1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA 2 3 Misael Ramos, Case No. 2:24-cv-02128-CDS-NJK
4 Plaintiff Order Granting the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Denying the 5 v. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file Surreply
6 Steven Thompson, et al., [ECF Nos. 31, 39] 7 Defendants
8 9 Plaintiff Misael Ramos brings this action against Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 10 Department (LVMPD) and officers Steven Thompson and Caroline Beck for injuries related to 11 an arrest. See Sec. am. compl., ECF No. 30. The court previously granted the defendants’ motion 12 to dismiss, but allowed Ramos leave to amend his complaint. Order, ECF No. 20. The defendants 13 now move to dismiss Ramos’s second amended complaint (SAC). Mot. to dismiss, ECF No. 31. 14 This motion is fully briefed.1 Ramos seeks leave to file a surreply. Mot. for leave, ECF No. 39. 15 This motion is also fully briefed.2 Because the defendants are entitled to discretionary act and 16 qualified immunity, I grant their motion to dismiss. I also deny Ramos’s motion for leave. 17 I. Background3 18 As alleged in the SAC, on October 8, 2022, Officer Thompson and Officer Beck arrived 19 and responded to a domestic disturbance call at the Signature at MGM Grand. ECF No. 30 at 2– 20 3. Officer Thompson interviewed Ramos in the hallway while Officer Beck interviewed Ramos’s 21 girlfriend inside the hotel room. Id. at 3. During the interview, Ramos “described injuries he had 22 sustained, including a bloody nose.” Id.4 Officer Thompson asked Ramos if he needed medical 23 attention, and Ramos responded affirmatively. Id. 24
25 1 Opp’n to mot. to dismiss, ECF No. 34; Reply to mot. to dismiss, ECF No. 38. 2 Opp’n to mot. for leave, ECF No. 40; Reply to mot. for leave, ECF Nos. 41, 42. 26 3 I incorporate by reference the factual background in previous order, ECF No. 20 at 1–2. 4 I note for the record that the SAC does not provide any additional allegations nor information as to what other injuries Ramos had sustained at this point. 1 Officer Beck’s and Thompson’s sergeant arrived and assisted in the investigation, and the 2 officers decided to arrest Ramos and his girlfriend. Id. at 4. EMTs arrived at the scene and 3 evaluated Ramos’s previously reported injuries.5 Id. During this time, Ramos declined to be 4 transported to the hospital, so the EMTs departed. Id. Then, Officer Beck handcuffed Ramos 5 with his hands behind his back facing the wall and placed him on a chair. Id. 6 As alleged, during this time, Ramos requested to use the restroom, so Officer Beck helped 7 Ramos get out of the chair and escorted him around the corner to an area in front of the hotel 8 room door. Id. While Officer Beck and Thompson tried to keep the hotel room open, Ramos 9 “suddenly developed acute onset of severe lightheadedness and dizziness.” Id. Ramos 10 immediately reported the symptoms to the officers, stating “he felt lightheaded and could not 11 maintain his balance.” Id. at 5.6 Officer Beck directed the hotel security to bring over the chair 12 that Ramos had been sitting in earlier. Id. While security was bringing the chair, Officer Beck 13 stayed next to Ramos, holding him by his right arm to help him maintain his balance. Id. 14 Officer Beck then assisted Ramos in sitting in the chair angled toward the wall. Id. at 5. 15 After Ramos was seated, Officer Thompson and Officer Beck returned to the hotel room to 16 handcuff Ramos’s girlfriend, and the hotel security officers supervised Ramos as he was seated. 17 Id. Ramos alleges that while Officers Thompson and Beck were in the hotel room with Ramos’s 18 girlfriend, his “neurological symptoms progressed to syncope” and he lost consciousness and fell 19 from the chair. Id. at 7. Ramos’s head struck the hard tile floor which resulted in him suffering a 20 traumatic brain injury and a loss of consciousness. Id. 21 After Ramos fell, Officer Thompson ran to assist, and medical personnel were called to 22 assist. Id. at 7. Officer Thompson remained with Ramos until medical personnel arrived. Id. As a 23 result of this event, Ramos filed a SAC and brings four claims: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the 24 5 It remains unclear what injuries were reported, outside of a bloody nose. 25 6 Absent from the SAC is any indication that Ramos told the officers that he wanted the EMTs to return. Nor does the SAC allege that Ramos told the officers that he felt like he was going to faint. In other 26 words, there was no other information provided to the officers regarding additional symptoms he may have been feeling at the time. 1 officers in their individual capacity and municipal liability against LVMPD, a negligence claim 2 against the individual officers, and a negligent training and supervision claim against LVMPD. 