IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATHENS DIVISION MIRANDA WHITWORTH, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. Officer JOHNATHON CHAMBERS, in 3:25-cv-00138-TES his individual capacity; Officer DANNY WOODS in his individual capacity; and JESSE ELDER, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING SECOND MOTION TO ADD PARTY
Before the Court is Plaintiff Miranda Whitworth’s Second Motion to Add Party [Doc. 14]. In this motion, Plaintiff seeks, once again, to add Franklin County as a defendant in this case under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. To briefly recap, Plaintiff previously tried to add Franklin County as a defendant in this case via an “amended complaint.” See [Doc. 8]. Rather than take the technical route and permit that filing to stand as the sole operative pleading in this case— potentially dropping Plaintiff’s claims against the other three named defendants—the Court construed her “amended complaint” as a motion to add party. [Doc. 9, pp. 2–3]. However, given the lack of factual allegations against Frankin County, the Court ultimately disallowed Franklin County’s addition into the case. [Id. at pp. 4–7]. Typically, when parties want to amend an operative pleading, they cannot just
file a single document pertaining to their efforts to amend (as Plaintiff did in this case). See [Doc. 8]. A plaintiff should, instead, redraft the complaint in its entirety—that way, defendants and courts do not have to engage in the inefficient practice of shuffling
between multiple filings to ascertain a plaintiff’s allegations and claims. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45, 47 (2016) (invoking “Rule 1 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]’s paramount command: the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
disputes” and the federal courts’ inherent powers “to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases”). Plaintiff quite clearly didn’t want to take that course of action in her previous effort to add Franklin County, so in order to prevent her previously filed “amended complaint”
from usurping her Complaint [Doc. 1], the Court viewed it as a motion to add party. [Doc. 9, pp. 2–3]. In doing so, the Court assessed whether Plaintiff’s allegations, as pled, were sufficient to state a plausible Monell claim against Franklin County. Had they been
enough, the Court would have added Franklin County as a defendant and ordered Plaintiff to recast all of her allegations against all four defendants into one single document. That document would have, of course, completely replaced her original Complaint. However, in its previous Order [Doc. 9], the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s
attempted Monell claim against Franklin County without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. [Doc. 9, p. 7]. The Court makes the same ruling here with respect to Plaintiff’s Second Motion
to Add Party. As this is Plaintiff’s second attempt to state a Monell claim against Franklin County, the Court will not rehash what is required for stating a plausible claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 or binding precent from the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., [Doc. 8], in connection with [Doc. 9, pp. 4–6]. Instead, the Court jumps straight to the “allegations” Plaintiff puts forth in support of
her second effort to add Franklin County as a party under Monell. See McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Conclusory allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Just like the Court told Plaintiff in its previous Order, “[t]o prove a Monell claim, a plaintiff must
show: (1) that [her] constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” [Doc. 9, p. 5 (quoting Andre v.
