ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
CHARLES R. SCOTT, District Judge.
The Court has before it motions to modify its order of February 17, 1976. By that order, the Court sought to grant the motion of defendant, Sumner Financial Corporation, for supplementary, postjudgment proceedings in aid of execution on a judgment rendered for defendant on July 16, 1971. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a), the Court on its own motion will correct the clerical error occurring throughout its order of February 17, 1976, by replacing the erroneous term ‘interplead’ with the correct term ‘implead’.
What defendant sought in its motion, that the Court endeavored to grant by the order of February 17, 1976, was an order authorizing supplementary, postjudgment proceedings against corporate nonparties. Defendant has been unable to satisfy its judgment, despite efforts through postjudgment discovery and writs of execution and garnishment. Defendant now seeks to imp-lead as involuntary plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants those corporate nonparties who defendant alleges participated in fraudulent transfers of plaintiff’s assets, to thwart defendant from satisfying its judgment.
Plaintiff opposes this, arguing that it is an attempt to pierce the corporate veil of the other, nonparty corporations under the theory that they are alter egos for plaintiff. To do that, plaintiff contends, there must be evidence clear and convincing to indicate fraud, not mere allegations of fraud. However, defendant rejoins that its theory in seeking supplementary, postjudgment proceedings is not that the corporate nonparties are alter egos of plaintiff, necessitating that their corporate veils be pierced. Instead, defendant contends that its theory is that there have been fraudulent transfers of assets by plaintiff to the corporate nonparties, thwarting defendant’s satisfaction of its judgment, and requiring the supplementary, postjudgment proceedings requested, regardless of the relationship corporately or otherwise of plaintiff to those corporate nonparties. After an adversary hearing, the Court found defendant’s theory to be a proper one, warranting such supplementary, postjudgment proceedings as were sought.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 69, however, provides in part:
. The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought
Consequently, the procedural law of Florida concerning postjudgment proceedings controls unless there are federal statutes to the contrary. The pertinent Florida law concerning supplementary, postjudgment proceedings is Florida Statutes Sec. 56.29 (1969).1
[434]*434Under the decisional law interpreting and applying the provisions of Florida Statutes Sec. 56.29, there are two jurisdictional prerequisites for supplementary, postjudgment proceedings: (1) a returned and unsatisfied writ of execution; and (2) an affidavit averring that the writ is valid and unsatisfied, along with a list of third persons to be impled. Tomayko v. Thomas, 143 So.2d 227, 229-30 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1962). Once those jurisdictional criteria are met, however, the “statute should be given a liberal construction so as to afford to the judgment creditor the most complete relief possible.” Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. 836, 840 (1935); Ryan’s Furniture Exchange, Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 162 So. 483, 487 (1935); General Guaranty Ins. Co. of Fla. v. DaCosta, 190 So.2d 211, 213 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1966). Defendant in this case has filed with the Court his unsatisfied writs of execution and garnishment, as well as his affidavit that those writs are valid and remain unsatisfied.
The authority and duty of the Court to implead third persons is past question. Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. at 840. Impleading those persons whose interest may be affected by the Court’s rulings is necessary both to acquire jurisdiction over them, and to afford them the essential elements of procedural due process. Id., 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. at 840, 841; Ryan’s Furniture Exchange, Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 162 So. at 487; State ex rel. O’Dare v. Kehoe, 189 So.2d 268, 269 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1966); Tomayko v. Thomas, supra, 143 So.2d at 229; Florida Guaranteed Securities, Inc. v. McAllister, 47 F.2d 762, [435]*435765 (S.D.Fla.1931). Such impleading, however, does not imply liability on the part of the implied third persons. General Guaranty Ins. Co. of Fla. v. DaCosta, 190 So.2d at 214. It provides them with an opportunity to raise their defenses and protect their interests in a forum of genuine due process. Id.; Tomayko v. Thomas, 143 So.2d at 229, 230. The fundamentals of procedural due process are (1) a hearing (2) before an impartial decision-maker, after (3) fair notice of the charges and allegations, (4) with an opportunity to present one’s own case. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578-79, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969) (Harlan J., concurring); Schrank v. Bliss, 412 F.Supp. 28, 41 (M.D.Fla.1976); Harper v. Cooper, 226 So.2d 878, 880 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1969). The burden of proof reposes upon the judgment creditor to prove his claim to have judgment entered against the impled third parties, as if it had been entered against them personally in the original final judgment. Riley v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769, 773 (Fla.1950).