3 See generally id. 4 II. Legal standard 5 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff to plead “a short and plain 6 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 7 Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) when a pleader fails to state a claim upon which 8 relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A 9 pleading must give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests, 10 and although a court must take all factual allegations as true, legal conclusions couched as 11 factual allegations are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) requires 12 “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 13 will not do.” Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 14 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 15 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility 16 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 17 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard “asks for more than a 18 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 19 If the court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should 20 be granted unless it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 21 amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Under Rule 15(a), a 22 court should “freely” give leave to amend “when justice so requires,” and in the absence of a 23 reason such as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, repeated 24 failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing 25 party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 26 371 U.S. 178 (1962). 1 III. Discussion 2 A. Ramos’s motion for leave to file a surreply (ECF No. 39) is denied. 3 A surreply is an additional reply brief filed by the non-moving party after the 4 underlying motion has already been fully briefed. Hammler v. Lyons, 2023 WL 113764, at *1 (E.D. 5 Cal. Jan. 5, 2023) (citations omitted). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly 6 permit the filing of a surreply. However, Local Rule 7-2(b) specifically permits the filing of 7 a motion, a response, and a reply. LR 7-2(b). That same rule explicitly states that “[s]urreplies 8 are not permitted without leave of court; motions for leave to file a surreply are 9 discouraged.” Id. (emphasis added). Because surreplies are discouraged, “[o]nly the most 10 exceptional or extraordinary circumstances warrant permitting a surreply to be filed.” Stevens v. 11 Prentice, 2018 WL 3758577, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 8, 2018) (citation omitted). 12 Where the moving party presents new matters for the first time in a reply brief, the court 13 may either refuse to consider the new matters or allow the opposing party an opportunity to 14 respond. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 15 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“[t]he district court need not consider arguments raised for the first 16 time in a reply brief”); see also Avery v. Barsky, 2013 WL 1663612, at *2–3 (D. Nev. Apr. 17, 2013) 17 (explaining that the non-moving party may only file a surreply to address new matters raised in 18 a reply brief); ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1071 (D. Nev. 1998) (explaining courts 19 must not consider new evidence filed in a reply brief without giving the non-moving party an 20 opportunity to respond). 21 Ramos argues that he seeks to file a surreply because the defendants’ reply contains 22 material mischaracterizations of the SAC’s allegations and fails to address controlling legal 23 authority that warrant a brief response. ECF No. 39. To support his motion for leave, Ramos 24 cites a singular case—that is, El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim. Id. (citing 316 F.3d 1032, 1040–41 (9th 25 Cir. 2003)). Ramos asserts that surreplies are appropriate when a reply raises new arguments or 26 mischaracterizes the record. Id. Ramos further argues that (1) the defendants’ reply 1 mischaracterizes the temporal sequence of events and relies on inapposite case law to create a 2 medical reliance defense; (2) the defendants argue for the first time that Ramos’s loss of 3 consciousness was unexpected and the officers did not affirmatively cause his injuries under 4 NRS 41.0336; (3) the defendants’ reply fails to address the plaintiff’s argument that elevating a 5 person with neurological symptoms is medically counter-indicated; (4) the defendants’ reply 6 fails to engage with and acknowledge controlling objective reasonableness standard for pretrial 7 detainees; and (5) the plaintiff seeks to correct his citation to Rico v. Ducart and directs this court 8 to Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). ECF No. 39 at 2–3. 9 In opposition, the defendants argue that the motion should be denied because this 10 circumstance does not rise to the exceptional or extraordinary level warranting surreply. ECF 11 No. 40 at 2. The defendants further argue that Ramos’s motion is an attempt to get the last word 12 on arguments concerning their motion to dismiss. Id. 13 I deny Ramos’s motion for two reasons. First, upon review of the case cited by Ramos, El 14 Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim, it is unclear how the case and pincite provided by Ramos support his 15 position that surreplies are appropriate when there is a mischaracterization of the record. See LR 16 7-2(d) (explaining the “failure of a moving party to file points and authorities in support of the 17 motion constitutes a consent to the denial of the motion.”). Thus, because Ramos provides no 18 points and authorities, I deny granting Ramos’s motion on his argument that the defendants’ 19 reply contains material mischaracterizations of the SAC’s allegations. 