Miracle v. Robbins

231 S.W.2d 18, 313 Ky. 390, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 866
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJune 23, 1950
StatusPublished

This text of 231 S.W.2d 18 (Miracle v. Robbins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Miracle v. Robbins, 231 S.W.2d 18, 313 Ky. 390, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 866 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950).

Opinion

Judge Knight

Reversing.

On May 7, 1949, an election was held in the Third Magisterial District of Bell County on the question, “Are you in favor of the sale of alcoholic beverages in the Third Magisterial District in • Bell County, Kentucky? ........Yes ( )”

No. ( ).

The count of the votes by those whose duty it was so to do resulted in a certification that the total “yes” vote in favor of the sale of such beverages was 581 and the total “no” vote against the sale was 537, or a majority of 44 in favor of the sale. Gf. W. Robbins and B. F. Simpson, two voters in the district who voted “no,” brought this suit against the sheriff and Board of Election Commissioners of Bell County praying that the illegal votes cast against prohibition be determined and deducted from the votes cast against it; that the fraudulent votes be purged and the court adjudge that the legal votes cast in favor of prohibition exceeded those cast against it and that prohibition prevailed in the election. Appellants filed an intervening petition to be made parties under the provisions of KRS 242.120, and the counter-contest or defense to the suit was carried on in their names. After the taking of considerable testimony, the case was submitted and, on September 30, 1949, a judgment was entered adjudging that the total legal votes cast for the sale, that is the “yes” vote, was 493 and the total legal votes cast against the sale, that is the “no” vote, was 527, or a total majority of 34 against the sale. This appeal is prosecuted from that judgment.

There are seven voting precincts in the Third Magisterial District and in each of these the names of some of those voting therein were challenged in the petition filed by appellees or in the intervening petition and counter-contest filed by appellants. Their votes were challenged as illegal because they voted openly or because they did not live in the precinct in which they voted or they had not lived for a sufficient length of time in the [393]*393state, county or precinct, or they were minors or were not registered.

It appears to be impossible to hold a fair and honest election in that portion of Bell County involved in this contest, as evidenced by the facts set out in Helton v. Franklin, 297 Ky. 23, 178 S. W. 2d 844, or even in Bell County as a whole, as evidenced by Franklin v. Helton, 298 Ky. 580, 183 S. W. 2d 532. Our vigorous condemnation of the intimidation, fraud and corruption proven in the contest in those two elections appears to have been futile. A prosecution and conviction on some of the proven offenses shown in these elections might be effective. It seems to have become an established custom for those seeking to control elections in this magisterial district to concentrate on one precinct. In the former election, referred to in Helton v. Franklin supra, the dirty work was done in Cubbage precinct. In that case the entire Cubbage precinct was thrown out because it was impossible to determine the total number of illegal votes cast or on which side of the wet and dry question they were cast. The winning side was therefore determined by the vote of the remaining precincts in the district, in which the correct vote could be determined with reasonable accuracy.

Cardinal Precmct No. 21

In the last election involved in the present appeal, Cubbage had purified itself and it was in Cardinal precinct No. 21 that the dirty work seems to have been done this time. It was in this precinct that the greatest number of irregularities are alleged to have occurred, and in which the greatest number of votes are challenged as illegal. In the petition, appellees challenged as illegal the names of 60 voters to which later 2 more were added, making a total of 62, it being alleged that their votes were illegal because cast openly.

It also challenged as illegal the names of 16 voters whose votes were cast in this precinct, it being alleged that none of them were qualified voters of this precinct when they voted. In their answer and intervening petition appellants challenged 19 votes cast in the precinct, some of them being among those listed by appellees.

In its judgment the lower court found and adjudged that 3 of those challenged in this precinct did not vote at all in this election and the stubs of the ballot book [394]*394filed as an exhibit confirmed this. It found and adjudged that the remaining 59 voters of the list of 62 voters challenged for open voting had voted openly on the table and so exposed their ballots that others saw how they voted. The court further found that all of them voted “yes” and the vote of this precinct was purged of these 59 votes for open voting.

Of the list of 16 voters challenged by the appellees as not being qualified voters, the lower court found that 8 of them were illegal voters for other reasons than that they voted openly; further held that they all voted “yes” and the vote of this precinct was purged of these 8 votes. The judgment further purged the names of 2 voters who had been challenged by the appellants. The court found from the evidence that they were illegal voters and had voted “no.” The judgment of the court therefore purged and deducted from the certified vote of this precinct 67 “yes” votes and 2 “no” votes.

The evidence as to the voting on the table rests largely on the testimony of the two dry election officers, Newt Lefevers, a judge, and Charlie Hammons, designated as clerk, but who seems to have acted as a judge instead because of his inability to write rapidly or legibly. Lefevers testified that practically half of the 148 voters who voted at Cardinal precinct on that day voted openly; that he told them to go into the booth which some would do and others refuse to do; that the .other officers never told them to go to the booth or encouraged them to do so. He was handed a list of 60 names challenged by appellees, as set out in their petition, and he testified that from his own knowledge all of them voted openly on the table and that they voted “yes.” He further testified that Ed Simpson, one of the “wet” election officers, and not on the challenged list, voted on the table and voted “yes.”

On cross-examination he admitted that he did not make a list of the voters as they voted and the list of 60 names was made up afterwards by him from memory. It was also shown on the cross-examination, by reference to the stub book, that three of those named by him did not vote at all that day, but he insisted that someone called for a ballot in each of their names and voted them. This is refuted by the absence of the names of these three on the stub book.

[395]*395Charlie Hammons, the other “dry” election officer, corroborated to some extent the testimony of Lefever testifying that of a list of 60 voters handed him, as set out in the petition, with the additional name of Ed Simpson, “wet” election officer, all voted openly on the table and voted “yes.”

In contradiction to the above testimony, appellants brought in as witnesses 11 of those challenged as having voted openly and all of them testified that they voted in the booth secretly. In addition, they brought in eight of those challenged as having voted openly and having .voted “yes,” and all of them testified that they voted openly on the table, but voted “no.”

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Related

Hendrickson v. Coign
200 S.W.2d 905 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1947)
Franklin v. Helton
183 S.W.2d 532 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1944)
Helton v. Franklin
178 S.W.2d 844 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1944)

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Bluebook (online)
231 S.W.2d 18, 313 Ky. 390, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 866, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/miracle-v-robbins-kyctapp-1950.