'WiNbokne, J.
Tbe sole question bere is tbis: Considering tbe evidence shown in tbe record on tbis appeal in tbe light most favorable to plaintiff, is there sufficient evidence to take tbe case to tbe jury as against tbe defendant Town of Murphy? Tbe trial court did not consider it sufficient for tbis purpose. And in tbis ruling error is not made to appear.
In an action for recovery of damages for injury resulting from actionable negligence of defendant, plaintiff must show: (1) That there has been a failure on the part of defendant to exercise proper care in tbe performance of some legal duty which t,he defendant owed tbe plaintiff under tbe circumstances in which they were placed. And (2) that such negligent breach of duty was tbe proximate cause of tbe injury, a cause that produced tbe result in continuous sequence, and without which it would not have occurred, and one from which a man of ordinary prudence could have foreseen that such result was probable under tbe facts as they existed.
Whitt v. Rand,
187 N.C. 805, 123 S.E. 84;
Murray v. R. R.,
218 N.C. 392, 11 S.E. 2d 326;
Mills v. Moore,
219 N.C. 25, 12 S.E. 2d 661;
Luttrell v. Mineral Co.,
220 N.C. 782, 18 S.E. 2d 412;
Mitchell v. Melts,
220 N.C. 793, 18 S.E. 2d 406;
Harris v. Montgomery Ward,
230 N.C. 485, 53 S.E. 2d 536;
McIntyre v. Elevator Co.,
230 N.C. 539, 54 S.E. 2d 45;
Spivey v. Newman,
232 N.C. 281, 59 S.E. 2d 844;
Baker v. R. R.,
232 N.C. 523, 61 S.E. 2d 621.
If tbe evidence fails to establish either one of tbe essential elements of actionable negligence, tbe judgment of nonsuit is proper.
Luttrell v. Mineral Co., supra; Mitchell v. Melts, supra; Thomas v. Motor Lines,
230 N.C. 122, 52 S.E. 2d 377.
And tbe principle prevails in tbis State that what is negligence is a question of law, and when tbe facts are admitted or established, tbe court must say whether it does or does not exist. “This rule extends and applies not only to tbe question of negligent breach of duty, but also to the feature of proximate cause.”
Hoke, J.,
in
Hicks v. Mfg. Co.,
138 N.C. 319, 50 S.E. 703;
Russell v. R. R.,
118 N.C. 1098, 24 S.E. 512;
Lineberry v. R. R.,
187 N.C. 786, 123 S.E. 1;
Clinard v. Electric Co.,
192 N.C. 736,
136 S.E. 1;
Murray v. R. R., supra; Reeves v. Staley,
220 N.C. 573, 18 S.E. 2d 239;
Luttrell v. Mineral Co., supra; Balter v. R. R., supra.
In
Lineberry v. R. R., supra,
in opinion by
Clarkson, J.,
it is said: “It is well settled that where the facts are all admitted, and only one inference may be drawn from them, the court will declare whether an act was the proximate cause of the injury or not.” See also
Nichols v. Goldston,
228 N.C. 514, 46 S.E. 2d 320;
Baker v. R. R., supra.
Furthermore, it is proper in negligence cases to sustain a demurrer to the evidence and enter judgment as of nonsuit under provision of G.S. 1-183, “(1) When all the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fails to show any actionable negligence on the part of defendant . . . (2) When it clearly appears from the evidence that the injury complained of was independently and proximately produced by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any outside agency or responsible third person . . . ,”
Stacy, C. J.,
in
Smith v. Sink,
211 N.C. 725, 192 S.E. 108, and cases cited in respect to each principle. See also
Boyd v. R. R.,
200 N.C. 324, 156 S.E. 507;
Powers v. Sternberg,
213 N.C. 41, 195 S.E. 88;
Butner v. Speas,
217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E. 2d 808;
