Miranda Campbell v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and Minor Children

2025 Ark. App. 72

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: February 12, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 72 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CV-24-664

MIRANDA CAMPBELL Opinion Delivered February 12, 2025 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 23JV-23-128]

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE DAVID M. CLARK, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE CHILDREN APPELLEES AFFIRMED

RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge

Miranda Campbell appeals the Faulkner County Circuit Court’s termination of her

parental rights to her three children, Minor Child 1 (MC1), Minor Child 2 (MC2), and

Minor Child 3 (MC3).1 On appeal, Campbell argues that the circuit court erred in denying

her motion for continuance. Specifically, Campbell argues that the court’s denial of a

continuance amounted to a violation of her due-process rights. We affirm.

On April 6, 2023, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) exercised

emergency custody of the three juveniles due to homelessness and neglect. Specifically, police

1 Campbell had a fourth child, hereinafter referred to as MC4, but Campbell’s rights to that child were not terminated. The children’s biological father is Caleb Johnson; his parental rights to MC1, MC2, and MC3 were also terminated, but he is not a party to this appeal. were called to a Walmart parking lot where the children were barefoot with no coats, and

MC2’s lips were blue. The parents indicated they were homeless, had been for about two

years, and had used up all available resources. Law enforcement found that they had been

banned from all the area hotels “due to the family trashing and destroying rooms.” MC4 was

living with his grandparents and had been since his birth.

On April 10, DHS filed a petition for ex parte emergency custody and dependency-

neglect of the juveniles, and on the same day, the circuit court entered an ex parte order for

emergency custody. The next day, the circuit court held a probable-cause hearing wherein it

found that probable cause existed for the emergency order to remain in place.

On May 9, the circuit court held an adjudication hearing and accepted the parties’

stipulation to a dependency-neglect finding based on the parents’ homelessness and

unemployment that made them unable to care for the basic needs of their children. The

court also ordered that the case goal be reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption.

Additionally, it ordered Campbell to cooperate with DHS; to notify DHS of changes in

residence; to take medication as prescribed; to refrain from the use of illegal drugs and

alcohol; to complete parenting classes; to obtain and maintain stable housing and

employment; to maintain a clean, safe home for herself and the juveniles; and demonstrate

an ability to protect the juveniles and keep the juveniles safe. Further, the circuit court

advised the parents that the clock is ticking, and there is a limited amount of time to obey

court orders and correct the conditions that caused the juveniles’ removal in order for the

juveniles to be safely returned.

2 On August 3, the circuit court held a review hearing. At this hearing, the circuit court

ordered that the case plan goal remain reunification with a concurrent goal of adoption, that

MC4 continue in the custody of his grandparents, and that the remaining juveniles continue

in the custody of DHS. The court also found that Campbell had failed to comply with the

case plan, noting that Campbell had not had any meaningful contact with DHS; had not

attended any visits; and had not made any progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes

of removal. Additionally, the court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts.

On November 1, the circuit court held another review hearing. At this hearing, the

circuit court ordered that the case-plan goal remain reunification with a concurrent goal of

adoption, that MC4 continue in the custody of his grandparents, and that the remaining

juveniles remain in the custody of DHS. The court also found Campbell had partially

complied with the case plan, noting that housing remained an issue throughout the case;

that she attended four visits in the review period; that she had tested positive for THC; and

that she had made minimal progress toward alleviating or mitigating the cause of removal.

The court also found that DHS had made reasonable efforts.

On January 18, 2024, the circuit court held a third review hearing. At this hearing,

the circuit court ordered that the case-plan goal remain reunification with a concurrent goal

of adoption, that MC4 remain in the custody of his grandparents, and that the remaining

juveniles remain in the custody of DHS. The court also found that Campbell had partially

complied with the case plan, noting that she was residing in Little Rock with family but that

DHS had not been able to visit inside the home; that she remained unemployed; that she

3 had been referred for and started counseling but had missed two sessions; that she had a

positive drug screen for methamphetamine and amphetamine; that she had been referred

for drug-and-alcohol assessment; that she had missed a substantial amount of visitation; and

that she had made minimal progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes of removal.

The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts.

On April 2, the circuit court held a permanency-planning hearing. At this hearing,

the circuit court changed the primary goal of the case to adoption and ordered that MC4

remain in the custody of his grandparents and that the other juveniles remain in DHS’s

custody. The circuit court also found that Campbell had failed to comply with the case plan

and court orders, specifically finding that she was residing with her sister; she was

unemployed and relies on others for financial support; she still needed to get into a

substance-abuse program; she had attended only one visit in 2024 but arrived an hour late,

which resulted in her not seeing the juveniles; she attended six visits during the case; she was

discharged from counseling but had not completed a drug-and-alcohol assessment; she

admitted to drug use as recently as February; and she had made minimal progress toward

alleviating or mitigating the causes for removal. Again, the court found that DHS had made

reasonable efforts.

4 On April 19, DHS filed a petition to terminate Campbell’s parental rights to MC1,

MC2, and MC3.2 On May 21, 2024, the circuit court terminated Campbell’s and Johnson’s

parental rights to MC1, MC2, and MC3. Campbell’s timely appeal is now before this court.

