Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 309 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-24-662
MINOR CHILD Opinion Delivered May 14, 2025 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 35JV-24-9] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE EARNEST E. BROWN, JR., JUDGE
AFFIRMED
MIKE MURPHY, Judge
Appellant Minor Child (MC) appeals from the circuit court’s adjudication of his
delinquency on charges of theft by receiving, a Class B felony. 1 MC’s sole point on appeal is
that the circuit court erred by failing to grant his motion to dismiss when there was
insufficient proof of knowledge or possession to support a finding of delinquency for theft
by receiving. We affirm.
An amended petition alleging delinquency was filed against MC and provided that
on January 19, 2024, “[MC], in concert with Raymond Chastain (an adult), was in possession
1 Theft by receiving is a Class B felony if the value of the property is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or more. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106(e)(1) (Repl. 2024). of a gray 2018 Hyundai Sonata, valued at approximately thirty thousand dollars, that was
reported stolen out of Stuttgart early that same day.”
During the adjudication proceeding, the State put on four witnesses. The owner of
the vehicle and her boyfriend testified that the boyfriend used the car to drive to work at
Stuttgart’s Riceland Foods. The boyfriend testified that he works the night shift, so he arrived
to work at 10:00 p.m. on January 18, and when he went to the parking lot for his break at
3:00 a.m., the car was missing. He reported the car stolen. Once the car was located, the
owner of the car testified that it was not damaged. She testified that she did not give MC
permission to use her car and that she does not know him and only recognized him from
seeing him around town.
Two Pine Bluff police officers testified that witnesses spotted the car in Pine Bluff
later that same morning. When the Pine Bluff police were dispatched to the Huddle House
restaurant just after 2:00 p.m. that same day, two individuals were found asleep inside the
vehicle. MC was in the passenger seat, and Chastain was in the driver’s seat. They were
awakened and ordered out of the vehicle. Chastain and MC were compliant with the
command. Officers searched the vehicle but did not find any other illegal items inside the
vehicle.
One of the officers testified that Chastain gave a statement after being Mirandized.
In the statement, Chastain said that he just caught a ride with some people to meet a woman
in Pine Bluff. He did not know who the other people were in the car, but they asked him
2 and MC to sit in the vehicle “because they were going to go do something.” Chastain said
he does not know MC but that MC rode with him from Stuttgart to Pine Bluff.
At the close of the State’s case, MC’s counsel moved for dismissal, asserting that the
State had not met its burden with respect to proof of knowledge or possession. The court
noted that the evidence presented was sufficient to surpass the motion and denied it but
continued the delinquency adjudication and held the record open for the parties to submit
briefs on the issue. The proceeding was continued until after the briefs were submitted, and
once it resumed, the motion to dismiss was renewed and again denied, and the defense rested
without calling witnesses. The court adjudicated MC delinquent and sentenced him to one
year of probation subject to several conditions of supervision, fines, and fees. MC appealed.
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding is the
same as in a criminal case: the test for determining sufficient proof is whether there is
substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the verdict. D.F. v. State, 2015 Ark.
App. 656, at 3, 476 S.W.3d 189, 191. On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State and sustain the conviction if there is any substantial evidence to
support it. Id. Evidence is substantial if it is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to
reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. In determining whether
there is substantial evidence, we consider only that evidence tending to support the verdict.
Id. We do not weigh the evidence presented at trial because that is a matter for the fact-
finder. Id. Where, as here, the trial is before the bench, the trial judge sits as fact-finder. Id.
3 MC was charged with theft by receiving. A person commits the offense of theft by
receiving if he or she receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property of another person
knowing that the property was stolen or having good reason to believe the property was
stolen. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106(a) (Repl. 2024). “Receiving,” as used in this section,
means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of the property. Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-36-106(b). The unexplained possession or control by the person of recently
stolen property gives rise to a presumption that a person knows or believes that the property
was stolen. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106(c)(1).
As an initial matter, MC argues that the presumption set forth in section 5-36-
106(c)(1) is unconstitutional. MC made passing references to the argument. However,
without further development or a ruling from the court, the issue is not preserved. See
Schermerhorn v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 395, at 4, 500 S.W.3d 181, 183 (“An ironclad rule of
law is that an appellant must raise an issue in the circuit court and support it with a sufficient
argument and legal authority, if there is any, to preserve it for an appeal.”).