Murray v. R. R., supra; Luttrell v. Mineral Co., supra; Riggs v. Motor Lines,
233 N.C. 160, 63 S.E. 2d 197.
In
Smith v. Sink, supra,
it is also said: “We had occasion to examine anew this doctrine of insulating the conduct of one, even when it amounts to passive negligence, by the intervention of the active negligence of an independent agency or third party, as applied to variant fact situations, in the recent case of
Beach v. Patton,
208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446,” and others cited. Then, continuing, “These decisions, and others, are in full support and approval of Mr. Wharton’s statement in his valuable work on Negligence (Sec. 134) : ‘Supposing that if it had not been for the intervention of a responsible third party the defendant’s negligence would have produced no damage to the plaintiff, is the defendant liable to the plaintiff? This question must be answered in the negative, for the general reason that causal connection between negligence and damage is broken by the interposition of independent responsible human action. I am negligent on a particular subject matter. Another person, moving independently, comes in, and either negligently or maliciously so acts as to make my negligence injurious to a third person. If so, the person so intervening acts as a nonconductor, and insulates my negligence, so that I cannot be sued for the mischief which the person so intervening directly produces. He is the one who is liable to the person injured.’ ” Then there follows, to like effect, a quotation from
R. R. v. Kellogg,
94 U.S. 469. See also
Butner v. Speas, supra; Riggs v. Motor Lines, supra.
A municipal corporation, engaged in the business of supplying electricity for private advantage and emolument is, as to this, regarded as a private corporation, — and, in such capacity is liable to persons injured
by the actionable negligence of its servants, agents and employees.
Fisher v. New Bern,
140 N.C. 506, 53 S.E. 342;
Harrington v. Wades
boro, 153 N.C. 437, 69 S.E. 399;
Rice v. Lumberton, ante,
227.
And this Court declared in
Helms v. Power Co.,
192 N.C. 784, 136 S.E. 9, that: “Electric companies áre required to use reasonable care in tbe construction and maintenance of tbeir lines and apparatus. The degree of care which, will satisfy this requirement varies, of course, with the circumstances, but it must always be commensurate with the dangers involved, and where the wires maintained by á company are designed to carry a strong and powerful current of electricity, the law imposes upon the company the duty of exercising the utmost care and prudence consistent with the practical operation of its business to avoid injury to those likely to come in contact with the wires.”
And in
Small v. Utilities Co.,
200 N.C. 719, 158 S.E. 385, it is said that, “Due to the deadly and latently dangerous character of electricity, the degree of care required of persons, corporate or individual, furnishing electric light and power to others for private gain, has been variously stated.” Then after reciting such expressions, the Court said: “In approving these formulas as to the degree of care required in such cases, it is not to be supposed that there is a varying standard of duty by which the responsibility for negligence is to be determined . . .
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'WiNbokne, J.
Tbe sole question bere is tbis: Considering tbe evidence shown in tbe record on tbis appeal in tbe light most favorable to plaintiff, is there sufficient evidence to take tbe case to tbe jury as against tbe defendant Town of Murphy? Tbe trial court did not consider it sufficient for tbis purpose. And in tbis ruling error is not made to appear.
In an action for recovery of damages for injury resulting from actionable negligence of defendant, plaintiff must show: (1) That there has been a failure on the part of defendant to exercise proper care in tbe performance of some legal duty which t,he defendant owed tbe plaintiff under tbe circumstances in which they were placed. And (2) that such negligent breach of duty was tbe proximate cause of tbe injury, a cause that produced tbe result in continuous sequence, and without which it would not have occurred, and one from which a man of ordinary prudence could have foreseen that such result was probable under tbe facts as they existed.
Whitt v. Rand,
187 N.C. 805, 123 S.E. 84;
Murray v. R. R.,
218 N.C. 392, 11 S.E. 2d 326;
Mills v. Moore,
219 N.C. 25, 12 S.E. 2d 661;
Luttrell v. Mineral Co.,
220 N.C. 782, 18 S.E. 2d 412;
Mitchell v. Melts,
220 N.C. 793, 18 S.E. 2d 406;
Harris v. Montgomery Ward,
230 N.C. 485, 53 S.E. 2d 536;
McIntyre v. Elevator Co.,
230 N.C. 539, 54 S.E. 2d 45;
Spivey v. Newman,
232 N.C. 281, 59 S.E. 2d 844;
Baker v. R. R.,
232 N.C. 523, 61 S.E. 2d 621.
If tbe evidence fails to establish either one of tbe essential elements of actionable negligence, tbe judgment of nonsuit is proper.
Luttrell v. Mineral Co., supra; Mitchell v. Melts, supra; Thomas v. Motor Lines,
230 N.C. 122, 52 S.E. 2d 377.
And tbe principle prevails in tbis State that what is negligence is a question of law, and when tbe facts are admitted or established, tbe court must say whether it does or does not exist. “This rule extends and applies not only to tbe question of negligent breach of duty, but also to the feature of proximate cause.”
Hoke, J.,
in
Hicks v. Mfg. Co.,
138 N.C. 319, 50 S.E. 703;
Russell v. R. R.,
118 N.C. 1098, 24 S.E. 512;
Lineberry v. R. R.,
187 N.C. 786, 123 S.E. 1;
Clinard v. Electric Co.,
192 N.C. 736,
136 S.E. 1;
Murray v. R. R., supra; Reeves v. Staley,
220 N.C. 573, 18 S.E. 2d 239;
Luttrell v. Mineral Co., supra; Balter v. R. R., supra.
In
Lineberry v. R. R., supra,
in opinion by
Clarkson, J.,
it is said: “It is well settled that where the facts are all admitted, and only one inference may be drawn from them, the court will declare whether an act was the proximate cause of the injury or not.” See also
Nichols v. Goldston,
228 N.C. 514, 46 S.E. 2d 320;
Baker v. R. R., supra.
Furthermore, it is proper in negligence cases to sustain a demurrer to the evidence and enter judgment as of nonsuit under provision of G.S. 1-183, “(1) When all the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fails to show any actionable negligence on the part of defendant . . . (2) When it clearly appears from the evidence that the injury complained of was independently and proximately produced by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any outside agency or responsible third person . . . ,”
Stacy, C. J.,
in
Smith v. Sink,
211 N.C. 725, 192 S.E. 108, and cases cited in respect to each principle. See also
Boyd v. R. R.,
200 N.C. 324, 156 S.E. 507;
Powers v. Sternberg,
213 N.C. 41, 195 S.E. 88;
Butner v. Speas,
217 N.C. 82, 6 S.E. 2d 808;
Murray v. R. R., supra; Luttrell v. Mineral Co., supra; Riggs v. Motor Lines,
233 N.C. 160, 63 S.E. 2d 197.
In
Smith v. Sink, supra,
it is also said: “We had occasion to examine anew this doctrine of insulating the conduct of one, even when it amounts to passive negligence, by the intervention of the active negligence of an independent agency or third party, as applied to variant fact situations, in the recent case of
Beach v. Patton,
208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446,” and others cited. Then, continuing, “These decisions, and others, are in full support and approval of Mr. Wharton’s statement in his valuable work on Negligence (Sec. 134) : ‘Supposing that if it had not been for the intervention of a responsible third party the defendant’s negligence would have produced no damage to the plaintiff, is the defendant liable to the plaintiff? This question must be answered in the negative, for the general reason that causal connection between negligence and damage is broken by the interposition of independent responsible human action. I am negligent on a particular subject matter. Another person, moving independently, comes in, and either negligently or maliciously so acts as to make my negligence injurious to a third person. If so, the person so intervening acts as a nonconductor, and insulates my negligence, so that I cannot be sued for the mischief which the person so intervening directly produces. He is the one who is liable to the person injured.’ ” Then there follows, to like effect, a quotation from
R. R. v. Kellogg,
94 U.S. 469. See also
Butner v. Speas, supra; Riggs v. Motor Lines, supra.
A municipal corporation, engaged in the business of supplying electricity for private advantage and emolument is, as to this, regarded as a private corporation, — and, in such capacity is liable to persons injured
by the actionable negligence of its servants, agents and employees.