20 Second, while surreplies may indeed be appropriate when there is a new argument raised 21 for the first time on reply, the defendants did not raise any new arguments in their reply. Ramos 22 argues that the defendants raised a new argument—that the plaintiff’s loss of consciousness was 23 unexpected and officers did not affirmatively cause injuries. However, in reading the motion to 24 dismiss, the defendants raised this argument. See ECF No. 31 at 7.7 25 7 To the extent that there are new arguments raised in the reply, I find that that the appropriate remedy is 26 not to consider new arguments raised, rather than granting Ramos’s motion to file a surreply. However, that is not the case here. 1 Lastly, Ramos has provided no support on how his third, fourth, and fifth grounds for 2 moving to file a surreply amount to exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, and a review of 3 those arguments are neither exceptional nor extraordinary warranting the filing of a surreply. 4 Accordingly, I deny Ramos’s motion for leave to file a surreply. 5 B. The defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 31) is granted. 6 The defendants argue that Ramos’s SAC still fails to assert a viable claim for two reasons. 7 ECF No. 31 at 2. First, the defendants argue that the statutory defenses under NRS 41.032 and 8 NRS 41.0336 bar Ramos’s negligence-based claims. Id. Second, the defendants argue that 9 Ramos’s § 1983 claims fail because the officers did not violate a clearly established duty of care 10 imposed by the Constitution and because Ramos’s conclusory allegations are not enough to 11 support a viable § 1983 claim against LVMPD itself. In opposition, Ramos asserts that the SAC 12 alleges that both suspects were detained in a purely custodial situation, and police officers 13 witnessed Ramos develop acute neurological symptoms and failed to provide “adequate 14 supervision and medical care to the pretrial detainee” as required by the Constitution. ECF No. 15 34 at 6. I first address the defendants’ negligence arguments. 16 17 Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) § 41.032(2) states that a plaintiff cannot maintain an 18 action based on “the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 19 function or duty on the part of the state or any of its agencies or political subdivisions or of any 20 officer, employee or immune contractor of any of these, whether or not the discretion involved is 21 abused.” Discretionary-act immunity applies when (1) the conduct involves individual judgment 22 or choice and (2) that judgment is based on considerations of social, economic, or political 23 policy. Martinez v. Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720, 727–29 (Nev. 2007). 24 25 26 1 8 2 The defendants first argue that Ramos’s third cause of action is barred under NRS 41.032 3 because the at-issue actions concerned discretionary conduct based on public policy concerns. 4 ECF No. 31 at 3. Specifically, they argue that discretionary-act immunity bars Ramos’s 5 negligence claim because the officers’ decision to detain Ramos and “how to do so when also 6 controlling and arresting his girlfriend for suspected domestic battery” are discretionary acts. Id. 7 at 4. In opposition, Ramos asserts that the SAC is challenging the defendants’ failure to fulfill 8 their constitutional obligation to provide medical care to a pretrial detainee in a purely custodial 9 situation. ECF No. 34 at 11–12. In essence, Ramos argues that the decision whether to summon 10 medical assistance for a pretrial detainee who cannot stand without physical support is not a 11 discretionary policy determination susceptible to a policy analysis, rather it is a constitutional 12 duty. Id. at 12. 13 To support his position, Ramos asserts that the court must accept as true the following 14 statements: 15 • The decision to arrest both Ramos and his girlfriend “concluded the 16 investigation.” ECF No. 34 at 10 (quoting ECF No. 30 at ¶ 24)9; 17 • “Officers Thompson’s and Beck’s discretionary functions as to the investigation 18 concluded.” Id. (quoting ECF No. 30 at ¶ 26); and 19 • At the time of the medical emergency, “all investigative work was complete, no 20 tactical decisions remained, and no policy judgments about crime scene 21 management were required.” Id. (quoting ECF No. 30 at ¶ 44). 22 The defendants argue that the factual allegations contradict Ramos’s conclusions and 23 support dismissal. ECF No. 38 at 3. I address discretionary immunity first. 24 8 Because I dismiss Ramos’s claims based on the defendants’ discretionary-act immunity theory under 25 NRS 41.032, I do not address the defendants’ arguments raised pursuant to NRS 41.0336. 