Next, MC argues he was a mere passenger, and there were no attendant circumstances
giving rise to a finding of knowledge or possession. Theft by receiving requires at least
constructive possession of the stolen property, which means the person has both the power
and the intent to control that property. D.F. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 656, at 7–8, 476 S.W.3d
189, 194. In Avett v. State, 325 Ark. 320, 322, 928 S.W.2d 326, 327 (1996), the supreme
court found that being a passenger in a stolen vehicle is not, standing alone, enough to
establish constructive possession. However, a conviction for theft by receiving based on other
4 corroborative evidence of guilt will be upheld. See Riddle v. State, 303 Ark. 42, 44, 791 S.W.2d
708, 709 (1990) (affirming because of the appellant’s presence in the stolen vehicle along
with the additional incriminating factors of his flight from the police and his violent attempt
to avoid capture).
In this case, the theory of accomplice liability was implicated. One is an accomplice
if he renders the requisite aid or encouragement to the principal with regard to the offense
at issue. Henson v. State, 94 Ark. App. 163, 168, 227 S.W.3d 450, 453–54 (2006). When two
people assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally
liable for the conduct of both. Id. One cannot disclaim accomplice liability simply because
he did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Id.
Here, the State provided sufficient evidence to prove that MC was an accomplice with
Chastain in the crime of theft by receiving. Evidence established that MC rode in the stolen
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Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 309 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-24-662
MINOR CHILD Opinion Delivered May 14, 2025 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 35JV-24-9] STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE HONORABLE EARNEST E. BROWN, JR., JUDGE
AFFIRMED
MIKE MURPHY, Judge
Appellant Minor Child (MC) appeals from the circuit court’s adjudication of his
delinquency on charges of theft by receiving, a Class B felony. 1 MC’s sole point on appeal is
that the circuit court erred by failing to grant his motion to dismiss when there was
insufficient proof of knowledge or possession to support a finding of delinquency for theft
by receiving. We affirm.
An amended petition alleging delinquency was filed against MC and provided that
on January 19, 2024, “[MC], in concert with Raymond Chastain (an adult), was in possession
1 Theft by receiving is a Class B felony if the value of the property is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or more. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106(e)(1) (Repl. 2024). of a gray 2018 Hyundai Sonata, valued at approximately thirty thousand dollars, that was
reported stolen out of Stuttgart early that same day.”
During the adjudication proceeding, the State put on four witnesses. The owner of
the vehicle and her boyfriend testified that the boyfriend used the car to drive to work at
Stuttgart’s Riceland Foods. The boyfriend testified that he works the night shift, so he arrived
to work at 10:00 p.m. on January 18, and when he went to the parking lot for his break at
3:00 a.m., the car was missing. He reported the car stolen. Once the car was located, the
owner of the car testified that it was not damaged. She testified that she did not give MC
permission to use her car and that she does not know him and only recognized him from
seeing him around town.
Two Pine Bluff police officers testified that witnesses spotted the car in Pine Bluff
later that same morning. When the Pine Bluff police were dispatched to the Huddle House
restaurant just after 2:00 p.m. that same day, two individuals were found asleep inside the
vehicle. MC was in the passenger seat, and Chastain was in the driver’s seat. They were
awakened and ordered out of the vehicle. Chastain and MC were compliant with the
command. Officers searched the vehicle but did not find any other illegal items inside the
vehicle.
One of the officers testified that Chastain gave a statement after being Mirandized.
In the statement, Chastain said that he just caught a ride with some people to meet a woman
in Pine Bluff. He did not know who the other people were in the car, but they asked him
2 and MC to sit in the vehicle “because they were going to go do something.” Chastain said
he does not know MC but that MC rode with him from Stuttgart to Pine Bluff.
At the close of the State’s case, MC’s counsel moved for dismissal, asserting that the
State had not met its burden with respect to proof of knowledge or possession. The court
noted that the evidence presented was sufficient to surpass the motion and denied it but
continued the delinquency adjudication and held the record open for the parties to submit
briefs on the issue. The proceeding was continued until after the briefs were submitted, and
once it resumed, the motion to dismiss was renewed and again denied, and the defense rested
without calling witnesses. The court adjudicated MC delinquent and sentenced him to one
year of probation subject to several conditions of supervision, fines, and fees. MC appealed.
