Mirwiss Pasoong v. Careerist, Inc., et al.
This text of Mirwiss Pasoong v. Careerist, Inc., et al. (Mirwiss Pasoong v. Careerist, Inc., et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 MIRWISS PASOON, Case No. 25-cv-05217-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING REMAND AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND 9 v. TERMINATING MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT 10 CAREERIST, INC., et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 28 11 Defendants.
12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Dkt. Nos. 15 (“Mot.”), 21 14 (“Opp.”), 22 (“Reply”). The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral 15 argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons discussed 16 below, the Court GRANTS the motion to remand. Dkt. No. 15. Defendant Careerist’s motion to 17 dismiss is TERMINATED AS MOOT. Dkt. No. 28. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in state court in January 2024, alleging claims against 20 Defendants Careerist, Inc. (“Careerist”) and Midwest Fidelity Services, LLC (“Midwest”) related 21 to Careerist’s educational programs and loans. See Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 2, 4, 16. Defendant Careerist 22 removed the case to federal court on June 20, 2025, arguing that the Court has diversity 23 jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 1 (“Notice of Removal”) ¶¶ 9, 14, 19. 24 Careerist admits it did not obtain Defendant Midwest’s consent before removal. Opp. at 4. 25 II. MOTION FOR REMAND 26 a. Legal Standard 27 “The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after 1 28 U.S.C § 1446(b)(1). “[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of 2 removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended 3 pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one 4 which is or has become removable.” Id. § 1446(b)(3). “[A]ll defendants who have been properly 5 joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action. Id. § 1446(b)(2)(A). 6 b. Discussion 7 Removal here was plainly untimely. Defendant Careerist was served no later than March 8 7, 2024. Dkt. No. 1-1 at 44. If, as Careerist contends, this Court has federal question jurisdiction 9 over the claims, it was required to remove this case within 30 days of service. The same is true for 10 diversity jurisdiction—Careerist states that it was aware the amount in controversy would exceed 11 $75,000 in March 2025, after Plaintiff first sent Careerist a settlement proposal demanding more 12 than that amount. Notice of Removal ¶ 12. Even if the amount in controversy was not 13 ascertainable from the original complaint, the latest Careerist knew it could remove the case was 14 March 2025. Careerist would have only had 30 days from that moment to remove this case. 28 15 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Instead, it waited to remove the case in June, three months later. Moreover, 16 Careerist could not remove under diversity jurisdiction “more than 1 year after commencement of 17 the action, unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent 18 a defendant from removing the action.” Id. § 1446(c)(1). The Court finds no evidence—and 19 Careerist does not argue—that Plaintiff acted in bad faith. 20 Careerist argues that the parties stipulated in December 2024 to allow Plaintiff to file an 21 amended complaint, and the 30-day removal period should be calculated from May 23, 2025, 22 when Plaintiff confirmed he would not file an amended complaint. Opp. at 2–3. Careerist cites 23 only two cases, both of which stand for the proposition that an amended pleading may trigger the 24 second 30-day window contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), but only “[i]f no ground for 25 removal is evident in [the first] pleading.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 26 (9th Cir. 2005); Deberry v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 5:25-CV-00779-DOC-SHK, 2025 WL 27 1513439, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 2025). This is unsurprising, since 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) only 1 when “it may first be ascertained that the case is [removable].” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). These 2 cases do not help Careerist where it concedes that removability was evident no later than March 3 2025. Careerist cites no authority supporting a delay of removal where an amended pleading 4 might add another basis for removal or eliminate existing removability.1 5 III. ATTORNEYS’ FEES 6 a. Legal Standard 7 Attorneys’ fees and costs are only available under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) if the removing 8 defendant “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. 9 Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). [R]emoval is not objectively unreasonable solely because the 10 removing party’s arguments lack merit, or else attorney’s fees would always be awarded whenever 11 remand is granted.” Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). 12 b. Discussion 13 Here, Defendant Careerist’s removal was objectively unreasonable. “The Ninth Circuit 14 has been clear on the 30-day deadline for decades . . . .” Ashman v. Bristol Hospice – Cal., L.L.C., 15 No. 24-CV-02652-SRM-SHK, 2025 WL 2650359, at *5–*6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025) (citing 16 Ninth Circuit precedent and granting attorneys’ fees in a case involving a similarly frivolous and 17 untimely attempt at removal); see also Magnoliadrhomes LLC v. Kahn, No. 21-CV-03682-PJH, 18 2021 WL 3286830, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2021) (granting attorneys’ fees for untimely 19 removal). As discussed above, Careerist’s original basis for removal described in the Notice of 20 Removal is plainly foreclosed by the statutory language in 28 U.S.C. § 1446, and Careerist does 21 not attempt to argue otherwise in its opposition. Careerist’s sole argument regarding the 22 stipulation to amend is similarly foreclosed by § 1446(b)(3). Careerist’s cited cases do not support 23 overriding that clear statutory language. Plaintiff warned Careerist that its removal would be 24 untimely and that he would seek fees. See Dkt. No. 15-2 (“Abraham Decl.”) ¶ 19. Careerist 25 nevertheless removed the case, even without consent from Defendant Midwest. 26 1 Plaintiff also notes that Careerist did not argue this in its Notice of Removal. Reply at 3. The 27 Court agrees that Careerist “may not present new grounds for removal for the first time in its 1 Plaintiff seeks $4,840 for 8.8 hours billed at $550 per hour. Abraham Decl. 20-23 (7.8 2 || hours for motion); Reply at 6 (1 hour for reply). The Ninth Circuit uses the “lodestar” method to 3 determine reasonable attorney fees. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th 4 || Cir. 2008). The court calculates the lodestar “by multiplying the number of hours reasonably 5 expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 6 || 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2007).
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