Clayton Cnty., Ga., 148 F.4th 1282, 1300 (11th Cir. 2025))]. There’s no doubt that Plaintiff plausibly alleges a violation of her own constitutional rights, but her efforts regarding the other two elements of a Monell claim fall short. See [Doc. 3, pp. 4–12]. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff plausibly
alleged a Monell claim where the plaintiff alleged (1) a violation of his own constitutional rights, (2) that others had suffered the same or similar constitutional violations, and (3) that the municipality itself referred to these constitutional violations
as part of a “program.” See, e.g., Andre, 148 F.4th at 1300 (citing Hoefling v. City of Mia., 811 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2016)). Absent from Plaintiff’s allegations underlying her Monell claim are any factual allegations as to how “others ha[ve] suffered the same
or similar constitutional violation.” See, e.g., id. Plaintiff merely offers this unadorned statement: “The deputies engaged in conduct similar.” [Doc. 14, p. 3]. Candidly, “Plaintiff alleges,” in a rather generic fashion, “that Franklin County is
liable under Monell . . . because: [Franklin] County had actual notice of repeated complaints involving the same deputies” and that “[t]he deputies engaged in conduct similar to that alleged in Plaintiff’s initial [C]omplaint.” [Doc. 14, p. 3]; see also [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff stops there, though. She fails to provide any real context or factual allegations
for what these repeated complaints are or who made them. Since Plaintiff is so adamant on her allegation that Franklin County had actual notice, she ought to have been able to supply specific examples where “others had suffered the same or similar constitutional
violations.” See, e.g., Andre, 148 F.4th at 1300; [Doc. 14, p. 3]. Plaintiff also failed to offer any examples of these alleged “repeated complaints.” [Doc. 14, p. 3]. It’s evident that Plaintiff can easily say her Monell claim is supported by “conduct similar to” what she says happened to her, but she failed to provide any factual allegations about that
supposed conduct to nudge the claim from conceivable to plausible. [Id.]. Plaintiff’s “allegations” are simply too generic, and as the Court has already told her, “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not sustain a cause of action. [Doc. 9,
p. 6 (citing McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333)]; Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). After all, Rule 8’s sole purpose is to provide a defendant “with ‘fair notice’ of the
claims and the ‘grounds’ for entitlement to relief.” Barreth v. Reyes 1, Inc., No. 5:19-cv- 00320-TES, 2020 WL 4370137, at *2 (M.D. Ga. July 29, 2020); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. Without the slightest descriptive effort of these “repeated complaints” or without any
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATHENS DIVISION MIRANDA WHITWORTH, Plaintiff, v. CIVIL ACTION NO. Officer JOHNATHON CHAMBERS, in 3:25-cv-00138-TES his individual capacity; Officer DANNY WOODS in his individual capacity; and JESSE ELDER, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING SECOND MOTION TO ADD PARTY
Before the Court is Plaintiff Miranda Whitworth’s Second Motion to Add Party [Doc. 14]. In this motion, Plaintiff seeks, once again, to add Franklin County as a defendant in this case under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. To briefly recap, Plaintiff previously tried to add Franklin County as a defendant in this case via an “amended complaint.” See [Doc. 8]. Rather than take the technical route and permit that filing to stand as the sole operative pleading in this case— potentially dropping Plaintiff’s claims against the other three named defendants—the Court construed her “amended complaint” as a motion to add party. [Doc. 9, pp. 2–3]. However, given the lack of factual allegations against Frankin County, the Court ultimately disallowed Franklin County’s addition into the case. [Id. at pp. 4–7]. Typically, when parties want to amend an operative pleading, they cannot just
file a single document pertaining to their efforts to amend (as Plaintiff did in this case). See [Doc. 8]. A plaintiff should, instead, redraft the complaint in its entirety—that way, defendants and courts do not have to engage in the inefficient practice of shuffling
between multiple filings to ascertain a plaintiff’s allegations and claims. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45, 47 (2016) (invoking “Rule 1 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure]’s paramount command: the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
disputes” and the federal courts’ inherent powers “to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases”). Plaintiff quite clearly didn’t want to take that course of action in her previous effort to add Franklin County, so in order to prevent her previously filed “amended complaint”
from usurping her Complaint [Doc. 1], the Court viewed it as a motion to add party. [Doc. 9, pp. 2–3]. In doing so, the Court assessed whether Plaintiff’s allegations, as pled, were sufficient to state a plausible Monell claim against Franklin County. Had they been
enough, the Court would have added Franklin County as a defendant and ordered Plaintiff to recast all of her allegations against all four defendants into one single document. That document would have, of course, completely replaced her original Complaint. However, in its previous Order [Doc. 9], the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s
attempted Monell claim against Franklin County without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. [Doc. 9, p. 7]. The Court makes the same ruling here with respect to Plaintiff’s Second Motion
to Add Party. As this is Plaintiff’s second attempt to state a Monell claim against Franklin County, the Court will not rehash what is required for stating a plausible claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 or binding precent from the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., [Doc. 8], in connection with [Doc. 9, pp. 4–6]. Instead, the Court jumps straight to the “allegations” Plaintiff puts forth in support of
her second effort to add Franklin County as a party under Monell. See McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Conclusory allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Just like the Court told Plaintiff in its previous Order, “[t]o prove a Monell claim, a plaintiff must
show: (1) that [her] constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” [Doc. 9, p. 5 (quoting Andre v.