9 As highlighted by the court previously, Ramos’s prior complaint asserted that the investigation was 26 ongoing. ECF No. 20 at 5 (citing 1-1 at ¶ 19). While the SAC controls, Ramos’s new conclusory position that the investigation had concluded is dubious. 1 Nevada law sets out that acts by officers can be either ministerial or discretionary—the 2 latter of which entitles the officers to immunity. See Pittman v. Lower Ct. Counseling, 871 P.2d 953, 3 956 (Nev. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Nunez v. City of North Las Vegas, 1 P.3d 959 (Nev. 2000). 4 “A ministerial act is an act performed by an individual in a prescribed legal manner in 5 accordance with the law, without regard to, or the exercise of, the judgment of the individual.” 6 Id. (citing Trout v. Bennett, 830 P.2d 81, 87 (Mont. 1992)). An act is discretionary if (1) the conduct 7 involves individual judgment or choice and (2) that judgment is based on considerations of 8 social, economic, or political policy. Martinez, 168 P.3d at 727–29. 9 Police officers “exercise[ ] discretion and [are] thus generally immune from suit where 10 the act at issue required ‘personal deliberation, decision, and judgment,’ rather than ‘obedience 11 to orders, or the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own.’” Davis v. 12 City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Maturi v. L.V. Metro. Police Dep’t, 871 13 P.2d 932 (1994)). Officers’ decisions “as to how to accomplish a particular seizure or search [are] 14 generally considered . . . discretionary determination[s] under Nevada law, and officers are 15 therefore immune from suit as to state law claims arising therefrom in most cases.” Id. 16 Although a court must take all factual allegations as true, legal conclusions couched as 17 factual allegations are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Here, Ramos’s “support” and 18 purported factual allegations are precisely the sort of legal conclusions Twombly prohibits. 19 Ramos alleges that when he developed his symptoms, “the scene had transitioned from an active 20 law enforcement investigation requiring discretionary decision-making to a purely custodial 21 situation requiring only compliance with established constitutional duties.” ECF No. 34 at 9; 22 ECF No. 30 at 5, ¶ 44. But Ramos provides no case law to support that this court should just 23 accept his conclusion that the investigation was over and that the officers’ actions were non- 24 discretionary, and are indeed contradictory as argued by the defendants.10 For instance, Ramos 25
26 10 As previously explained by the court, “[t]he purpose of the discretionary act exception is to prevent the judiciary from second guessing the in-the-moment decisions of officers.” ECF No. 20 at 6. 1 asserts that he “was handcuffed and compliant in front of the hotel room and his girlfriend was 2 detained and compliant in the bedroom of the hotel room far from Plaintiff. All investigative 3 work was complete, no tactical decisions remained, and no policy judgments about crime scene 4 management were required.” ECF No. 30 at 6, ¶ 44. But a few paragraphs earlier, Ramos alleges 5 that the officers briefly left Ramos to go “handcuff [p]laintiff’s girlfriend,” id. at 5, ¶ 41, giving an 6 indication that the investigation and an arrest was still on-going. And the allegation that “[a]ll 7 investigative work was complete, no tactical decisions remained” is not factual, but an 8 unsupported legal conclusion. 9 The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court of Nevada have clearly 10 addressed this issue. Whether to detain or arrest a suspect and how to do so are discretionary 11 functions of the police department. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Maturi, 871 P.2d at 934. 12 In Alfrey v. United States, the court held “in the absence of mandatory directives governing how to 13 perform investigations, the discretionary-function exception bar[s] the plaintiffs’ claims relating 14 to the negligent conduct of the investigation. That holding applies to any criminal or quasi- 15 criminal investigation.” 276 F.3d 557, 565–66 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations modified). 16 Ultimately, only when officers act in bad faith or in disregard for a citizen’s rights do 17 they lose discretionary-function immunity. See NRS 41.032; Jones v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 873 18 F.3d 1123, 1133 (9th Cir. 2017). The complaint lacks any allegations of bad faith or an outright 19 disregard of Ramos’s rights. Instead, the SAC summarily alleges Officer Beck effectuated a 20 seizure by handcuffing Ramos and placing him in a chair. But an officer “with a particularized 21 basis to believe that a situation may pose safety risks may handcuff or point a gun at an 22 individual without converting an investigative detention into an arrest.” See United States. v. 23 Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 884 (9th Cir. 2009). 24 25 26 1 Because the only allegations provided by Ramos to support that there was no longer an 2 ongoing investigation are legal conclusions couched as factual allegations,11 I find that 3 discretionary-act immunity bars Ramos’s negligence claim against the individual officer. So 4 Ramos’s third claim is dismissed. Further, as Ramos was previously given leave to amend, it 5 appears further amendment would be futile, so Ramos’s third claim is dismissed with prejudice. 