The burden of proof in termination-of-parental rights cases is clear and convincing

evidence, which requires a “degree of proof that will produce in the finder of fact a firm

conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.” E.g., Ring v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2021 Ark. App. 146, at 5, 620 S.W.3d 551, 555. To terminate parental rights, a circuit court

must find by clear and convincing evidence at least one termination ground and that

termination is in the juvenile’s best interest. Id. at 6, 620 S.W.3d at 555. The circuit court

determines whether termination is in the juvenile’s best interest by considering two factors:

(1) the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if parental rights are terminated and (2)

the potential harm caused by continuing contact with the parent. Id., 620 S.W.3d at 555.

The termination statute does not require clear and convincing evidence of each of

these factors; rather, it is the best-interest finding, itself, that must be supported by clear and

convincing evidence. E.g., Holdcraft v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 151, at 10,

573 S.W.3d 555, 561. On appeal, appellate courts review termination-of-parental-rights cases

de novo. Ring, 2021 Ark. App. 146, at 5, 620 S.W.3d at 555. Additionally, appellate courts

will not reverse a circuit court’s termination order unless the findings are clearly erroneous,

meaning “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence

2 The petition was also filed against the biological father, Caleb Johnson, and did not include MC4.

5 is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 5–6, 620

S.W.3d at 555. Further, appellate courts give great weight to the circuit court’s ability to

observe and assess witnesses. Id. at 6, 620 S.W.3d at 555.

On appeal, Campbell argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying

her motion for continuance. Campbell’s appeal fails to challenge any of the circuit court’s

findings related to termination grounds or best interest; therefore, she has waived those

findings on appeal. State v. Grisby, 370 Ark. 66, 69, 257 S.W.3d 104, 107 (2007) (holding

that arguments made below but not on appeal are considered abandoned); Benedict v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 96 Ark. App. 395, 409, 242 S.W.3d 305, 316–17 (2006).

Rather, Campbell argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her

counsel’s motion for continuance, and by doing so, it was a violation of her due-process

rights. Campbell failed to appear for the termination hearing, and she argues that the circuit

court’s decision to move forward with the termination hearing despite her absence prevented

her from being able to put on a defense. If a circuit court denies a continuance request, the

appellant must show both that the circuit court abused its discretion and that she was

prejudiced by the denial. E.g., Shultz v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 93, at 7.

To prove an abuse of discretion, the appellant must show that the circuit court acted

improvidently and without due consideration. Id. For a court to grant a continuance, the

moving party must show good cause. Id. at 6. Notably, “[l]ack of diligence by the moving

party is sufficient reason to deny a motion for continuance.” Id. One common example of a

lack of diligence is when the appellant requests a continuance at the beginning of a

6 termination hearing. Wright v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 503, at 9, 560 S.W.3d

827, 832; Brown v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 455, at 3; Martin v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 407, at 4, 465 S.W.3d 881, 883. Additionally, to determine

whether an appellant was prejudiced from the denial, appellate courts may consider the

appellant’s history of compliance during the case. See Wright, 2018 Ark. App. 503, at 9, 560

S.W.3d at 832 (“[A]ppellant fails to show prejudice because her past behavior demonstrated

a history of noncompliance such that even if the court granted the continuance, she was not

likely to follow all the steps necessary for reunification.”).

Given the record before us, we hold that Campbell was not diligent in requesting a

continuance. She never communicated with her attorney to request a continuance at all; she

simply requested a Zoom link the day of the hearing. While Campbell told DHS that she

was stuck in Missouri due to a broken-down Penske truck, her maternal grandfather testified

that Campbell was in Missouri working. The court found that Campbell had failed to take

adequate steps to ensure her presence for the hearing and waited until the eleventh hour to

attempt to make arrangements to attend. Moreover, the circuit court did not act

improvidently because it considered Campbell’s arguments and determined that her

testimony was unlikely to affect the court’s decision on termination. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 481, at 4.

Further, Campbell was never found to be more than partially compliant with the case

plan and court orders and attended only six visits with her children during the entire year-

long case, so she is unable to demonstrate that she was prejudiced. St. John v. Ark. Dep’t of

7 Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 450, at 4–5, 700 S.W.3d 197, 203) (holding the denial of a

motion for continuance did not prejudice the appellant where she had only one contact with

the child and had near complete noncompliance in the case). On appeal, Campbell fails to

identify actual prejudice; there was no proffer of testimony, just a vague argument that

counsel was unable to call her as a witness. Britt v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App.

95, at 9, 640 S.W.3d 721, 727 (“A circuit court does not abuse its discretion in denying a

motion for continuance on the basis of the absence of witnesses where no proffer was made

of what the witnesses would testify to.”). Moreover, we note, Campbell cannot establish

prejudice because she failed to challenge the statutory grounds or the determination that

termination was in the best interest of the juveniles. Id. at 9, 640 S.W.3d at 727. The circuit

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Campbell’s request for a continuance.

Nevertheless, Campbell argues that depriving a parent of a child without the proper

due process is an improvident act and an abuse of discretion. However, we decline to address

Campbell’s argument because no due-process argument was preserved for review. E.g.,

Chacon v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App 277, at 8, 600 S.W.3d 131, 135 (“It is well

settled that to preserve arguments for appeal, even constitutional ones, the appellant must

obtain a ruling below.”); Harris v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 559, at 9, 16 538

S.W.3d 842, 849 (“[N]o specific due-process argument was raised below, and therefore this

point is not preserved for review.”).

For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

8 GLADWIN and THYER, JJ., agree.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.

Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.