Consequently, the Court will grant defendant’s motion to implead the corporate nonparties listed in its affidavit; and the Court will order those corporate third persons to show cause why the assets now in their possession or control, allegedly transferred to them by plaintiff, should not be declared fraudulently acquired, the transfers voided, and those assets levied upon to satisfy defendant’s judgment.
Moreover, pursuant to Florida Statutes Sec. 56.29(7), the Court will refer the supplementary, postjudgment proceedings to the Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States Magistrate, for hearing before him, after which he shall make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law for the Court to review in reaching its decision.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
(1) On its own motion, and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a), the Court hereby amends and corrects its order of February 17, 1976, by replacing the erroneous term “interplead” with the correct term “im-plead”.
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ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
CHARLES R. SCOTT, District Judge.
The Court has before it motions to modify its order of February 17, 1976. By that order, the Court sought to grant the motion of defendant, Sumner Financial Corporation, for supplementary, postjudgment proceedings in aid of execution on a judgment rendered for defendant on July 16, 1971. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a), the Court on its own motion will correct the clerical error occurring throughout its order of February 17, 1976, by replacing the erroneous term ‘interplead’ with the correct term ‘implead’.
What defendant sought in its motion, that the Court endeavored to grant by the order of February 17, 1976, was an order authorizing supplementary, postjudgment proceedings against corporate nonparties. Defendant has been unable to satisfy its judgment, despite efforts through postjudgment discovery and writs of execution and garnishment. Defendant now seeks to imp-lead as involuntary plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants those corporate nonparties who defendant alleges participated in fraudulent transfers of plaintiff’s assets, to thwart defendant from satisfying its judgment.
Plaintiff opposes this, arguing that it is an attempt to pierce the corporate veil of the other, nonparty corporations under the theory that they are alter egos for plaintiff. To do that, plaintiff contends, there must be evidence clear and convincing to indicate fraud, not mere allegations of fraud. However, defendant rejoins that its theory in seeking supplementary, postjudgment proceedings is not that the corporate nonparties are alter egos of plaintiff, necessitating that their corporate veils be pierced. Instead, defendant contends that its theory is that there have been fraudulent transfers of assets by plaintiff to the corporate nonparties, thwarting defendant’s satisfaction of its judgment, and requiring the supplementary, postjudgment proceedings requested, regardless of the relationship corporately or otherwise of plaintiff to those corporate nonparties. After an adversary hearing, the Court found defendant’s theory to be a proper one, warranting such supplementary, postjudgment proceedings as were sought.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 69, however, provides in part:
. The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought
Consequently, the procedural law of Florida concerning postjudgment proceedings controls unless there are federal statutes to the contrary. The pertinent Florida law concerning supplementary, postjudgment proceedings is Florida Statutes Sec. 56.29 (1969).1
[434]*434Under the decisional law interpreting and applying the provisions of Florida Statutes Sec. 56.29, there are two jurisdictional prerequisites for supplementary, postjudgment proceedings: (1) a returned and unsatisfied writ of execution; and (2) an affidavit averring that the writ is valid and unsatisfied, along with a list of third persons to be impled. Tomayko v. Thomas, 143 So.2d 227, 229-30 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1962). Once those jurisdictional criteria are met, however, the “statute should be given a liberal construction so as to afford to the judgment creditor the most complete relief possible.” Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. 836, 840 (1935); Ryan’s Furniture Exchange, Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 162 So. 483, 487 (1935); General Guaranty Ins. Co. of Fla. v. DaCosta, 190 So.2d 211, 213 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1966). Defendant in this case has filed with the Court his unsatisfied writs of execution and garnishment, as well as his affidavit that those writs are valid and remain unsatisfied.
