Mission Wellness Pharmacy LLC v. Caremark LLC

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided November 17, 2022·No. 2:22-cv-00967·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Mission Wellness Pharmacy LLC, No. CV-22-00967-PHX-GMS

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Caremark LLC, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 16 Pending before the Court are Respondent Caremark’s Motions to Seal (Doc. 24) 17 (Doc. 37). For the following reasons, the first Motion to Seal (Doc. 24) is granted in part 18 and denied in part, and the second Motion to Seal (Doc. 37) is granted. 19 BACKGROUND 20 These Motions to Seal stem from a complex commercial arbitration that invalidated 21 a fee agreement between Mission Wellness (a specialty pharmacy) and Caremark (a 22 Pharmacy Benefit Manager or “PBM”). In that arbitration, Mission Wellness (hereinafter, 23 “Mission”) claimed that Caremark assessed excessive “direct and indirect remuneration 24 fees” (“DIR fees”) in violation of federal statutes and Arizona state law. For its part, 25 Caremark claimed it was merely enforcing the terms of the parties’ fee agreement. 26 Ultimately, the Arbitrator ruled in Mission’s favor, and on May 17, 2022, he ordered 27 Caremark to pay $3,662,099.47. However, to date, Caremark has neither paid the award 28 nor provided Mission with assurances that it will eventually pay. On June 20, 2022, 1 Mission asked the Court to confirm the award. On July 29, 2022, Caremark asked the 2 Court to vacate it. 3 Caremark also filed two Motions to Seal. In its first Motion to Seal (Doc. 24), 4 Caremark seeks to file redacted versions of its Cross-Motion to Vacate (Doc. 23) and three 5 Network Enrollment Forms (“NEFs”) from 2015 (Doc. 23-5), 2016 (Doc. 23-6), and 2020 6 (Doc. 23-4), respectively. These documents contain redacted references to numerical data 7 Caremark uses in its agreements with pharmacies, including: 8 • average-wholesale-price discounts for generic and brand-name drugs (“AWP Discounts”); 9 • dispensing fees; 10 • variable network rebate rates and ranges, also known as “Performance Network Rebate” (“PNR”) fees; 11 • weighted factors used to calculate PNRs; 12 • fixed network-rebate rates and ranges; • point-of-sale reimbursement rates (AWP minus X%), and; 13 • the names of various specialty drugs, whether the drugs were 14 excluded from a PNR, and the drugs’ associated AWP discounts, which are listed in a Specialty Drug Reimbursement Addendum 15 (“SDRA”). 16 17 Some of Caremark’s filings discuss the redacted data in general terms. For example, 18 in its Cross-Motion to Vacate, Caremark references the range in which all PNR fees fall 19 without referencing any particular pharmacy’s PNR fees. (Doc. 23 at 4.) Other filings 20 reference data that is specific to particular pharmacy networks, like Exhibit 5, which lists 21 Network 23’s dispensing fee circa 2015. (Doc. 23-5 at 2.) And some filings reference data 22 that is specific to the agreement at issue in the arbitration, such as Mission’s AWP discount 23 rate for generic drugs. (Doc. 23-4 at 3.) 24 In its second Motion to Seal (Doc. 37), Caremark seeks to file redacted versions of 25 the Reply (Doc. 36) that corresponds with its Cross-Motion to Vacate, two deposition 26 transcripts (Doc. 36-1), (Doc. 36-2), a post-hearing brief from arbitration (Doc. 36-4), and 27 their response to that brief (Doc. 36-5). These documents contain references to the same 28 kind of data (and, in many cases, the same data) as the documents connected to Caremark’s 1 first Motion to Seal, except the second Motion to Seal does not include redacted references 2 to fixed-rate rebates, dispensing fees, or the SDRA data. Because the data underpinning 3 both motions is highly similar this order will address whether categories of data (e.g., AWP 4 discounts, fixed network-rebate fees, etc.) should be sealed, rather than analyze each 5 motion or source independently. 6 DISCUSSION 7 I. Legal Standard 8 Courts review all motions to seal with a “strong presumption in favor of [public] 9 access.” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). 10 However, sources of business information should be sealed when its’ publication would 11 harm a party’s competitive standing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. 12 Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016). But parties’ mere allegations 13 that disclosure would harm their competitive standing are insufficient to justify sealing 14 court records. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). Instead, movants must offer “compelling 15 evidence” that shows disclosure would harm their competitive standing, for example, by 16 alleging that the underlying documents contain trade secrets. Nixon v. Warner Comms., 17 Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978); see also TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. v. Avago Techs. Ltd., 18 2011 WL 4947343, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 18, 2011). Because public disclosure of trade 19 secrets necessarily harms a party’s competitive standing, “a court may expose trade secrets 20 only in extraordinary circumstances.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 21 247 Ariz. 567, 573 (Ct. App. 2019). 22 II. Analysis 23 In Arizona, the existence of a trade secret “is a mixed question of law and fact” that 24 requires a movant to prove that the (1) underlying information is not generally known or 25 ascertainable and (2) retains economic value because it is unknown to others, and (3) the 26 owner has taken steps to maintain its secrecy. Physics, Materials, & Applied Mathematics 27 Research LLC v. Yeak, Case No., 2021 WL 2557398, at *5 (Date D. Ariz. 2021) (citing 28 Calisi v. Unified Financial Services, LLC, 302 P.3d 628 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013)). The 1 definition of “trade secret” is expansive under Arizona law. Phoenix v. Ehmke, 197 Ariz. 2 144, 149 (Ct. App. 1999). Still, the owner of a trade secret must identify the secret with 3 sufficient particularity, especially where the matter is highly complex. Goodyear, 247 4 Ariz. at 570; see also InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Global Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 658 5 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Imax Corp. v. Cinema Technologies, Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th 6 Cir. 1998)). 7 Caremark has identified the alleged trade secrets with sufficient particularity. It has 8 redacted specific figures, but otherwise provides documents in their original, unredacted 9 form. Additionally, Caremark has identified methods by which it sought to keep the 10 redacted data secret––the data is pulled from documents that contain confidentiality 11 disclaimers. Enter. Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke, 3 P.3d 1064, 1070 (Ariz. Ct. App. 12 1999) (“[T]he most important factor in gaining trade-secret protection is demonstrating 13 that the owner has taken such precautions as are reasonable under the circumstances to 14 preserve the secrecy of the information.”). Still, not all of the data Caremark seeks to seal 15 appears to retain economic value by virtue of being unknown. Likewise, some of the data 16 has been publicly disclosed. 17 A. Economic Value by Virtue of Being Unknown 18 Generally speaking, the network-specific data Caremark seeks to seal is 19 economically valuable when it is unknown to others. The fundamental purpose of a PBM 20 is to bargain with actors in the healthcare supply chain to drive down drug prices. The 21 specific methods and means by which PBMs achieve this end are important commercial 22 assets.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Mission Wellness Pharmacy LLC v. Caremark LLC, (D. Ariz. 2022).

Mission Wellness Pharmacy LLC v. Caremark LLC (Mission Wellness Pharmacy LLC v. Caremark LLC) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
435 U.S. 589 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.
467 U.S. 986 (Supreme Court, 1984)
United States v. Bernice T. Morales
978 F.2d 650 (Eleventh Circuit, 1992)
MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.
991 F.2d 511 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)
MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A.
331 F. Supp. 2d 396 (E.D. Virginia, 2004)
In Re JULIO L
3 P.3d 383 (Arizona Supreme Court, 2000)
Enterprise Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke
3 P.3d 1064 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1999)
Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC
809 F.3d 1092 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Calisi v. Unified Financial Services, LLC
302 P.3d 628 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 2013)
Brittain v. Stroh Brewery Co.
136 F.R.D. 408 (M.D. North Carolina, 1991)