Miralli v. Fullana Corp.

98 P.R. 323
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedJanuary 30, 1970
DocketNo. R-69-104
StatusPublished

This text of 98 P.R. 323 (Miralli v. Fullana Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miralli v. Fullana Corp., 98 P.R. 323 (prsupreme 1970).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Blanco Lugo

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Relying on the provisions of § 1372 of the Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3840,1 the purchasing spouses Antonio Miralli and Providencia Fernández filed an action against the vendor Fullana Corporation requesting indemnity, because the property sold was encumbered with a sewerage servitude not mentioned in the deed of sale. The Superior Court, San Juan Part, granted the complaint, and ordered defendant to pay [325]*325plaintiffs the sum of ten thousand dollars for damages. At the request of the defendant corporation we issued writ of review.

From the findings of fact of the trial court and from the documentary evidence presented and admitted2 the following facts arise as indisputable facts: (i) That on September 26, 1960 the parties signed a private document designated as a “bilateral contract of sale” regarding lot No. 203 of block S of Las Américas Development, “as said lot appears drawn and numbered in a plan made by the CORPORATION,” wherein the purchasers stated that “(i) we have examined the plan mentioned in the description of the lot described . . .3 (ii) . . .; (iii) we know the place and site of location of Las Américas Development; and (iv) we have knowledge of all those other facts necessary for a determination of the object of this contract” (Exh. 3, Plaintiffs);'(ii) that in the Registry of Plats of the Registry of Property in Río Piedras a partial record, plan for Las Américas Development was filed, according to report No. 61-L-1281 of the Planning Board certified on December 19, 1960, approving the segregation, among others, of lots 200 to 208, both inclusive, of block S;4 (iii) that in said plan “there appears the layout of a 5 meter servitude in [326]*326favor of P.R.A.S.A.5 which affects lots number . . . two hundred and three ... of Block S . . .” (Exh. 1, Plaintiffs); (iv) that through deed No. 138 of February 15,1961 before Notary .Miguel Marcos Contreras the plaintiff spouses acquired by purchase from Fullana Corporation the aforementioned lot and the building erected therein for the price of $19,733.80, the proper record being entered on June 2, 1961; (v) that in the relation of encumbrances it was only stated that it was subject to restrictive building conditions, a servitude in favor of the Water Resources Authority and a mortgage in favor of the Banco Crédito y Ahorro Ponceño (Exh. 2, Plaintiffs) ;6 (vi) that by an order entered on January 24, 1963 in case E-63-193, the Commonwealth acquired through condemnation for the benefit of the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority a perpetual servitude of access and aqueduct for the construction of sanitary sewage system over a strip of land of the main property, which was recorded on March 20, 1964, (Exh. 1, Plaintiffs) ;7 (vii) that in August 1965 employees of the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority raised to ground level a cleanout hole of a little more than a meter in diameter which up to that moment had been hidden in plaintiffs’ lot, for the purpose of cleaning a sewerage pressure line which was obstructed; (viii) that said pressure line of twenty-four inches in diameter was buried at thirteen feet from the sur[327]*327face, and crosses in part the northern boundary of said lot; and, (ix) that neither before nor at the time the sale was executed were plaintiffs “informed” by defendant that the property was encumbered by a sewerage servitude in favor of the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority.

In its conclusions of law the trial court referred to: (1) the presumption that the property was free from encumbrances and to defendant’s obligation, in an action of denial of servitude, to establish as a defense the existence of the same; (2) the continuous and nonapparent character of the sewerage servitude; and, (3) the vendor’s obligation to indemnify “for the existence of the pressure lines, the clean-out hole, and the sewerage pipes hidden beneath the surface of the property . . . without any visible or undoubted sign revealing its existence, [which] constitutes a nonapparent servitude of which defendant had and has knowledge, but, however, did not mention it in the deed of sale. . . .”

1. It should be noted, immediately, that any reference to the freedom from encumbrances and to defendant’s consequent obligation in an action of denial of servitude to establish the existence of the servitude is extraneous to the controversy. Neither did the pleadings nor the evidence justify it, for the contractual breach which is sought to be redressed originates clearly from the relation of purchaser and vendor of the parties. Even more when the action of denial should be directed against the alleged owner of the servitude which in this case is acknowledged to be the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, and not the defendant corporation.

2. The requirements for the action mentioned in § 1372 of the Civil Code, swpra, as we stated in Pagan v. Heirs of Rivera, 38 P.R.R. 583 (1928), are: (i) the existence of a nonapparent servitude; (ii) the failure to mention it in the deed; and (iii) the circumstance that the purchaser would not have acquired the property had he known of the encum[328]*328brance.8 It is derived from the vendor’s obligation to warrant and it is directed to guarantee the peaceful possession of the thing sold, objecting to any material or juridical defect which impairs the useful possession of the same.

The physical nonapparent requirement depends on the servitude being exposed or revealed by external signs which confirm its existence. The doctrine is practically unanimous in recognizing likewise what is known as juridical appearance, situation which arises when the burden or encumbrance appears in the Registry. It is the appearance derived from the publicity of registries, that by legal presumption is considered known by all those who make contracts on the property. Castán states that “it is usually understood that it is also a necessary condition for the - encumbrance not to appear in the Registry of Property, because, otherwise, the purchaser could have realized perfectly well the condition of the property, and if he is prejudiced he should impute such prejudice to himself.”9 Manresa,10 Scaevola,11 Puig Brutau,12 De Diego,13 and Borrell y Soler14 agree with this view we adopted in Mejia v. Mouriño, 68 P.R.R. 614, 615 (1948). Ossorio Morales,15 upon considering the interaction of this [329]*329provision with the principle of publicity which characterizes the Mortgage Law, points out that “Summarizing then, all we have said, we believe that Art. 1483 of the Civil Code [§ 1372 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code] is only applicable when neither the owner of the encumbrance nor the purchaser had recorded their right, and that the rescissory action of said article could not be effectively exercised when one of those rights is recorded.

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98 P.R. 323, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miralli-v-fullana-corp-prsupreme-1970.