6 7 In his fourth claim, Ramos seeks to hold LVMPD liable for failing to train and supervise 8 its officers as it pertains to providing adequate instruction on recognizing medical emergencies 9 requiring immediate professional evaluation, failing to establish clear protocols mandating 10 medical assistance when detainees report acute symptoms, and by failing to monitor officers’ 11 responses to detainee medical emergencies. ECF No. 30 at 14, ¶¶ 94–95. 12 The defendants seek to dismiss this claim based on discretionary-act immunity under 13 NRS 41.032. ECF No. 31 at 5. In particular, the defendants argue that the Supreme Court of 14 Nevada held that discretionary-act immunity bars a cause of action for negligent training and 15 supervision. Id. at 6 (first citing Paulos v. FCH1, LLC, 456 P.3d 589, 596 (Nev. 2020); and then 16 citing Manriquez v. L.V. Metro. Police Dep’t, 2020 WL 557520, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 4, 2020)). In 17 opposition, Ramos argues that the defendants’ position overstates the holding in Paulos and 18 ignores the SAC allegations. ECF No. 34 at 12. Ramos further argues that the allegation in the 19 SAC is not that LVMPD made a policy judgment about how to balance competing interest, but 20 rather that LVMPD failed to train officers on a non-discretionary constitutional duty. Id. at 13. 21 22
23 11 For instance, Ramos asserts in the SAC that he “was handcuffed and compliant in front of the hotel room and his girlfriend was detained and compliant in the bedroom of the hotel room far from Plaintiff. 24 All investigative work was complete, no tactical decisions remained, and no policy judgments about crime scene management were required.” ECF No. 30 at 6, ¶ 44. But a few paragraphs before, Ramos 25 alleges that the officers briefly left Ramos to go “handcuff [p]lainitiff’s girlfriend,” ECF No. 30 at 5, ¶ 41, giving an indication that an arrest was still being effectuated. Further, the statement, “[a]ll investigative 26 work was complete, no tactical decisions remained” is not a factual allegation, but an unsupported legal conclusion. 1 In reply, the defendants argue that Ramos cannot support his claim by using generalized 2 conclusory allegations that LVMPD breached a duty to properly and adequately train officers on 3 providing medical care. ECF No. 38 at 7. The defendants cite Scott v. Department of Commerce, 4 which held that NRS 41.032 shielded the state from civil liability with a negligence claim 5 because a governmental body retains “considerable discretion in how exactly to administer the 6 statute.” ECF No. 38 at 7–9 (citing 763 P.2d 341 (Nev. 1988)). 7 “Claims for negligent training and supervision are based upon the premise that an 8 employer should be liable when it places an employee, who it knows or should have known 9 behaves wrongfully, in a position in which the employee can harm someone else.” Okeke v. Biomat 10 USA, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1028 (D. Nev. 2013). For negligent training and supervision, the 11 plaintiff must prove “(1) a general duty on the employer to use reasonable care in the training, 12 supervision, and retention of employees to ensure that they are fit for their positions, (2) breach, 13 (3) injury, and (4) causation.” Sanchez v. Albertson’s LLC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134119, at *4 (D. 14 Nev. July 27, 2022). Nevada recognizes that an “employer has a duty to use reasonable care in the 15 training, supervision, and retention of his or her employees to make sure that the employees are 16 fit for their positions.” Hall v. SSF, Inc., 930 P.2d 94, 99 (Nev. 1996). 17 The Supreme Court of Nevada has held that “because NRS 41.032(2) mirrors the Federal 18 Tort Claims Act (FTCA), [they] turn to federal decisions to aid formulating a workable test for 19 analyzing claims of immunity under NRS 41.032(2).” Martinez, 168 P.3d at 727. The Ninth Circuit 20 has consistently held that “decisions relating to the hiring, training, and supervision of 21 employees usually involve policy judgments of the type Congress intended the discretionary 22 function exception to shield.” Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2000); see Neal- 23 Lomax v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1192 (D. Nev. 2008) (“Because Nevada 24 looks to federal case law to determine the scope of discretionary immunity, and because federal 25 case law consistently holds training and supervision are acts entitled to such immunity, LVMPD 26 is entitled to discretionary immunity on this claim.”). 1 Ramos alleges in his SAC that LVMPD knew or should have known that its inadequate 2 training and supervision of its officers created an unreasonable risk of harm to detainees in 3 custody. ECF No. 30 at 14, ¶ 96. But LVMPD’s decision to implement certain training policies as 4 it pertains to medical assistance in emergency situations when detaining a suspect are decisions 5 that involve policy-type judgments. Therefore, I find that the negligent training and 6 supervision claim is barred by § 41.032(2).12 Consequently, Ramos’s fourth cause of action 7 asserting negligent training and supervision against LVMPD is dismissed with prejudice. 