The authority and duty of the Court to implead third persons is past question. Richard v. McNair, 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. at 840. Impleading those persons whose interest may be affected by the Court’s rulings is necessary both to acquire jurisdiction over them, and to afford them the essential elements of procedural due process. Id., 121 Fla. 733, 164 So. at 840, 841; Ryan’s Furniture Exchange, Inc. v. McNair, 120 Fla. 109, 162 So. at 487; State ex rel. O’Dare v. Kehoe, 189 So.2d 268, 269 (3d D.C.A.Fla.1966); Tomayko v. Thomas, supra, 143 So.2d at 229; Florida Guaranteed Securities, Inc. v. McAllister, 47 F.2d 762, [435]*435765 (S.D.Fla.1931). Such impleading, however, does not imply liability on the part of the implied third persons. General Guaranty Ins. Co. of Fla. v. DaCosta, 190 So.2d at 214. It provides them with an opportunity to raise their defenses and protect their interests in a forum of genuine due process. Id.; Tomayko v. Thomas, 143 So.2d at 229, 230. The fundamentals of procedural due process are (1) a hearing (2) before an impartial decision-maker, after (3) fair notice of the charges and allegations, (4) with an opportunity to present one’s own case. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578-79, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969) (Harlan J., concurring); Schrank v. Bliss, 412 F.Supp. 28, 41 (M.D.Fla.1976); Harper v. Cooper, 226 So.2d 878, 880 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1969). The burden of proof reposes upon the judgment creditor to prove his claim to have judgment entered against the impled third parties, as if it had been entered against them personally in the original final judgment. Riley v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769, 773 (Fla.1950).
Consequently, the Court will grant defendant’s motion to implead the corporate nonparties listed in its affidavit; and the Court will order those corporate third persons to show cause why the assets now in their possession or control, allegedly transferred to them by plaintiff, should not be declared fraudulently acquired, the transfers voided, and those assets levied upon to satisfy defendant’s judgment.
Moreover, pursuant to Florida Statutes Sec. 56.29(7), the Court will refer the supplementary, postjudgment proceedings to the Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States Magistrate, for hearing before him, after which he shall make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law for the Court to review in reaching its decision.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
(1) On its own motion, and pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a), the Court hereby amends and corrects its order of February 17, 1976, by replacing the erroneous term “interplead” with the correct term “im-plead”.
(2) Plaintiff’s motion that the Court modify its order of February 17, 1976, is hereby denied.
(3) Defendant’s motion that the Court modify its order of February 17, 1976, is hereby granted.
(4) The Court’s order of February 17, 1976, is hereby modified to provide:
(a) Defendant’s motion for supplementary, post judgment proceedings, allowing defendant to implead as involuntary plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants the McMillen Corporation, Peninsular Life Insurance Company, Peninsular Fire Insurance Company, Peninsular Title Insurance Company, and Penn Enterprises, Inc., is hereby granted.
(b) McMillen Corporation, Peninsular Life Insurance Company, Peninsular Fire Insurance Company, Peninsular Title Insurance Company, and Penn Enterprises, Inc., are hereby impled as involuntary plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants to this cause for the purpose of supplementary, postjudgment proceedings in aid of execution.
(c) McMillen Corporation, Peninsular Life Insurance Company, Peninsular Fire Insurance Company, Peninsular Title Insurance Company, and Penn Enterprises, Inc., are hereby ordered to show cause in writing, within twenty (20) days from the date of service of process of this order, why the assets in their possession or control, allegedly transferred to them by plaintiff, should not be declared fraudulently acquired, the transfers voided, and the assets levied upon to satisfy defendant’s judgment.
(d) In the event that the involuntarily impled plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants respond to this order, the Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States Magistrate, shall set a day certain hearing before him on the issue of fraudulent transfers of assets for supplementary, postjudg[436]*436ment proceedings, after which he shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law and report them to the Court.
(e) The United States Marshal for the Middle District of Florida, is hereby ordered to serve a copy of this order upon an officer, a managing or general agent, or such other agent as is authorized to accept service of process for each of the above-named, corporate third persons who are hereby im-pled.