Miranda Gayle Smith AKA Miranda Gayle Keever v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-23-00134-CR
MIRANDA GAYLE SMITH AKA MIRANDA GAYLE KEEVER, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 100th District Court Childress County, Texas Trial Court No. 5525, Honorable Stuart Messer, Presiding
February 2, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
Miranda Gayle Smith, a/k/a Miranda Gayle Keever, appeals from the trial court’s
judgment revoking her community supervision, adjudicating her guilty of possessing a
controlled substance with the intent to deliver, and assessing a twelve-year prison
sentence. She challenges the judgment through two issues, arguing 1) the evidence is
insufficient to support the decision to revoke and 2) the sentence imposed is cruel and
unusual. We affirm. Issue One
Reading the first issue and the record brings to mind the lyrics “[i]t rained all night
the day I left, the weather it was dry; [t]he sun so hot, I froze to death, Susanna, don’t you
cry.”1
Appellant argues that insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s decision
granting the motion to revoke and adjudicating guilt. This is purportedly so because the
reporter’s record illustrates that trial court relied on her pleas of true to the accusations in
the motion when she actually pleaded “not true.” The State responds by arguing that the
reporter’s record is wrong. Though it shows she pleaded “not true,” she actually pleaded
“true.” Confusion is added when one sees that elsewhere in the record appellant
acknowledged that she had not ingested controlled substances except for the two
occasions to which “you have pled true to today.” (Emphasis added). So too does one
find in the record the trial court saying, when announcing its decision, that 1) “on each of
the allegations [in the State’s motion] . . . each of those are true based upon the
defendant’s plea” and 2) “[i]t is that you have come forward and pled true . . . .”2
(Emphasis added). Thus springs our reference to “Oh! Susanna,” its inherent
contradictions, and those found in the reporter’s record.
Irrespective of whether that record accurately memorializes appellant’s plea as
true, it nonetheless contains evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to find one or
more of the allegations true and grant the State’s motion. That evidence includes
1 “Oh! Susanna,” Stephen F. Foster.
2 The judgment adjudicating guilt also reflects that appellant pleaded “true” to the State’s motion to
adjudicate.
2 testimony by the probation officer about appellant ingesting methamphetamine in 2020
after receiving community supervision. So too did appellant implicitly acknowledge (as
shown above) that she ingested illegal substances at least twice. One of the conditions
to remaining on probation obligated her to abstain from such substances.
Other evidence, to which appellant admitted, illustrated that she associated with a
felon while on community supervision. This contravened the directive to avoid persons
of harmful or disreputable character, including those previously convicted of a crime.
Appellant acknowledging that she engaged in the foregoing activity precludes us
from holding that no evidence supported the trial court’s decision to revoke probation,
adjudicate guilt, and pronounce sentence. Indeed, evidence illustrating the violation of
any one condition named in the motion provides basis to adjudicate guilt, Johnson v.
State, No. 07-22-00344-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 5128, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July
7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), and such evidence exists.
So, we overrule issue one.
Issue Two
Next, appellant contends her twelve-year sentence was cruel and unusual. Yet,
the record fails to illustrate that she urged this complaint when sentenced or thereafter
through a motion for new trial. Having so failed, the matter was not preserved for review.
Rucker v. State, No. 07-20-00128-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7024, at *10 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Aug. 25, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op. not designated for publication) (so holding).
Accordingly, we overrule the issue.
3 Having overruled each issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Brian Quinn Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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