Miranda v. Pfaff

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 28, 2021
Docket3:19-cv-06222
StatusUnknown

This text of Miranda v. Pfaff (Miranda v. Pfaff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miranda v. Pfaff, (W.D. Wash. 2021).

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 JESUS MIRANDA, CASE NO. C19-6222 BHS-TLF 8 Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING IN PART 9 v. AND MODIFYING IN PART REPORT AND 10 RYAN A. PFAFF, et al., RECOMMENDATION 11 Defendants. 12 13 This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) 14 of the Honorable Theresa L. Fricke, United States Magistrate Judge, Dkt. 31, and 15 Defendants’ objections to the R&R, Dkt. 32. 16 On December 18, 2019, Plaintiff Jesus Miranda filed a proposed prisoner civil 17 rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 stating an Eight Amendment claim for 18 unconstitutional deprivation of food against Department of Corrections officials and staff 19 members at the Washington State Penitentiary (“WSP”). Dkt. 1. Miranda is an inmate at 20 the WSP in maximum (“Max”) custody. Dkt. 7. As set forth in the R&R, Miranda alleges 21 that while in Max custody, he was subject to a policy by which he received only “‘around 22 half of the food/800 calorie meals [prisoners receive] in [the general] population’” and 1 alleges that between May 22, 2019 and November 26, 2019, he received between 1200- 2 1500 calories per day. Dkt. 31 at 2 (quoting Dkt. 7 at 7). He alleges that due to the lack of 3 adequate nutrition, he lost fifteen pounds and suffered lack of sleep, emotional distress,

4 and lack of focus and motivation. Id. (citing Dkt. 7 at 8). 5 On May 26, 2020, Judge Fricke ordered service of the complaint. Dkt. 8. On July 6 27, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss. Dkt. 27. On December 1, 2020, Judge Fricke 7 issued the R&R recommending that the Court grant the motion to dismiss in part and 8 deny it in part. Dkt. 31. Judge Fricke recommended that Miranda’s Eight Amendment

9 claim for unconstitutional deprivation of food be allowed to proceed against four 10 Supervisory Defendants—Steven Sinclair, Timothy Thrasher, Robert Herzog, and Scott 11 Russell—and that his remaining claims be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to 12 amend. 13 The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s

14 disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or 15 modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the 16 magistrate judge with instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 17 The Supervisory Defendants object to Judge Fricke’s conclusion that Miranda 18 sufficiently alleged personal involvement or causal connection between their actions and

19 the deprivation of food he experienced and object to the conclusion that Miranda’s 20 allegations are plausible. 21 Judge Fricke explained that Miranda sought to hold the Supervisory Defendants 22 liable for the alleged months-long deprivation of sufficiently nutritious food he 1 experienced under two theories: (1) that they are responsible for the impact of facility 2 lockdowns, holidays, and kitchen mistakes on the provision of sufficient food and (2) that 3 they are responsible for a WSP policy to limit the caloric intake of inmates in Max

4 custody by half. Dkt. 31 at 8. Miranda alleges that the Supervisory Defendants “control 5 all the prison and IMU procedures state wide and refuse to correct their violations.” Dkt. 6 7 at 12. Judge Fricke concluded that Miranda had insufficiently alleged personal 7 participation as to the first theory but concluded his allegations stated a plausible claim as 8 to the second theory. Dkt. 31 at 9.

9 First, the Supervisory Defendants argue that alleging that they control the relevant 10 policies insufficiently alleges that they committed affirmative acts or omitted legally 11 required actions that caused the deprivation. Dkt. 32 at 3 (citing Johnson v. Duffy, 588 12 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). Second, the Supervisory Defendants reiterate their 13 argument that under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 680 U.S. 662, 663–64 (2009), “[a]n allegation that

14 DOC systematically state-wide is starving all inmates in [close confinement] is simply 15 implausible.” Dkt. 32 at 4. They argue that though Miranda referenced the DOC policy 16 regarding inmate diets, he omitted the relevant portion providing that inmates in close 17 custody should receive “[m]eals of similar quality and quantity as provided to the general 18 population,” though “[m]ethods of preparation and/or delivery may be modified for

19 security reasons.” Id. at 5. Defendants argue the Court should consider this policy under 20 the incorporation by reference doctrine. Id. at 4 (citing, among others, Dunn v. Castro, 21 621 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010)). 22 1 Even considering the existence of this policy, which would be more appropriate on 2 a motion for summary judgment than a motion to dismiss, the Court agrees with Judge 3 Fricke that, considering Miranda’s specific factual allegations about his experience of

4 food deprivation and liberally construing his complaint, his allegations are plausible as to 5 the existence of this policy. See Dkt. 31 at 9.1 However, the Court agrees with the 6 Supervisory Defendants that Miranda’s allegations are conclusory as to the causal 7 connection between their actions and the harm suffered. To state a claim for deprivation 8 of food against the Supervisory Defendants, Miranda must allege facts showing they

9 participated in or directed a policy specific to the alleged deprivation of food or knew of 10 the deprivation of food and failed to prevent it. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 11 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 12 The Court having considered the R&R, Defendants’ objections, and the remaining 13 record, does hereby find and order as follows:

14 (1) The R&R is ADOPTED in part and MODIFIED in part; 15 (2) Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 27, is GRANTED; 16 (3) All of Miranda’s claims are DISMISSED without prejudice and with 17 leave to amend; 18 (4) Miranda may file an amended complaint on or before February 26, 2020;

19 and 20 21 1 Plausibility of this allegation is a close question, suggesting this claim may be 22 susceptible to an early motion for summary judgment. 1 (5) The matter is rereferred for further consideration. 2 Dated this 28th day of January, 202A1. 3

4 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 5 United States District Judge

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Related

Dunn v. Castro
621 F.3d 1196 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)

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Miranda v. Pfaff, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miranda-v-pfaff-wawd-2021.