Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Anderson

198 S.W. 795, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 984
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided October 24, 1917·No. No. 5806.·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

KEY, C. J.

This is a personal injury damage suit, and as a number of objections are made to the court’s charge to the jury, and as that charge discloses the nature of the suit, and as it is regarded by this court as a model, we here copy it in full, omitting certain formal parts:

“Gentlemen of the Jury: In this case the plaintiff, Sol Anderson, is suing the defendant, the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas, for damages. The plaintiff alleges that on the 16th day of October, 1914, while he was a passenger on a train operated by the defendant, in the town of Granger, Williamson county, Texas, the servants, agents, and em-ployés of the defendant, while said train was in rapid motion, pushed, urged, and ordered the plaintiff to disembark from the car in which he was riding, which alleged act plaintiff says constituted negligence-on-the part of the defendant, and as a result thereof he alleged that he sustained certain injuries, on account of which he sues. For a further statement of plaintiff’s allegations you are referred to plaintiff’s second amended original petition, with the exception of paragraphs 5, 15, and 16 thereof, which have been abandoned. The said petition is herewith delivered to you. The defendant answered by denying the allegations of plaintiff’s petition, and specially denies that if plaintiff was Injured, that he was a passenger at the time he was injured, and says that upon the arrival of said train at Granger, Texas, said arrival was announced, and that the train stopped at said station for a reasonable time, and that it was plaintiff’s duty, under his contract of carriage with the defendant, to disembark, from said train while the same was stopped at the station, but that plaintiff failed to do so. The defendant denies that its servants, agents, or employés pushed, ordered, advised, or compelled the plaintiff to leave said train after same was in motion, but defendant alleges that, if plaintiff left said train while same was in motion, he did so voluntarily, and was thereby guilty of contributory negligence, which contributed to cause his injury.
“You are given the fallowing as the law applicable to this case:
“I. You are the exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight to be given to the testimony; but you are bound to receive the law from the court as given you in this charge and in any special charges which may be given, and be governed thereby.
“II. The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove the allegations of his petition necessary to entitle him to recover by a preponderance of the evidence.
“III. By the term ‘ordinary care,’ as used in this charge, is meant that degree of care which would be exercised by a person of ordinary prudence, under the same or like circumstances.
“IV. You are further instructed that where a person purchases a railway ticket, entitling him to transportation from one point to another, and where in the course of such transportation it is necessary for such person to change from one train to another, and where upon arrival at the station where such change should be made the train upon which such person is riding is stopped for such length of time as to reasonably enable such person to make such change, and where the arrival at such station is announced, and where such passenger fails to make such change by reason of being asleep, that thereafter the railway company owes such person no duty to carry him further as a passenger, but owes to such person only the duty of exercising ordinary care to prevent injury to.him; but such railway company; would be liable for any injury directly resulting from any failure on the part of its servants or employés to exercise ordinary care in such regard.
“V. Now if you believe from the evidence that *796 on the occasion in question the plaintiff had been a passenger upon defendant’s train from Houston, Texas, to Granger, Texas, his destination being Georgetown, Texas, and that plaintiff had failed to leave said train at Granger, Texas, until said train was in motion leaving Granger, and if you believe from the evidence that while said train was in motion the servants or em-ployés of the defendant company in charge of said train pushed the plaintiff from said train, or that such employés urged or ordered the plaintiff to leave said train while the same was in motion, and if you believe that a person of ordinary care, under the same or like circumstances; would not have pushed plaintiff from said train (if said employés did do so), or would not have urged or ordered plaintiff to leave said train (if such employés did so), and if you believe that as the direct result thereof the plaintiff sustained the injuries complained of in his petition, then you will find for the plaintiff against the defendant, and assess his damages as hereinafter directed, unless you find for the defendant under other instructions hereinafter given.
“VI. Unless you find from the evidence that the employés of defendant in charge of said train pushed, urged, or ordered the plaintiff to disembark from said train while same was in motion, and that a person of ordinary care would not have pushed, urged, or ordered plaintiff to so disembark from said train, then you will find for the defendant.
“VII. If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff voluntarily left said train while the same was in motion, and that he thereby sustained the injuries complained of, then you will find for the defendant.
“VIII. If under the foregoing instructions you find for the plaintiff, you will assess his damages at such sum as if paid to him in cash at this time will reasonably compensate him for the physical and mental pain (if any) suffered by him, and which you may believe will be suffered by him as the direct result of such injuries, and at such sum as will reasonably compensate him for his reduced capacity to earn money (if you believe his capacity in such respect has been reduced) as the direct result of said injuries, and at such reasonable sum as you may believe from the evidence has been, necessarily expended by him for medical and hospital treatment as the direct result of such in•juries.
“IX. If you believe from the evidence that on the occasion in question, while the train was moving out of the station at Granger, the defendant’s employés ordered or directed the plaintiff to leave the said train, but said employés did not forcibly eject plaintiff from said tram, and if you believe from the facts and the circumstances in evidence that it was dangerous for plaintiff to leave said train under said circumstances, and if you believe that a person of ordinary prudence, under the same or like circumstances as was plaintiff, would not have left said train, even though he had been ordered or directed by defendant’s employés to leave said train, and that the plaintiff, under such circumstances, did disembark from said moving train and was thereby injured, then you will find for the defendant. O. A. Wilcox, Judge.”

Verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff Anderson for $2,500, and the defendant has appealed.

As this case is unusual and novel, we copy from appellant’s brief the following statement:

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Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Anderson, 198 S.W. 795, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 984 (Tex. Ct. App. 1917).

198 S.W. 795 (Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Anderson) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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