Miroe v. Miroe

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Miroe v. Miroe

270 A.D.2d 400, 705 N.Y.S.2d 62, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2978

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 20, 2000

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 270 A.D.2d 400 (Miroe v. Miroe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Miroe v. Miroe, 270 A.D.2d 400, 705 N.Y.S.2d 62, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2978 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant third-party plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (De-Maro, J.), dated April 22, 1999, as denied his cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the third-party defendant separately appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of the same order as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motion and cross motion are granted, and the complaint and the third-party complaint are dismissed.

One who ,has received workers’ compensation benefits is barred from commencing an action against a fellow employee who was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time of the injury (see, Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [6]; Maines v Cronomer Val. Fire Dept., 50 NY2d 535, 543). As the defendant was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident (see, Matter of Husted v Seneca Steel Serv., 41 NY2d 140), the plaintiffs’ action is barred, and the third-party action for contribution and indemnification becomes academic. In any event, the third-party action should have been dismissed as the injured plaintiff did not suffer a “grave injury” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 11). Santucci, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant third-party plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (De-Maro, J.), dated April 22, 1999, as denied his cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the third-party defendant separately appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of the same order as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motion and cross motion are granted, and the complaint and the third-party complaint are dismissed.

One who ,has received workers’ compensation benefits is barred from commencing an action against a fellow employee who was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time of the injury (see, Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 [6]; Maines v Cronomer Val. Fire Dept., 50 NY2d 535, 543). As the defendant was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident (see, Matter of Husted v Seneca Steel Serv., 41 NY2d 140), the plaintiffs’ action is barred, and the third-party action for contribution and indemnification becomes academic. In any event, the third-party action should have been dismissed as the injured plaintiff did not suffer a “grave injury” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 11). Santucci, J. P., Krausman, Florio and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

270 A.D.2d 400, 705 N.Y.S.2d 62, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2978, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miroe-v-miroe-nyappdiv-2000.

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