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding is the
same as in a criminal case: the test for determining sufficient proof is whether there is
substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the verdict. D.F. v. State, 2015 Ark.
App. 656, at 3, 476 S.W.3d 189, 191. On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State and sustain the conviction if there is any substantial evidence to
support it. Id. Evidence is substantial if it is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to
reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. In determining whether
there is substantial evidence, we consider only that evidence tending to support the verdict.
Id. We do not weigh the evidence presented at trial because that is a matter for the fact-
finder. Id. Where, as here, the trial is before the bench, the trial judge sits as fact-finder. Id.
3 MC was charged with theft by receiving. A person commits the offense of theft by
receiving if he or she receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property of another person
knowing that the property was stolen or having good reason to believe the property was
stolen. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106(a) (Repl. 2024). “Receiving,” as used in this section,
means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of the property. Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-36-106(b). The unexplained possession or control by the person of recently
stolen property gives rise to a presumption that a person knows or believes that the property
was stolen. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106(c)(1).
As an initial matter, MC argues that the presumption set forth in section 5-36-
106(c)(1) is unconstitutional. MC made passing references to the argument. However,
without further development or a ruling from the court, the issue is not preserved. See
Schermerhorn v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 395, at 4, 500 S.W.3d 181, 183 (“An ironclad rule of
law is that an appellant must raise an issue in the circuit court and support it with a sufficient
argument and legal authority, if there is any, to preserve it for an appeal.”).
Next, MC argues he was a mere passenger, and there were no attendant circumstances
giving rise to a finding of knowledge or possession. Theft by receiving requires at least
constructive possession of the stolen property, which means the person has both the power
and the intent to control that property. D.F. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 656, at 7–8, 476 S.W.3d
189, 194. In Avett v. State, 325 Ark. 320, 322, 928 S.W.2d 326, 327 (1996), the supreme
court found that being a passenger in a stolen vehicle is not, standing alone, enough to
establish constructive possession. However, a conviction for theft by receiving based on other
4 corroborative evidence of guilt will be upheld. See Riddle v. State, 303 Ark. 42, 44, 791 S.W.2d
708, 709 (1990) (affirming because of the appellant’s presence in the stolen vehicle along
with the additional incriminating factors of his flight from the police and his violent attempt
to avoid capture).
In this case, the theory of accomplice liability was implicated. One is an accomplice
if he renders the requisite aid or encouragement to the principal with regard to the offense
at issue. Henson v. State, 94 Ark. App. 163, 168, 227 S.W.3d 450, 453–54 (2006). When two
people assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally
liable for the conduct of both. Id. One cannot disclaim accomplice liability simply because
he did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Id.
Here, the State provided sufficient evidence to prove that MC was an accomplice with
Chastain in the crime of theft by receiving. Evidence established that MC rode in the stolen
vehicle without permission to travel from Stuttgart to Pine Bluff and then, within hours of
its being stolen, used it to sleep inside it in a business parking lot in the middle of the day
until awakened and arrested. Notably, both MC and the vehicle originated in Stuttgart and
were found together in Pine Bluff along with Chastain. Additionally, the stolen vehicle was
found with him in it a few hours later tending to corroborate that MC knew or should have
known the property was stolen. See Benton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 71, 388 S.W.3d 488
(possession of recently stolen property gives rise to the presumption that appellant knew the
property was stolen).
5 In accordance with Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-36-106(c)(1), MC was
required to plausibly explain how this all amounts to something other than proof of his theft
by receiving. Because MC failed to offer any plausible explanation (or any explanation at all)
for his possession and use of the stolen vehicle without permission or being an accomplice
to someone who did, there is sufficient evidence to support the delinquency adjudication
for theft by receiving.
Thus, having reviewed the record and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, we conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding—without resorting to
speculation of conjecture—that MC had constructive possession of the vehicle.
Affirmed.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and ABRAMSON, J., agree.
The Law Office of Geoffrey D. Kearney, PLLC, by: Geoffrey D. Kearney, for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: David L. Eanes, Jr., Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.