Mion v. Atlantic Marble & Tile Co.

9 S.E.2d 501, 217 N.C. 743, 1940 N.C. LEXIS 339
CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina
DecidedJune 8, 1940
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 9 S.E.2d 501 (Mion v. Atlantic Marble & Tile Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mion v. Atlantic Marble & Tile Co., 9 S.E.2d 501, 217 N.C. 743, 1940 N.C. LEXIS 339 (N.C. 1940).

Opinion

*747 Winborne, J.

Upon the evidence appearing in the record on tbis appeal, tbe findings of fact upon which the award of the Industrial Commission as affirmed by judgment of the Superior Court is based, appears to be supported by the evidence except with respect to the average weekly wage. We consider the questions in order:

1. Is there sufficient evidence to support the finding of fact that the 'injury to Alfred Mion, admittedly by accident and resulting in his death, arose out of and in the course of his employment by the Atlantic Marble & Tile Company within the meaning of the North Carolina 'Workmen’s Compensation Act? Public Laws 1929, chapter 120, as amended. We are of opinion and hold that there is.

As of the date of the happening of the accident, 1 August, 1938, the evidence tends to show, among others, these pertinent facts: The Atlantic Marble & Tile Company, whose only office was in Charlotte, North Carolina, had a contract to do tile work in the Curtis Johnson residence in the State of South Carolina, about fifteen miles from Charlotte. It had six men at work there, Albert Calvinson, foreman, Alfred Mion and four others. These employees on the morning of that day were transported by the company from its office in Charlotte — the foreman and two others in a truck, and Mion and another in the president’s sedan, but Albert Boldrini went in his own Ford. At the close of work for the day on the job, the company was supposed to furnish transportation from the job to the office. For that purpose the foreman told the driver of the truck to be at the place of the job around 4:30 p.m., but as it was raining he came in the president’s sedan. When Alfred Mion came to the car to begin the return trip to Charlotte, six, including the driver, were already in same. There was not any room for him unless he sat in the lap of one of the others. However, the foreman testified that when Mion came up “I said, Come on if you want to sit in somebody’s lap, if you want to ride here but if you want to ride with Boldrini. I suggested that he ride with Boldrini.” Thereupon, Mion rode with Boldrini in his car. The wreck occurred in North Carolina on the way to and before reaching the office of the company, and Mion was killed.

The evidence further tends to show that it was customary for Mion and other employees to report to and check in at the office in the morning, and to return there at the close of the day to get instructions as to where he or they should work the next day, and then to check out. They were paid wages for the time intervening. Mion was in the act of returning to the office to get instructions for the next day and to check out when he was killed.

In the light of this evidence this case does not come within the rule that ordinarily injury by accident, while the employee is going to or returning from his work in a conveyance of a third person over which *748 the employer has no control, does not arise out of or in the course of his employment. See Smith v. Gastonia, 216 N. C., 517, 5 S. E. (2d), 540, and cases cited. But, rather, the evidence tends to show that at the time of the accident Mion was actually in the course of his employment, performing a part of his duty thereunder and for which he was being paid the same as when actually laying tile. Also, from the suggestion of the foreman it may be inferred that the employer thereby-undertook to perform its obligation to transport Mion to the office in Boldrini’s car. The cases of Hunt v. State, 201 N. C., 707, 161 S. E., 203, and Martin v. State Highway Board (Ga.), 189 S. E., 614, relied upon by appellants are distinguishable from the present case.

2. Is there evidence sufficient to support the findings of fact and award as against the United States Casualty Company? "We are of opinion and hold that there is.

There is evidence tending to show that: Prior to 5 June, 1938, Atlantic Marble & Tile Company carried workmen’s compensation insurance in the United States Casualty Company covering its liability in each of the States of South Carolina and North Carolina — the policy' for South Carolina expiring on 5 June, 1938, and that for North Carolina on 5 September, 1938. As these policies expired neither was renewed. But, in lieu thereof, the Atlantic Marble & Tile Company first took out a policy, dated 5 June, 1938, in the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company to cover its workmen’s compensation liability in the State of South Carolina effective on that date, and then by rider attached to the said policy for South Carolina, extended the coverage so as to include its workmen’s compensation liability in the State of North Carolina— effective 5 September, 1938. There is conflict of evidence as to whether this rider-stated the effective date to be 5 June, 1938, or 5 September, 1938. The Commission makes no specific finding on the question. However, regarding what it terms “the main controversy . . . as to which of the two insurance companies shall be required to pay for the death of the deceased,” by finding that the United States Casualty Company was the compensation insurance carrier in North Carolina on 1 August, 1938, the Commission finds inferentially that this rider was not a part of the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company policy on that date.

By the terms of the policy in question issued by the United States Casualty Company, a standard workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability policy, that company in effect agreed with the Atlantic Marble & Tile Company, as respects personal injuries sustained by employees, including death at any time resulting therefrom, to pay to any person entitled thereto under the North Carolina "Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, and in the manner therein provided, “the entire amount of *749 any sum due, and all installments thereof as they become due.” It is provided in the policy that: “This agreement shall apply to such injuries so sustained by reason of the business operations described in said declarations which, for the purpose of this insurance, shall include all operations necessary, incident or appurtenant thereto, or connected therewith, whether such operations are conducted at the work places defined and described in said declarations or elsewhere in connection with, or in relation to, such work places.” The business operations are described in the declaration in this manner: “Item 3. Locations of all factories, shops, yards, buildings, premises or other work places of this Employer, by Town or City, with Street and Number: Charlotte, North Carolina, and Elsewhere in North Carolina. All business operations, including the operative management and superintendence thereof, conducted at or from the locations and premises defined above as declared in each instance by a disclosure of estimated remuneration of employees under such of the following Divisions as are undertaken by this Employer: 1.- — -All industrial operations upon the premises. 2.- — All office forces. 3.- — All repairs or alterations to premises. 4. — Operations not on the premises.”

Pertinent evidence is sufficient to bring the instant case within these terms of the policy.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
9 S.E.2d 501, 217 N.C. 743, 1940 N.C. LEXIS 339, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mion-v-atlantic-marble-tile-co-nc-1940.