Clayton Cnty., Ga., 148 F.4th 1282, 1300 (11th Cir. 2025))]. There’s no doubt that Plaintiff plausibly alleges a violation of her own constitutional rights, but her efforts regarding the other two elements of a Monell claim fall short. See [Doc. 3, pp. 4–12]. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff plausibly
alleged a Monell claim where the plaintiff alleged (1) a violation of his own constitutional rights, (2) that others had suffered the same or similar constitutional violations, and (3) that the municipality itself referred to these constitutional violations
as part of a “program.” See, e.g., Andre, 148 F.4th at 1300 (citing Hoefling v. City of Mia., 811 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2016)). Absent from Plaintiff’s allegations underlying her Monell claim are any factual allegations as to how “others ha[ve] suffered the same
or similar constitutional violation.” See, e.g., id. Plaintiff merely offers this unadorned statement: “The deputies engaged in conduct similar.” [Doc. 14, p. 3]. Candidly, “Plaintiff alleges,” in a rather generic fashion, “that Franklin County is
liable under Monell . . . because: [Franklin] County had actual notice of repeated complaints involving the same deputies” and that “[t]he deputies engaged in conduct similar to that alleged in Plaintiff’s initial [C]omplaint.” [Doc. 14, p. 3]; see also [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff stops there, though. She fails to provide any real context or factual allegations
for what these repeated complaints are or who made them. Since Plaintiff is so adamant on her allegation that Franklin County had actual notice, she ought to have been able to supply specific examples where “others had suffered the same or similar constitutional
violations.” See, e.g., Andre, 148 F.4th at 1300; [Doc. 14, p. 3]. Plaintiff also failed to offer any examples of these alleged “repeated complaints.” [Doc. 14, p. 3]. It’s evident that Plaintiff can easily say her Monell claim is supported by “conduct similar to” what she says happened to her, but she failed to provide any factual allegations about that
supposed conduct to nudge the claim from conceivable to plausible. [Id.]. Plaintiff’s “allegations” are simply too generic, and as the Court has already told her, “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not sustain a cause of action. [Doc. 9,
p. 6 (citing McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333)]; Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). After all, Rule 8’s sole purpose is to provide a defendant “with ‘fair notice’ of the
claims and the ‘grounds’ for entitlement to relief.” Barreth v. Reyes 1, Inc., No. 5:19-cv- 00320-TES, 2020 WL 4370137, at *2 (M.D. Ga. July 29, 2020); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. Without the slightest descriptive effort of these “repeated complaints” or without any
specific examples of this so-called “similar conduct,” there’s no “fair notice” to Franklin County when it comes to its ability to mount a defense. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Bailey v. Reliance Tr. Co., No. 1:04-CV-0340-JOF, 2002 WL 8154440, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2005) (“[T]he purpose of a pleading is to give the adverse party a fair notice of the
claim, so that the adverse party can prepare an answer and an adequate defense.”). Again, complaints reviewed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are governed by the same relevant standards for a motion based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, the relevant inquiry in assessing a plaintiff’s allegations through a Rule 12(b)(6) lens is whether there is enough factual heft to nudge a claim from the “conceivable” category to the “plausible” one. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Here, the conclusory allegations Plaintiff offers in support of
her second effort assert a Monell claim against Franklin County, once again, do not provide enough factual heft to nudge the claim into that latter category. Accordingly, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s second effort to add Franklin County
as a defendant in this case under Monell. Anytime a plaintiff seeks to amend a complaint, especially if the attempted amendment is to add a party, the plaintiff must attach a proposed amended complaint for review. “A plaintiff who moves for leave to
amend a complaint ‘must either attach a copy of the proposed amendment to the motion or set forth the substance thereof.’” United States ex rel 84Partners, LLC v. Nuflo, Inc., 79 F.4th 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States ex rel Atkins v. McInteer,
470 F.3d 1350, 1361–62 (11th Cir. 2006)). SO ORDERED, this 26th day of November, 2025. S/ Tilman E. Self, III TILMAN E. SELF, III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE