Miriam Duran Ortiz v. Pamela Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 20, 2026
Docket19-72530
StatusUnpublished

This text of Miriam Duran Ortiz v. Pamela Bondi (Miriam Duran Ortiz v. Pamela Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Miriam Duran Ortiz v. Pamela Bondi, (9th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

MIRIAM KARINA DURAN ORTIZ; No. 19-72530 DILAN FROYLAN LANDA DURAN, Agency Nos. A208-592-957 Petitioners, A208-592-958

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 12, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and BLUMENFELD,*** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

1 Petitioners Miriam Karina Duran Ortiz and her minor son, Dilan Froylan

Landa Duran, are natives and citizens of Mexico. They seek review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial

of their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (CAT). They also seek review of the BIA’s denial of

their motion to terminate proceedings based on a defective Notice to Appear

(NTA). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

1. The BIA determined that the petitioners did not suffer past persecution

and lack a well-founded fear of future persecution. “We review factual findings

for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo.” Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d

909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020).

The petitioners first challenge the BIA’s finding that they did not experience

past persecution in Mexico. Whether we review for substantial evidence or de

novo, the petitioners do not demonstrate past persecution. Persecution “is an

extreme concept that means something considerably more than discrimination or

harassment.” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009)). Duran Ortiz testified

that she encountered armed cartel members who frequently asked her whether she

had seen the police or military. She also testified that she once saw cartel members

assaulting another man. But the record contains no evidence that the petitioners

2 were harmed while living in Mexico. Indeed, Duran Ortiz testified that she did not

receive any threats and was not specifically targeted by the gangs.1 The BIA

therefore did not err in concluding that the petitioners failed to establish past

persecution.

Nor did the petitioners present any evidence establishing an “objectively

‘reasonable possibility’ of persecution upon return to [Mexico].” Duran-

Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Duran Ortiz

testified that her father was kidnapped and held for ransom by cartel members in

April 2016, after she and her son left Mexico. She fears that she would similarly

be targeted for extortion if returned to Mexico. But after the father’s kidnapping,

he returned home and has lived there without further harm. Duran Ortiz conceded

that neither she nor any family member has been threatened since her father’s

release. “The ongoing safety of family members in the petitioner’s native country

undermines a reasonable fear of future persecution.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066.

Thus, the BIA did not err in affirming the denial of the petitioners’ asylum

claim. Because the petitioners do not show that they are entitled to asylum, they

1 Although the petitioners now assert that they received threatening phone calls while in Mexico, this claim cannot be considered because they failed to raise it before the IJ or BIA. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963–64 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e are limited to reviewing the facts considered by the [BIA].”).

3 necessarily cannot meet the “more stringent” showing for withholding of removal.

Id.

2. As for CAT relief, the petitioners have waived any challenge to the denial

of that claim by failing to address it in their opening brief. See Escobar Santos v.

Garland, 4 F.4th 762, 764 n.1 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding waiver of arguments not

raised in opening brief).

3. The petitioners next challenge the BIA’s denial of their motion to

terminate, arguing that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over their removal

proceedings because their NTA omitted the date, time, and location of their initial

hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14(a), 1003.15(b).

Defects in the NTA do not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction.

United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc).

The petitioners do not dispute that they timely received the missing information in

the notice of hearing and appeared as scheduled, thereby curing any defects in the

NTA. See Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir. 2020).

PETITION DENIED.2

2 Petitioners’ motion to stay removal, Dkt. No. 6, is denied.

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