Missouri Pac. R. v. Norwood

13 F. Supp. 24
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedJuly 1, 1935
DocketNo. 501
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 13 F. Supp. 24 (Missouri Pac. R. v. Norwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Missouri Pac. R. v. Norwood, 13 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Ark. 1935).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

In 1907, Arkansas enacted a “full crew” law (affecting freight trains) requiring three brakemen on trains of 25 or more cars (Ark. Laws 1907, Act No. 116 [page 295]) and, in 1913, a “full crew” law requiring 3 switch “helpers” in all cities of the first and second class where switching movements were made across public crossings within the city limits (Ark. Laws 1913, Act No. 67 [page 211]). The validity of these laws was promptly questioned. The contest and controversy was over the third brakeman and the third switch helper; the railways contending these third men were unnecessary. The brakeman law was first upheld in Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State of Arkansas, 86 Ark. 412, 111 S.W. 456, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 219 U.S. 453, 31 S.Ct. 275, 55 L. Ed. 290. The switchman law was first upheld in St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. State of Arkansas, 114 Ark. 486, 170 S.W. 580, affirmed in 240 U.S. 518, 36 S.Ct. 443, 60 L.Ed. 776. Some years after these decisions, this plaintiff filed its petition attacking the validity of both laws. The earlier attacks were (as to federal grounds) based upon violation of the Interstate Commerce provisions of the Constitution (article 1, § 8) and the Fourteenth Amendment. The bases of this plaintiff’s action covered the grounds in the two earlier suits, and also that Congress had, prior and since those decisions, occupied the field covered by these two laws. As to the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff alleged such a change in conditions affecting the application of the two laws as to render them then invalid. Before a statutory court of three judges, plaintiff applied for a temporary injunction, and defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as insufficient. That court sustained the motion and dismissed the complaint for failing to show any ground for relief. (D.C.) 42 F.(2d) 765. On appeal, that decree was affirmed. 283 U.S. 249, 51 S.Ct. 458, 75 L.Ed. 1010. In that opinion, Mr. Justice Butler (for the court) said that the complaint contained “much by way of argument, assertions as to questions of law together with inferences and conclusions of the pleader as to matters of fact” (283 U. S. 249, page 254, 51 S.Ct. 458, 461, 75 L. Ed. 1010); that such were not deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss (283 U.S. 249, page 254, 51 S.Ct. 458, 461, 75 L.Ed. 1010); and that “the burden is on the plaintiff by candid and direct allegations to set forth in its complaint facts sufficient plainly to show the asserted invalidity” (283 U. S. 249, page 255, 51 S.Ct. 458, 461, 75 L. Ed. 1010). Also, the court said (283 U.S. 249, page 255, 51 S.Ct. 458, 461, 75 L.Ed. [25]*251010) : “There is no showing that the dangers against which these laws were intended to safeguard employees and the public no longer exist or have been lessened by the improvements in road and equipment or by the changes in operating conditions there described. And, for aught that appears from the facts that are alleged, the same or greater need may now exist for the specified number of brakemen and helpers in freight train and switching crews. It is not made to appear that the expense of complying with the state laws is now relatively more burdensome than formerly.”

Based upon these and related expressions in the opinion, plaintiff filed its motion to modify the mandate so as to permit filing of an amended petition. The mandate was modified to an affirmance “without prejudice to any application to the District Court to amend the pleadings or otherwise.” 283 U.S. 809, 51 S.Ct. 652, 75 L. Ed. 1428. Under this modification, plaintiff was allowed to file an amended petition (further amended since in some respects). A motion to dismiss was denied; the application for a temporary injunction was denied “on the ground of a balance of convenience in favor of defendants”; defendants answered and a special master was appointed to take testimony. . Conceiving it contrary to the spirit and purposes of the act (Jud. Code, § 266, amended, U.S.C.A. title 28, § 380) creating the statutory court to permit a master to make findings of fact or to state conclusions of law, which under ordinary equity practice would have certain force, the court expressly denied the master such functions and confined his powers and duties to taking and reporting the testimony and to filing “an index and a summary or abstract” of the evidence “as an aid to the Court in ready examination of the evidence.” Under this authority, the master has returned over 1900 pages of testimony and about 100 paper exhibits. This entire record has been read as well as copious briefs.

The Issues.

With commendable perseverance, counsel have argued the validity of these laws as violating the Interstate Commerce provision of the Constitution, as invading a field occupied by congressional regulation of interstate commerce, and as violating the Fourteenth Amendment. We deem all of these issues settled by the above three decisions of the Supreme Court, except one. That issue arises under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Rock Island (219 U.S. 453, 31 S. Ct. 275, 55 L.Ed. 290) and the Iron Mountain (240 U.S. 518, 36 S.Ct. 443, 60 L.Ed. 776) cases determined that these laws were valid as applied to the conditions presented at the time these cases were tried.' We must presume the actual conditions then existing were revealed in those ca.ses. The Missouri Pacific Case (283 U.S. 249, 51 S. Ct. 458, 75 L.Ed. 1010) was decided upon the face of a complaint held imperfect, in part because of method of statement; such being argument, legal assertions, and inferences and conclusions of fact rather than direct allegation of facts. While that opinion contains valuable statements as to what plaintiff had alleged (283 U.S. pages 255, 256, 51 S.Ct. 461, 462) or failed to allege (283 U.S. pages 254, 255, 51 S.Ct. 461), it was not intended as a determination of the validity of these laws under the conditions at the time that case was determined in the lower court. However, that opinion (283 U.S. page 255, 51 S.Ct. 461) clearly suggested the issue which plaintiff would have to meet to overthrow the laws because of the Fourteenth Amendment. Broadly, this issue was whether there had been such a change in the situations to which the laws applied as to render their application to the new conditions clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.

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Bluebook (online)
13 F. Supp. 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/missouri-pac-r-v-norwood-arwd-1935.