Minor L. McNeil v. Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration; Robert Pugh, Manager; And Wade Gambill, Auditor
This text of 2021 Ark. App. 408 (Minor L. McNeil v. Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration; Robert Pugh, Manager; And Wade Gambill, Auditor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Cite as 2021 Ark. App. 408 Elizabeth Perry I attest to the accuracy and ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS integrity of this document DIVISION I 2023.07.13 11:26:35 -05'00' No. CV-20-616 2023.003.20244
MINOR L. MCNEIL OPINION DELIVERED October 27, 2021 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, V. TWELFTH DIVISION [NO. 60CV-20-2487] ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION; HONORABLE ALICE S. GRAY, ROBERT PUGH, MANAGER; AND JUDGE WADE GAMBILL, AUDITOR APPELLEES AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Minor McNeil brings this pro se appeal of the September 14, 2020 Pulaski County
Circuit Court order of dismissal with prejudice of his complaint for the return of private
property, specifically in the form of taxes he claimed were illegally collected. McNeil argues
multiple issues including constitutionality claims, state-taxation authority, reservation of
power, private-property questions, and de facto government allegations related to his most
recent lawsuit against the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA).
Because McNeil has failed to make any argument on appeal relating to the actual bases on
which his lawsuit was dismissed, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
A long-standing disagreement has been established during multiple previous lawsuits
between McNeil and DFA regarding what the Arkansas Constitution defines as the reserved immunities of its people; what Arkansas taxing statutes clearly state—as passed by the
legislature; and how those laws vary from the way in which DFA interprets and administers
its tax programs.
Since 2006, McNeil has communicated with DFA during each annual “tax return”
period and has submitted requests for the refund of his private property from DFA—
property that he maintains has not been described in the Arkansas taxing statutes under its
definitions found there, as “gross income” or a gain being “derived” therefrom. McNeil
submits that his property was taken pursuant to a payroll-deduction “scheme” authorized
by the state legislature. He maintains that the amount of his private property that has been
illegally taken now exceeds $50,000 and is ongoing as evidenced by records of this history
in DFA’s possession.
McNeil has been before the Arkansas Supreme Court regarding virtually these same
issues. See McNeil v. Weiss, 2011 Ark. 46, 378 S.W.3d 133. He has also raised these issues in
a federal case, which made it to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, see McNeil v. United
States, 125 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2020-2604, (E.D. Ark. June 22, 2020), aff’d, 839 F. App’x
29 (8th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
Then, as now, still in contemplation of the alleged unconstitutional behavior of the
State of Arkansas and its administrative agencies, McNeil argues that the State of Arkansas
and DFA’s acts are in violation of its constitution as well as our supreme court’s own
precedent in Simms v. Ahrens, 167 Ark. 557, 271 S.W. 720 (1925). McNeil argues that, after
many additional years of research, the record of the circuit court below proves beyond any
doubt that the now de facto corporate State of Arkansas is an instrumentality of a unitary
2 military government engaged in war against the American people and using those belligerent
powers to take private property as an act of treason.
McNeil urges that he has been deprived of due process in Arkansas by having been
refused a jury trial on the issues presented below. He maintains that the circuit court denied
his right and followed the directions of DFA’s counsel by dismissing the case with prejudice
in a treasonous act. He maintains that the court’s decision was made despite DFA’s having
made no appearance in court, having provided no testimony, nor having offered any
evidence in response to McNeil’s complaint.
McNeil’s first complaint in this particular lawsuit against DFA was dismissed without
prejudice. On April 3, 2020, McNeil filed his second complaint, which he titled “Complaint
for Return of Private Property for Return of Taxes Illegally Collected 1.26-18-507(e)(2)
Judicial Relief” (“Complaint”). McNeil’s Complaint and briefs appear to contest the legal
authority of the State of Arkansas to levy on wages its income tax and income-tax
withholding on grounds that the State of Arkansas is engaged in treason with the federal
government and therefore does not exist.
On May 7, DFA moved to dismiss for several failures of the Complaint, namely (1)
failure to state facts that would establish jurisdiction over the subject matter with the court;
(2) failure to state facts on which relief can be granted; and (3) failure to join a necessary
party. In its September 9 order to dismiss with prejudice McNeil’s complaint against DFA,
the circuit court “grant[ed DFA’s] Motion to Dismiss for all the reasons set forth therein.”
The reasons stated in DFA’s motion to dismiss included (1) that McNeil failed to state facts
3 upon which relief can be granted, (2) that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and (3) that McNeil failed to join a necessary party.
In McNeil, 2011 Ark. 46, at 4, 378 S.W.3d at 135, our supreme court affirmed the
circuit court order of dismissal of Mc Neil’s lawsuit:
To summarize, based on the fact that McNeil has only presented arguments not decided by the circuit court, failed to make any argument on appeal relating to why his case was actually dismissed, and because his brief is almost entirely incomprehensible as a legal brief, this court must affirm the circuit court’s order of dismissal. See Widmer v. Taylor, 296 Ark. 337, 756 S.W.2d 903 (1988) (affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint, in part, because his brief was “an incoherent conglomeration of statements and arguments which cannot be fairly characterized as a legal brief”).
Because McNeil likewise failed to raise any argument in his brief regarding the
specific bases on which the circuit court dismissed his lawsuit, we decline to address the
issues he does raise and must affirm the findings in the September 9, 2020 order of dismissal.
Affirmed.
ABRAMSON and KLAPPENBACH, JJ., agree.
Minor L. McNeil, pro se appellant.
James Christopher McNeal, Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. Off. of Revenue Legal
Counsel, for appellee.
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