8 9 Ramos alleges that he had the following constitutional rights: the right to adequate 10 medical care for serious medical needs while in custody; the right to be free from deliberate 11 indifference to substantial risks of serious harm; the right to have officers summon medical help 12 when experiencing acute medical symptoms; and the right to adequate supervision when 13 physically restrained and medically compromised. ECF No. 30 at 8–9, ¶ 65. Incorporating these 14 allegations, Ramos alleges that Officer Thompson and Officer Beck violated clearly established 15 law by making an unqualified medical decision and ignoring his serious neurological symptoms 16 and making unqualified medical determinations that these symptoms did not require 17 professional assessment. Id. at ¶ 68. 18 Ramos also brings a § 1983 claim against LVMPD, alleging that its policies, customs, and 19 deliberate indifference to training needs were the moving force behind the plaintiff’s injuries 20 caused by the violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 10, ¶ 73. The defendants argue that 21 qualified immunity bars Ramos’s first and second § 1983 claims against the officers, and that 22 Ramos’s conclusory allegations do not support a viable claim against LVMPD. ECF No. 31 at 7. I 23 agree. 24 25 12 Even if I did not find that the claim is barred, Ramos does not sufficiently plead a cause of action for 26 negligent training or supervision. Rather, his complaint is doused with conclusory statements couched as factual allegations. See ECF No. 30 at 13–15, ¶¶ 90–99. 1 2 As explained in my prior order granting dismissal, 3 “In § 1983 actions, qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 4 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Sampson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 5 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). “Clearly established” means that the statutory or constitutional question was “beyond debate,” such that every 6 reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful. See District 7 of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62 (2018); Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018). Relevant case law “does not require a case directly on point 8 for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 9 (2017) (cleaned up). The court may evaluate the qualified immunity prongs in any order. Felarca v. Birgeneau, 891 F.3d 809, 815–16 (9th Cir. 2018). 10
11 Further, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 12 575 U.S. 600, 613 (2015) (quotation marks omitted), because such immunity “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 13 231. In other words, “immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). 14 In the Ninth Circuit, if a defendant affirmatively raises qualified immunity as a 15 defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that both prongs are met. Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2017). 16 17 ECF No. 20 at 7. Like Ramos’s initial complaint, the SAC alleges that Ramos had the right to be 18 free from deliberate indifference to his safety and medical needs while in the defendants’ custody 19 (ECF No. 30 at 8–9, ¶ 65; ECF No. 1-1 at 6, ¶ 39). 20 Ramos asserts that he felt lightheaded and dizzy, and that “[t]hese acute neurological 21 symptoms are indicative of multiple serious medical conditions, which require immediate 22 medical attention.” ECF No. 30 at 4–5, ¶¶ 34–35. But the SAC alleges that Ramos only 23 communicated with the officers that he “felt lightheaded and could not maintain his balance.” Id. 24 at 36. Further, part of the assertions raised in the SAC is that the officers “abandoned direct 25 supervision of a medically compromised detainee who could not protect himself from falling.” Id. 26 at 6–7, ¶ 49. However, Ramos’s own SAC describes that the hotel room that the officers left to 1 go arrest Ramos’s girlfriend in relation to where he was as “the corner to an area immediately in 2 front of the hotel room door.” Id. at 4. Such allegations do not indicate that Ramos was 3 abandoned when he was left with hotel security officers. While the court recognizes the 4 argument Ramos makes—that is, the security officers had no authority to physically assist—it 5 still remains unclear how the officers’ decision to place Ramos in a chair when he had only 6 communicated lightheadedness and feeling unbalanced amounts to a constitutional violation. 