Fisher v. New Bern,
140 N.C. 506, 53 S.E. 342;
Harrington v. Wades
boro, 153 N.C. 437, 69 S.E. 399;
Rice v. Lumberton, ante,
227.
And this Court declared in
Helms v. Power Co.,
192 N.C. 784, 136 S.E. 9, that: “Electric companies áre required to use reasonable care in tbe construction and maintenance of tbeir lines and apparatus. The degree of care which, will satisfy this requirement varies, of course, with the circumstances, but it must always be commensurate with the dangers involved, and where the wires maintained by á company are designed to carry a strong and powerful current of electricity, the law imposes upon the company the duty of exercising the utmost care and prudence consistent with the practical operation of its business to avoid injury to those likely to come in contact with the wires.”
And in
Small v. Utilities Co.,
200 N.C. 719, 158 S.E. 385, it is said that, “Due to the deadly and latently dangerous character of electricity, the degree of care required of persons, corporate or individual, furnishing electric light and power to others for private gain, has been variously stated.” Then after reciting such expressions, the Court said: “In approving these formulas as to the degree of care required in such cases, it is not to be supposed that there is a varying standard of duty by which the responsibility for negligence is to be determined . . . The standard is always the rule of the prudent man, or the care which a prudent man ought to use under like circumstances. What reasonable care is, of course, varies in different cases and in the presence of different conditions.”
Moreover, we find it stated in 18 Am. Jur. 491-2, subject Electricity, Sec. 97, “That the duty of providing insulation should be limited to those points or places where there is reason to apprehend that persons may come in contact with the wires, is only reasonable. Therefore, the law does not compel companies to insulate . . . their wires everywhere, but only at places where people may legitimately go for work, business, or pleasure, that is, where they may be reasonably expected to go. The same rule applies with equal, if not greater, force in regard to placing warning signs.” This principle is recognized by this Court in
Ellis v. Power Co.,
193 N.C. 357, 137 S.E. 163. See also 29 C.J.S. 582—Electricity, Sec. 42.
The mere maintenance of high tension transmission line is not wrongful, and in order to hold the owner negligent, when an injury occurs, he must be shown to have omitted some precaution which he should have taken. 18 Am. Jur. 490—Electricity, Sec. 96.
On the other hand, the law imposes upon a person
sui juris
the obligation to use ordinary care for his own protection, and the degree of such care should be commensurate with the danger to be avoided. Since the danger from uninsulated or otherwise defective wires is proportionate to the amount of electricity so transmitted, contact with such wires
should be avoided where their existence is known. Where a person seeing such a wire knows that it is, or may be highly dangerous, it is his duty to avoid coming in contact therewith .... See 18 Am. Jur. 471, Electricity 76. See also
Rice v. Lumberton, ante,
227.
Furthermore, it may be conceded, for purposes of this appeal, that the State Highway and Public Works Commission is vested with authority to control the uses to which the easements acquired by the State for public highway purposes, may be put,
Hildebrand v. Telegraph
Co., 219 N.C. 402, 14 S.E. 2d 252; and that in the exercise of such authority the Commission had the right to call upon the Town of Murphy to remove so much of its electric transmission line as interfered with the re-location and improvement of portions of Highway No. 64. And the evidence discloses that the Town of Murphy was co-operating with the request of the Commission in this respect.
Angl applying the principles of law here stated to the evidence offered by plaintiff, such evidence fails to make out a case of actionable negligence. If it should be conceded that the evidence tends to show that defendant failed to maintain its transmission line in accordance with its legal duty, the evidence fails to show that such failure was a proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff. On the other hand, it clearly appears from the evidence that the injury of which plaintiff complains was “independently and proximately produced by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of an outside agency or responsible third person.” There would have been no injury to plaintiff but for the intervening wrongful act, neglect or default of those in control of and operating the derrick, over which defendant had no control, and of which defendant had no knowledge.
The judgment below is
Affirmed.