Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Sealy

Supreme Court

Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Sealy

248 U.S. 363, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 296, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2321

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedJanuary 7, 1919

Docket90

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 248 U.S. 363 (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Sealy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Sealy, 248 U.S. 363, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 296, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2321 (1919).

Pincite

Opinion

Mr. Justice Brandeis

delivered the opinion of the court.

In June, 1900, the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company issued bills of lading to shipper’s order, covering 27 carload's of grain to be shipped from Kansas City, Missouri, to Galveston, Texas. No grain was in fact delivered to it for shipment; but before the fraud was discovered, the alleged shipper transferred the bills of lading to Hutchings, Sealy & Co., who made advances thereon. The advances were not fully repaid; and in 1905 they brought suit against the railroad in' a state district court of Kansas. The railroad defended on the ground that, since the bills of lading had been delivered in Missouri, the transaction was governed by the Missouri law, and that under the law of that State the railroad was not liable. For more than eight years the record contained no suggestion of a federal question, the case having meanwhile been passed upon twice by the Supreme Court of Kansas (Railway Co. v. Hutchings, 78 Kansas, 758; Hutchings v. Railway Co., 84 Kansas, 479). Thereafter, in 1913, the railroad presented the claim that the transaction was governed by the federal law; and that, by it, the defendant was not liable. The Supreme Court of Kansas, apparently as a matter of state practice, declared that the contention came too late to be considered; and entered judgment for the plaintiff. 98 Kansas, 225. The case comes here on writ of error under § 237 .of the Judicial Code.

*365 The federal question was not seasonably raised. Bonner v. Gorman, 213 U. S. 86, 91; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Woodford, 234 , U. S. 46, 51. But it is also unsubstantial. Prior to the Carmack Amendment (Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 595) the rights of the parties were governed by state law, Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 109-110; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; and the Carmack Amendment does not apply, as the cause of action, if any arose six years before the passage of that act. The writ of error is

Dismissed.

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Mr. Justice Brandeis

delivered the opinion of the court.

In June, 1900, the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company issued bills of lading to shipper’s order, covering 27 carload's of grain to be shipped from Kansas City, Missouri, to Galveston, Texas. No grain was in fact delivered to it for shipment; but before the fraud was discovered, the alleged shipper transferred the bills of lading to Hutchings, Sealy & Co., who made advances thereon. The advances were not fully repaid; and in 1905 they brought suit against the railroad in' a state district court of Kansas. The railroad defended on the ground that, since the bills of lading had been delivered in Missouri, the transaction was governed by the Missouri law, and that under the law of that State the railroad was not liable. For more than eight years the record contained no suggestion of a federal question, the case having meanwhile been passed upon twice by the Supreme Court of Kansas (Railway Co. v. Hutchings, 78 Kansas, 758; Hutchings v. Railway Co., 84 Kansas, 479). Thereafter, in 1913, the railroad presented the claim that the transaction was governed by the federal law; and that, by it, the defendant was not liable. The Supreme Court of Kansas, apparently as a matter of state practice, declared that the contention came too late to be considered; and entered judgment for the plaintiff. 98 Kansas, 225. The case comes here on writ of error under § 237 .of the Judicial Code.

*365 The federal question was not seasonably raised. Bonner v. Gorman, 213 U. S. 86, 91; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Woodford, 234 , U. S. 46, 51. But it is also unsubstantial. Prior to the Carmack Amendment (Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 595) the rights of the parties were governed by state law, Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 109-110; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; and the Carmack Amendment does not apply, as the cause of action, if any arose six years before the passage of that act. The writ of error is

Dismissed.

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248 U.S. 363, 39 S. Ct. 97, 63 L. Ed. 296, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2321, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/missouri-kansas-texas-railway-co-v-sealy-scotus-1919.

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