7 As previously explained, the allegation that Ramos felt lightheaded and was swaying is 8 not a serious medical issue.13 See ECF No. 20 at 9 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th 9 Cir. 2000) (“Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a 10 reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the 11 presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the 12 existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” (quotation omitted)); Madlock v. Shannon, 2021 U.S. 13 Dist. LEXIS 48530 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2021) (“[A] single incident of vomiting and feeling ‘a 14 little light headed’ . . . does not rise to the level of a constitutional harm (citing Lord v. Beahm, 952 15 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that “minor” physical injuries are insufficient to support 16 violation under the Eighth Amendment)); Killens v. Sheffield, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136693 (S.D. 17 Ga. June 30, 2020) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim of medical indifference where he 18 felt lightheaded and dizzy and was denied any assistance)). 19 20
21 13 The SAC also alleges that his “symptoms were so severe that Officer Beck had to physically hold him by the arm to prevent him from falling, that Plaintiff literally could not remain upright without physical 22 assistance.” ECF No. 34 at 23–24 (citing ECF No. 30 at ¶¶ 37–38). Ramos argues that this is not a plaintiff who reported feeling dizzy, but rather a plaintiff who an officer observed could not stand 23 without being held up. Id. at 24. But the SAC does not allege that Ramos had communicated or indicated that he needed medical assistance; rather, it alleges that Officer Beck remained next to him “holding him 24 by his right arm to help him maintain his balance until the hotel security officer brought the chair to Plaintiff.” ECF No. 30 at 5, ¶ 38. Moreover, the SAC is devoid of any allegations indicating that the 25 officers continued to observe Ramos being unbalanced once he was seated nor are there any allegations indicating Ramos communicated feeling dizzy or lightheaded after being seated in a chair. So, even if the 26 court accepts his allegations as true, it is unclear how the officers’ decision to seat him amounted to a constitutional violation. 1 Having reviewed the SAC and the parties’ arguments, I still find that the officers are 2 entitled to qualified immunity because Ramos has not pled sufficient facts demonstrating that 3 Officer Thompson’s and Officer Beck’s actions amounted to a constitutional violation. 4 Accordingly, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and the defendants’ motion is 5 granted as to the individual officers. 6 7 The defendants argue that Ramos’s second claim against LVMPD fails because no officer 8 violated Ramos’s constitutional rights. ECF No. 31 at 13. They argue that the fact that Ramos fell 9 from the chair does not establish any act in violation of the Constitution. Id. In essence, they 10 argue that because no officer violated Ramos’s constitutional rights, Ramos cannot proceed with 11 a § 1983 claim against LVMPD. The defendants next argue that Ramos’s conclusory allegations 12 are not enough to plausibly show unconstitutional policies or procedures because the SAC 13 asserts “broad and vague references to ‘similar incidents in the past.’” Id. (citing ECF No. 30 at 14 11). 15 In opposition, Ramos argues that he has adequately pleaded a municipal liability claim 16 against LVMPD under Monell. ECF No. 34 at 24. To support his position, Ramos asserts that 17 when the court accepts the allegations as true, “Officers Thompson and Beck’s conduct 18 demonstrates objectively deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious symptoms and medical 19 needs.” Id. Ramos further asserts that these actions took place during a purely custodial 20 situation with no competing law enforcement demands. Id. at 25.14 21 For a plaintiff to maintain a § 1983 claim against a municipality, there must be a 22 violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 23 1994) (“While the liability of municipalities doesn’t turn on the liability of individual 24 14 As already explained above, Ramos’s assertion that when he was injured, it was a “purely custodial 25 situation” is unpersuasive. His own allegations are that the officers were still effectuating his girlfriend’s arrest. See ECF No. 30 at 5, ¶ 41 (explaining officer Thompson and Officer Beck left to handcuff plaintiff’s 26 girlfriend). Further, the SAC does not allege whether the officers were able to determine what or who caused the domestic disturbance at the time of executing Ramos’s arrest. See ECF No. 30 at 3, ¶¶ 13–18. 1| officers, it is contingent on a violation of constitutional rights. Here, the municipal 2}| defendants cannot be held liable because no constitutional violation occurred.”). Because | find Ramos fails to sufficiently allege a constitutional violation, I grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss Ramos’s second § 1983 claim. Conclusion 6 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss [ECF No. 31] is 7|| GRANTED. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply [ECF 9|| No. 39] is DENIED. 10 The Clerk of Court is kindly instructed to enter □□ ment accordingly, and close this case. 77 12 Dated: June 4, 2026 kéea— 13 Cristi aD Wao Wnited States District Judge [ 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26