a number of pipes used for different purposes. These pipes were on the walls at various heights; some being attached to the wall by strap brackets and some not. From a short distance below the manhole a ladder extended to the bottom. This ladder was of five-eighth inch steel rods bent out to form steps and with the ends sunk into the concrete wall. Some (if not all) of the pipes extended along the wall back of the ladder. The pit contained electric lights which could be turned on from above.

Appellee had been with the company at this plant some years. He was a machinist, whose duty was to look after the machinery in the blacksmith shop. Apparently the machinery in the pit was regarded as part of that having to do with the shop since he had been into the pit on various occasions in connection with repairs to the pumps. He had nothing to do with the pipes in the pit. He went into the pit when the pumps needed repair.1 Fie could not remember when he had last been in the pit before the accident but thought “it hadn’t been over a week [255]*255or ten days, maybe not that long.” He knew about the pipes on the wall between the ladder steps, but they were against the wall and could not be stepped on by one using the ladder.

Early on February 18, 1931, when he went to work, he was told by his foreman that something was the matter with the pumps and to fix them. He turned on the pit lights, removed the manhole cover, and proceeded down the ladder. When he placed his foot on a certain step (as to which one there is an immaterial difference), his foot encountered an end of one of the pipes which had become disconnected and had fallen on the step tread. The pipe or his foot slipped and he was thrown to the bottom, rendered unconscious, and seriously injured.

The position of appellant as to assumption of risk is stated in its brief as follows: “Siratt himself knew better than the company if these pipes were insecurely fastened and liable to come loose and fall onto the grabiron steps, as he had been going up and down these steps and seeing these pipes every few days for seven or eight or nine years. It certainly cannot be said that he did not assume the liability of them coming loose because they were insecurely fastened; neither can it be said that he did not assume the liability of stepping on the pipe which was so large and easy to be seen, and which he did see, after it fell upon the step. The company was depending upon Mr. Siratt more than anyone else to take care of just such conditions, because he was the repair man and sent into the pit for the purpose of repairing the machinery and conditions in there. Even though he contends that he was not a pipe man the company had a right to rely upon the employees who daily went: in and out of this pit to see that there was no dangerous condition existing there which they could easily remedy or have remedied by the proper parties. There was nothing hidden about the pipe, whether it was fastened on the wall or on the step, and even if it was on the step it would support the weight of a man even though he was large like Mr. Siratt. According to the testimony of Mr. Siratt it was the fact that the pipe slipped off of the step that caused him to fall; that could not have been caused by anything else except the manner in which he put his foot upon the pipe and he could easily see the position of the pipe and could have avoided that had he looked. The wall, the grabiron steps and the pipes were all solid, substantial and strong enough to support Mr. Siratt as long as the pipe and his weight remained upon the grabiron step and he certainly assumed the condition that existed there when he put his foot on the pipe and thereby caused it to slip off of the step and let his weight go down with the pipe and turn loose of the grab-irons above where he was holding with his hands. According to his own testimony he caused his own injury in the way he hit the pipe with his foot. ‘This step seemed to be a little closer than the others, and as my foot hit it it seemed like it hit it quicker, you know, quicker than it should’. We submit that this was a very obvious condition which he could easily have seen and did see and he assumed the risk under the rule of law as to assumed risk under similar conditions which the courts have repeated time and again in the numerous cases we have cited.”

The gist of this contention is that appellee (1) assumed the risk of the pipe becoming loose because he knew of its insecure fastening and (2) assumed the risk of injury from its-being on the step because it was easy to be seen there on the step and (3) because he did see it there.

Many cases have been cited in the briefs, and they have been examined. However, it is not necessary to discuss [256]*256them, since there is .no disagreement concerning rules of law. The controversy is solely over the applicability of those rules to the facts presented by the evidence. The rules relied on by appellant are as follows: (1) That where a permanent condition, which is known to the employee and which he knows may cause injury to him, exists, he assumes the risk of injury therefrom — this rule is urged in connection with the claimed probability that the pipes back of the ladder might become loose from the wall and unjointed and then fall on the ladder steps; (2) that, where a dangerous condition is easily observable by the employee in the reasonable exercise of his senses for his own safety, he assumes the risk therefrom — this rule is urged in connection with the claim that appellee could easily have seen this projecting pipe end on the step tread had he looked; (3) that, where an employee actually sees a condition and knows the danger therefrom, he assumes the risk of injury — this is urged in connection with the claim that appellee saw the pipe end on the step tread.

As to the first, there is no evidence that appellee knew the pipes were so insecurely fastened that they might come loose and fall on the step, much .less that they might (on coming loose) become unjointed and a portion thereof fall upon the ladder steps.

As to an Obvious Condition.

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Related

Pitcairn v. Perry
122 F.2d 881 (Eighth Circuit, 1941)
Kurn v. Stanfield
111 F.2d 469 (Eighth Circuit, 1940)
Thompson v. Siratt
95 F.2d 214 (Eighth Circuit, 1938)

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Bluebook (online)
78 F.2d 253, 1935 U.S. App. LEXIS 3696, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/missouri-pac-r-v-siratt-ca8-1935.